

EAST EUROPE

A Monthly Review of East European Affairs

**Survey of an Unfinished Peace —
THE SOVIET BLOC AND WEST GERMANY**

**Czechoslovak Literature Discovers the Automobile —
THE PATHETIC CHARIOTS**

**Notes and Reviews by Bertram Wolfe, Gregory Grossman,
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Good Soldier Schweik

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THE MONTH IN REVIEW

PLOTTERS

ALBANIA CONTINUED its pursuit of the Stalinist past with the first full-strength political show trial since the barrage of exhibitions that ate its way across Communist Europe in the bad years of 1949-54. The defendants in this trial are accused of being guilty of the anti-regime plot which Party boss Enver Hoxha confided to the world at the recent Albanian Party Congress: their accomplices are said to be Yugoslavia, Greece, NATO and the United States.

The leading defendant was Teme Sejko, the former commander-in-chief of the Albanian navy; his associates included a major-general, two other officers and six civilians. Their plan was allegedly to infiltrate armed bands from Yugoslavia, Greece, Yugoslavia, and the U. S. Sixth Fleet would blockade the country, the regime would be overthrown and a new government established headed by one Major-General Panajot Plaku, a former Central Committee member who fled to Yugoslavia in 1957.

So far, so good; the tradition of such show trials is followed unimpeachably. The defendants are reported to be open and sweeping in their protestations of guilt. One was reported to have said (there are no Western correspondents present at the trial), "My activities against the Albanian People's Republic as a member of this hostile organization date back to October 1951, when I was recruited by Teme Sejko into the service of Greek espionage."

There were, however, suggestions of something quite out of the ordinary: repeated hints that Moscow was aware of the "plot." Stress was laid on the frequent long visits paid by Admiral Sejko to Moscow during the period he was supposed to be weaving his subversive schemes. Perhaps these hints were meant as a warning to the Kremlin not to try to interfere in the Albanian purge. It is possible, however, that they pre-figure more overt sallies against Moscow. In consonance with this possibility, there have been recent reports that the Albanian government officials previously seized as Soviet agents have now been executed.

There is, of course, no hope of evaluating what is fact and what is fantasy in the farrago of charges. It seems plain, however, that the essential crime was not participation in an international conspiracy focused on Albania, but a movement within the Albanian regime to remove or lighten the repressive rule of Enver Hoxha. One sentence of the indictment is particularly significant in this regard: it says that in 1956 (the year of the Twentieth Congress and the Hungarian Revolt) "the defendants engaged in extensive propaganda activities, trying to create ideological confusion among the Party rank and file and thus to achieve the assumption of power through the elimination of the leadership of the Party"



THE CHINESE HAND

IT HAS LONG been obvious, of course, that the Albanians feel that Communist China is supporting them in their defiance of Moscow with ideological approval. A recent announcement, however, indicated how far beyond ideology China is willing to go to maintain its bridgehead among the Parties of Eastern Europe. China has granted Albania an enormous credit of 500 million rubles—valued at 125 million dollars—for the purchase of industrial equipment during the years 1961-1965. This is by far and away the largest amount any country, including the Soviet Union, has advanced Albania in recent years. It is especially dramatic in that it comes at a time when China is suffering the most profound and agonizing economic difficulties.

INDIFFERENCE

AT THE OTHER end of the Satellite spectrum, the Polish regime has released some revealing figures on Party membership. That the total membership is still well below what it was in 1948, when the united Party was formed, is no surprise, nor is it particularly distressing to the leadership; they have been insistent that what is needed is not quantity so much as quality—those minimal degrees of honesty and competence which have so often been lacking. Nor is the decidedly low percentage of farmers any surprise; Polish agriculture under Gomulka is by and large going its own prosperous independent way. Nor, again, is there anything new in the high proportion of white-collar workers and “technical intelligentsia”; it is just this segment of society, entirely employed by the government or government-owned enterprises, that has most to gain from Party membership—in Poland and everywhere else in the bloc.

What is striking and indicative is the figure for membership among university students. Of a total of 160,000 students, a minuscule 2,529 were Party members at the end of 1960. This is 1.6 percent; it is well less than half the proportion of total membership to total population. It is a demonstration—as, of course, the Hungarian Revolt was a dramatic and bloody demonstration—of the signal failure of the Party to capture the imagination and the allegiance of the best of its youth. University youth in Poland, if they reflect any class differentiation at all, derive predominantly from the workers and peasants. University education in Poland is free. Yet, overwhelmingly, university youth reject that Party which is the self-proclaimed champion of their class, which is, in truth, largely responsible for their university opportunity. There could be no clearer definition of the profound difficulties faced by Communism in Eastern Europe.

DEATH

THE RECENT regressive Soviet decree widening the death penalty to include certain “economic crimes” such as “embezzlement of State or public property on a particularly large scale” reflects a concern common to the bloc. In the last few years there has been a sprinkling of death penalties for such crimes, particularly in Bulgaria, and enormous floods of exhortation and threat. At the moment, Czechoslovakia seems to be going through the most intense campaign; although Czechoslovakia is the Satellite which has proclaimed itself closest to a “mature Socialist society,” and although agricultural collectivization is largely an accomplished fact, Czechoslovak farmers are apparently subverting regime plans on a considerable scale. Meat, milk and milk products seem to be the favored fields of illegal private endeavor; peasants surrender these to State purchasing organs in amounts far less than demanded, and the difference finds its way into the hands of “speculators.” The regime is making an enormous fuss about this, with no discernible effect. Once again it is being brought home to the hierarchs of Eastern Europe that the gap between the rhetoric of “Socialist maturity” and cold reality is a painful one.

The Soviet Bloc and West Germany



The course of US-West German relations from 1945 to 1948 to 1960, as seen by the weekly *Ludas Matyi* (Budapest), December 15, 1960.

Survey of an Unfinished Peace

THE RELATIONS between Eastern Europe and Germany, once so pivotal a factor in European politics, are today little more than a mirror, at most a function, of Soviet relations with the Western powers, particularly the United States. No nation in Soviet-dominated Eastern Europe has an independent policy on West Germany, though some have particular interests vis-a-vis their former neighbor.

Formal relations hinge on the question of the division of Germany and the Bonn policy—the so-called Hallstein Doctrine—of maintaining no diplomatic ties with States which recognize the Communist East German government. The notable exception is the Soviet Union, with ambassadors at both Bonn and Pankow. But no East European government at present has diplomatic relations with West Germany. Some have professed readiness to “normalize” these relations,* on terms, however, which so far have rendered such offers safely unacceptable.

The formal relations of the Eastern European countries

with East Germany are entirely conventional. As one of the most thoroughly controlled, exemplary pseudo-States in the Soviet orbit, East Germany is, in a sense, scarcely regarded as “Germany” at all by the other members of the bloc. Curiously, Soviet bloc propaganda implicitly accredits West Germany in treating it as the successor of the historic German State and thus the legatee of its past iniquities.

Between West Germany on the one hand and Poland and Czechoslovakia on the other move the unlaid ghosts

man politicians [wish to hold off], well, there is no hurry—we will wait.” (TRYBUNA LUDU [Warsaw], January 15, 1957.) Polish Foreign Minister Adam Rapacki said at the end of 1957: “Relations with Germany have always been and still are a prime factor in Poland’s history and politics. We maintain the best relations with East Germany. We would like to establish with the whole German nation relations based on the principles of mutual security, cooperation and good neighbor policies.” (ZBIOR DOKUMENTOW [Warsaw], No. 12, 1957.)

In 1956, the Czechoslovak regime leaders—Zapotocky, Siroky, Foreign Minister David—avowed on many occasions their desire to establish “normal” relations with West Germany, including the signing of a non-aggression pact, which, the Czechoslovaks complained, was rejected by West German intransigence. (RUDE PRAVO [Prague], January 2; July 31, 1956; MLADA FRONTA [Prague], March 3, 1956.)

* Thus, Gomulka in 1957: “As adherents of realistic and constructive policies, we have expressed readiness to regularize our relations with the German Federal Republic. If certain West Ger-

of past conflicts, claims and injuries, particularly of course the Nazi record during World War II. Many of these disputes, however, are only tangentially related to the basic conflict of character between the present West German-East European regimes.

But that these frictions, over territories, minorities, et al., are nurtured and stimulated by the Communists to serve both domestic and external goals is apparent. Even considering the history of the last thirty years, the hostility expressed toward West Germany in the Soviet bloc press springs from something deeper and broader than any putative threat from the Bonn Republic itself. Fear and mistrust of West German intentions are fanned by the Communist regimes in order to justify and fasten their grip on the East European people. Militant "revanchism" (revenge-seeking) among the Germans expelled from Eastern Europe in the postwar settlement, and who want to return, is represented in Soviet bloc propaganda as the dominant force in West German politics. Although NATO is a defense alliance directed specifically against the Soviet Union, it is made to seem a direct threat to Eastern Europe because of West German participation in it. The rearming of West Germany under NATO "jeopardizes the territorial integrity" of Poland and Czechoslovakia as well as the general peace in Europe.

German participation in NATO, says the East European press, is motivated above all by its old imperial designs on the east, the notorious *Drang nach Osten*. Communist statements invariably refer to a resurgence of Nazism in West Germany—not as a revival indeed, but a continuum: Nazism never died in West Germany. Adenauer, himself a crypto-Nazi, has staffed his entire government with Nazis and former Hitler Generals, and Bonn's goals are indistinguishable from Hitler's: the expansion of German power, at any price. Reassurances from Bonn are dismissed as bluff in the Hitler manner: "The governments of Western nations were satisfied with Hitler's avowals of his peaceful intentions, and he produced them on every possible occasion—as does Adenauer today."¹

Conjuring up the spectre of West German militarism stirs not only fear for their territorial integrity but of war itself among the East European people. This is especially so in Poland, of course, which still looks back to the horror of the Nazi conquest and occupation. That this still haunts the Polish imagination can be seen in the constant recurrence of the theme in Polish plays, novels, films. Anti-war and anti-Nazi themes are of course prescribed "Socialist realist" subjects in all Communist art; in the Polish work, however, they have an intensity and reality that goes beyond the stereotypes. (Poland's anti-war bent is expressed also on the official level, in the Rapacki Plan which in 1957 called for an "atom-free" zone in central Europe, covering Poland, Czechoslovakia, East and West Germany; and its consistent backing of the Soviet "peace" line against the Chinese theories of the inevitability of war.)

To such sentiment West Germany is presented as stubbornly "holding out" against—indeed, sabotaging—otherwise wholehearted Western acceptance of the Soviet formula of peaceful coexistence. (E.g., Radio Sofia, April 10, 1959.) A characteristic theme was in a Bulgarian radio pro-



A Romanian cartoon showing West German General Heusinger climbing to his high NATO post over British and French commanders.

Romania Libera (Bucharest), April 1, 1961

gram "Night Radio Journal" in which the commentator compared Adenauer to Goethe's Faust, with the difference that the price demanded of Adenauer by Mephistopheles for eternal life is that the Chancellor deny any Soviet proposal, no matter what it is. Adenauer agrees, and for love of life is forced to deny the peaceful disarmament proposals of the Soviet Union, "because he does not want to vex the Devil."²

If history and geopolitics stand between West Germany and Eastern Europe, they also draw them together. Bulgaria and Romania, at the farthest remove from West Germany, have the most attenuated contacts with it on all levels. With Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, there are many-stranded ties: links between families, accessibility to each other's press and radio, and vital economic interdependence. West German capital goods are in great demand for the Soviet bloc's industrialization program, while West Germany traditionally looks to Eastern Europe for agricultural goods and industrial raw materials. The old pattern of trade is beginning to change, but trade itself is of great importance to both sides.

Poland

THE STATUS OF the Polish-German border and the Polish Western Territories* is of course the outstanding

* Upper and Lower Silesia and portions of former Pomerania and East Prussia, comprising an area of 39,400 square miles. Cession to Poland of this territory under the Potsdam Agreement was at least partly compensation for territory in the Polish east taken by the Soviet Union under the Yalta Agreement (an area amounting to 47 percent of the prewar territory of Poland). Many Poles displaced from this area are resettled in the Western Territories.

issue between Poland and West Germany and the constant abrasive in their relations. The disputed territories have changed hands so many times over past centuries that they have accumulated a staggering burden of "historical claims" against them. The present controversy, however, dates from the Potsdam Agreement (1945) which fixed Poland's western frontier at the Oder-Neisse line pending conclusion of a peace treaty with Germany. The German population east of this line was forcibly returned to Germany. The Polish government's position is that, after fifteen years of Polish resettlement and development of the area, Poland's hegemony in the area must be recognized not only as right but accomplished fact; this is also, apparently, the view of all Poles whatever their attitude toward their government. The West German government, and the other Western powers, have never formally acknowledged the permanence of the Oder-Neisse line;* the Soviet Union and its satellites, on the other hand, have recognized and "guaranteed" it.** West Germany officially regards the issue as still open, a view which alarms and infuriates the Poles.

Spokesmen of the Polish Communist regime maintain that the Bonn government, and indeed all of West Germany, quite independent of political party, are bent on "revising" the Oder-Neisse border and repossessing the Western Territories. To this end, the Poles say, West Germany has built up a vast government-supported research and propaganda apparatus to keep up interest in and justify claims against Poland. Some 60 institutes and 26 university chairs put out a "flood" of anti-Polish documents and books which are backed up by "a realistic force: the Bundeswehr, equipped with rocket missiles."³ Poland admittedly has a counterpart force in research and propaganda: in 1960 some 35 institutes, societies and publishers produced over 200 items on the subject of the Western territories and Polish-West German relations, according to *Polityka* (Warsaw), December 31, 1960.

The Polish press is tireless in warning against and denouncing the schemes which it attributes to German "revisionists." The Wroclaw paper *Wroclawski Tygodnik Katolikow* on December 11, 1960, published a report on "a new tactical conception" on the rise in West Germany, whose adherents "do not believe in the permanence of national borders" but champion the idea of a Central European Community. Commented the Wroclaw paper darkly: "It is plain enough. If a frontier cannot be moved, it must be removed. Then it can be established again. But this time in a different place."

The Polish Communist regime takes the stand that the Oder-Neisse line is not a subject for discussion with West Germany or any other power; it can be challenged only at the risk of war. "There is no boundary problem, only a

* Informal "acknowledgement" of this border by French President de Gaulle and (according to Gomulka in an election speech in Poznan on April 9) by alleged spokesmen for the Kennedy administration is of course eagerly seized upon by the Polish government; but there has been no official act of recognition by any Western State.

** Including East Germany which, of course, is the actual site of the disputed line. Unlike Berlin, however, the Oder-Neisse line is not a proclaimed "concern" of the Ulbricht regime.

peace problem" was one of the slogans used in the recent Communist election campaign in Poland.

The German issue was frequently invoked in election propaganda: for example, in reply to a reader's question as to why everyone should vote in the elections ("after all, the elections will be valid no matter whether 80 or 90 percent or more go to the polls"), the Warsaw paper *Sztandar Młodych*, April 11, 1961, gave among other reasons, the necessity for confounding the West Germans:

"Our friends are pleased and our enemies are worried and angry if the entire community participates consciously in the act of voting. Do you think German revanchists—those who are still reaching out for our Western Territories—would be pleased if the Polish people were at odds among themselves? Of course they would, but we think that they will be worried when it turns out that our community is united and that the National Unity Front program enjoys the support of an overwhelming majority of our people. That is why it is important that the poll should be massive—the highest possible—and that is why your vote, too, is important."

The German threat is clearly one of the most effective levers of Soviet power over Poland: this is the one area where the Soviets are able to turn Polish nationalism

EICHMANN TRIAL FALLS SHORT

In reporting the Eichmann trial, the East European Communist press has used it above all as an opportunity for pushing the charge that there are still numerous Nazi war criminals not only at large in West Germany but occupying influential positions there; the Israeli court is accused of deliberately suppressing its own knowledge of them. Typical was a commentary by Jigala Arci, Tel Aviv correspondent for the Prague paper *Prace*:

"The main question in Eichmann's trial today is the question of his accomplices. It is not only that [some of them] are still alive and have never been brought to justice; many of them today hold high government positions [in West Germany], and are ministers, judges and West German Army commanders. That is why the trial must be carried out against Eichmann without naming his former associates.

"In his opening speech, the prosecuting attorney tried in every way to name only those [collaborators] of Eichmann who were dead, but despite all attempts he was forced to recall the names of some living persons. . . . Of course, the most important people have not yet been named. It cost the prosecution no little effort to keep the name of Adenauer's State Secretary out of the testimony on racial laws, of which Globke was one of the authors. According to reliable sources, Globke may come to Jerusalem personally to save whatever he can by his own testimony, since it is almost impossible to omit his name. In spite of all efforts, the crimes of former Nazi leaders now occupying important posts in the Bonn state will have to come to the surface."

(CTK [Prague], May 4, 1961.)

(otherwise a constant tripwire) to their own account; it is virtually the sense of what the Poles refer to as "the Polish *raison d'état*," by which they mean the necessity for Poland to remain a member of good standing in the Soviet bloc, with all the duties that entails, rather than unrealistically pursuing independence. The Soviet Union heavily underscores its role as protector and only effective guardian of Poland's western border; and the Poles, whatever their views and feelings about Communism, accept this.

Thus, following a speech by Adenauer in August 1959 in which the German Chancellor deplored Poland's victimization by the Nazis, Premier Cyrankiewicz replied in a speech in Warsaw with jeers at "the several well-measured crocodile tears shed by Adenauer over Poland's fate," accused him of trying to drive a wedge between Poland and the Soviet Union, and concluded: "Whoever wants to see differences arise between Poland and the Soviet Union clearly wants the former to be weak and defenseless, as it was in September 1939; and, in reality, would like to rekindle war in Europe. . . . A wasted effort, Mr. Chancellor!"

The Beitz Mission

Early in December 1960, Berthold Beitz, general manager of West Germany's vast and powerful Krupp industrial enterprise, went to Poland as the first officially invited guest of the Polish government from West Germany since the war. It was widely assumed that he had an unofficial mission from the Bonn government to take soundings on possibilities for substantial improvement of Polish-West German relations. Beitz' recommendations upon his return to Bonn, as reported in the Western press, were for estab-

lishing reciprocal trade missions with consular powers which could serve as the framework for the gradual evolution of more formal diplomatic relations. Beitz returned to Warsaw and conferred privately with Polish officials for two days late in January. Following this, the West German government suggested that Bonn and Warsaw establish informal contact through their envoys in a neutral third capital.

During this period of tentative probing, both sides accused the other of deliberate obscurity and, if not bad, at least questionable good faith. On January 10, Adenauer (after the first Beitz report) called improvement of relations with Poland wholly desirable: "but first we must know what we want and what Poland wants." Polish leader Gomulka, during the VII plenary meeting of the Central Committee in Warsaw (January 20-22, 1961) complained that Adenauer's proposals for a Polish-West German rapprochement were "cloudy."

On February 5, the Party organ *Trybuna Ludu* (Warsaw) made the first press comment, and, in fact, the first official Polish acknowledgement of Beitz' mission—only to dismiss it. The paper claimed that West Germany had so far made no concrete propositions on normalization of relations with Poland.

Trybuna Ludu rejected the principle of gradual "normalization" and called for the establishment of full diplomatic relations: "We cannot agree that [normalization] can be accomplished through 'half way' measures such as the establishment of trade missions." Full diplomatic relations with the West German government are, as before, contingent on recognition of the Oder-Neisse line, the paper added.



The Soviet bloc press has been sarcastic on the stationing of German NATO troops in France. "This Eiffel Tower is a good launching pad."

László Matyi (Budapest), November 3, 1960

Contact between diplomatic representatives of the two countries was reportedly established in Paris, but talks quickly reached an impasse over the border question. Meantime Bonn and Warsaw began trade talks, with the prospects for a mutually advantageous agreement considerably brighter than in the political field. To all other initiatives and assurances from Bonn, the Gomulka regime maintains an aloof and skeptical attitude ("The recent series of Bonn manoeuvres is calculated to prove to the new administration in Washington that Adenauer is not the Last Mohican of the Cold War," was the February 5 *Trybuna Ludu* appraisal.) Poland has no "special problem" with West Germany (since the border cannot be considered problematical); West Germany is "everybody's" problem: "We reject attempts to isolate the question of relations between Poland and the German Federal Republic," said *Trybuna Ludu*, March 23, 1961. "Adenauer's suggestions for a non-aggression pact between Poland and the GFR, in answer to proposals for an all central Europe non-aggression pact, are aimed precisely at that. . . ."

Czechoslovakia

THE FOCUS of old strife between Germany and Czechoslovakia is the Sudetenland and the former Sudeten Germans: the infamous issue which Hitler used to "justify" the first of his aggressions against the neighboring countries of the Third Reich. The Sudetenland was returned to Czechoslovakia and under the Potsdam Agreement, the expulsion of its German population was stipulated. The "transfer" was carried out rapidly, giving rise to resentment and animosity which lingers on. Between one and two million Sudeten German refugees live in West Germany, where, like the Polish expellees, they have their own political organizations whose leaders still call for their return to their former homes. The Bonn government, however, lays no claim on the Sudetenland. Nevertheless, Soviet bloc propaganda repeatedly charges that "Czechoslovak areas are being demanded by Bonn. . . . The uncurbed West German revanchists are threatening to restore the frontiers of Hitler's Reich." (Anton Yugov, chairman of the Bulgarian Council of Ministers, on the East Berlin radio, May 10, 1959.)

The yearly rallies of the Sudeten Germans in West Germany automatically set off a barrage of indignant protests from Prague. In 1960, the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs formally protested to Bonn against the "revanchist provocations" in West Germany which are "official policy of the Bonn government." This attack was occasioned by the Sudeten German Congress in Munich in June 1960, at which, Prague declared, maps were displayed which showed the Sudetenland as "territory seized by the Czechs."⁴

As part of the anti-German campaign, aimed particularly at the Sudeten German organizations, the Prague regime held a massive "press conference" for foreign and local journalists and diplomats in February 1961. At the conference were exhibited some 32 documents, containing Nazi plans to exterminate the Czechs and repopulate the country with ethnic Germans, which the regime claimed



A Czechoslovak cartoon on the alleged Nazi influence in NATO.

Rohac (Bratislava), March 24, 1961

to have recently unearthed in the former offices of the Sudeten German Party, which functioned as a Nazi arm inside Czechoslovakia before the war. These are also being printed in pamphlet form under the title "A Lesson from History," for distribution internally and abroad.

Another "provocation" charged to the Bonn government is the issuing of German Federal Republic citizenship papers to members of the handful of ethnic Germans still living in Czechoslovakia. In a note on December 29, 1960, the Czechoslovak government complained that this action was being carried out under the dubious legal cover of a regulation originally passed by the Nazi occupation regime. Bonn claims that the papers are being issued upon request to those Germans who for various reasons, mostly in order to join their families, wish to emigrate from Czechoslovakia. According to the Munich newspaper *Süddeutsche Zeitung*, January 24, 1961, more than 51,000—almost one third—of the Czechoslovak citizens of German nationality have desired to expedite their emigration to West Germany.

Revanchism: Hungary

COMMUNIST conjuring of a "revanchist" issue otherwise not highly explosive is seen in the case of Hungary. Hungary and West Germany have no unsettled claims dat-

POLISH MISTRUST OF THE GERMAN FEDERAL REPUBLIC

Edmund Osmanczyk in *Przeglad Kulturalny*
(Warsaw), February 9, 1961

"Poland belongs to those countries of the world where public opinion is informed about everything that is happening in the world quickly, extensively and truthfully. The Polish public, being able to inform itself through foreign newspapers also, is able to check on whether certain foreign sensations are, on the rare occasions when this occurs, omitted for good reasons from its own press and radio. Such a thing happened in January this year . . . namely, that for nearly two weeks Bonn was spreading the sensational news that the GFR had changed its attitude towards People's Poland; meanwhile our press and radio kept a dead silence, seeing nothing really essential or newsworthy in the confused communiquees and contradictory statements. Poles who read about it in the foreign press or heard it in foreign broadcasts were also, as I was able to note, skeptical and were not surprised that our organs of information, interested in remaining truthful, kept silent on Bonn. . . .

"What is the source of Polish distrust of the German Federal Republic? Resentments carried over from the Third Reich? No! Modern Poles are not guided by resentments, something which guests from the GFR have had opportunity enough to note. Our distrust was created by Germans in the years 1949-1960 through the not entirely accidental fact that neither the GFR government nor the legal opposition worked out any kind of peaceful program for GFR Eastern policy during those long years; rather, both government and opposition parties to this day compete with each other in their old imperialist cold war program. . . . The phenomenon is without precedent in the history of Germany, showing the total degeneration of political thought in West German bourgeois parties, including not only the Christian Democratic Union and FDP [Free Democratic Party], but unfortunately also the SPD [Social Democratic Party]. I should go so far as to say that as long as the real need for a peaceful Eastern policy does not appear in the governing circles of GFR, there is no hope of distrust fading away, and I do not mean in Poland only."

ing from the war regarding either nationals or territory. Nevertheless, the Hungarian Communist press mentions with regular frequency a West German organization called Ost-Burgenland Action whose alleged aim is to replace the Hungarians and Croatians in the Burgenland (Austria, formerly part of Hungary) with Swabians from West Germany. "By concentrating the Swabians along the Hungarian border they aim to stir up trouble in Hungary and to establish a base from which an attack could be launched." (*Hetofi Hírek* [Budapest], Feb. 8, 1960.) Other reports claim that Hitler's *Süd Sachsen* Plan is being revived, and that this would mean that German-populated sections of

Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia would be made "a colony of the German Reich."

Economic Relations

THE CONTRADICTORY nature of Soviet bloc-West German relations is seen in the fact that West Germany, the target of some of the Soviet bloc's most malignant propaganda, is also its leading trade partner in the non-Communist West.*

Eastern Europe imports iron and steel products, industrial machinery and chemicals from West Germany, and sells it mainly raw material and agricultural goods. West Germany is Bulgaria's and Romania's largest single market in the West for their fruit and grain. (Grain, once also a leading export of Hungary and Poland, now has to be imported by these countries.) West Germany and Czechoslovakia trade extensively with each other but are also now competitors in third markets, notably in Asia and Africa, where both countries are major suppliers of factory equipment and machinery. (West German products are generally held to be superior in quality, but Czechoslovakia in many instances offers lower prices and more favorable terms.) In 1959, Czechoslovak exports to West Germany—mainly coal and coke, minerals, metals, chemical products, dyes and varnishes—had a value of 439 million *koruny*; imports from West Germany (machine tools, electrical equipment, metals, laboratory and medical equipment, chemical products, in part) were worth 417 million *koruny*, giving Czechoslovakia a favorable trade balance.

Trade between West Germany and Eastern Europe is regulated by bilateral agreements on a year-to-year basis. Trade volume, which dropped to near-vanishing point during the Stalin era, has grown rapidly since 1953 and taken a sharp upward turn in the past two years. The 1960 Hungarian-West German trade agreement, for example, called for a 35 percent volume increase over 1959. (It was not in fact met by Hungary because of the agricultural shortages brought on by Kadar's rapid collectivization program.)

About 30 percent of Hungary's exports to West Germany are industrial raw materials, mainly minerals; the remainder are mainly agricultural products. The chief import from West Germany is machinery. Under the 1960 trade pact, a West German company began construction in Hungary of a 2 million dollar polyvinyl chloride plant to begin operating in 1962. West Germany also plays an increasing role in equipping the Hungarian metal industry.

The 1960 agreement with Bulgaria called for an exchange to the value of 142 million DM for each partner; the Romanian agreement for a total exchange worth 196 million DM. Tobacco is Bulgaria's chief export to West Germany; petroleum and timber are Romania's.

Between Poland and West Germany the trade volume has increased from an import-export value of some 25 mil-

* West Germany does about one third of the West's total trade with the Communist bloc countries. However, West Germany's share of the total foreign trade of the Communist bloc is only a small percentage. COMECON, the Soviet bloc's "common market" organization, stipulates that more than 75 percent of the members' foreign trade be with each other.



Soviet bloc comment on the Eichmann trial charges that Eichmann has been "gagged" on the subject of his still extant "accomplices" in West Germany. Cartoon from *Tvorba* (Prague), February 23, 1961.

lion dollars in 1949 to over 170 million in 1960. Poland traditionally sends West Germany coal, cotton and wool fabric, and foodstuffs (meat, eggs). The demand for coal, however, has fallen off* and Poland is trying to export more and generically different products: chemicals, construction materials, lumber and industrial goods. Poland imports from West Germany specialized machinery, non-ferrous metals, steel, chemicals, laminated products, etc.⁵

While West German-Soviet bloc trade practice and policy seems to have no organic connection to political policy and even to run counter to it, it is via the trade channels that West Germany recently attempted to find a route to political and diplomatic relations with Poland, without a head-on confrontation of the Oder-Neisse issue. The only official contacts between Poland and West Germany have been the year-to-year trade agreements; the exchange of trade missions and negotiation of a long-term trade agreement were suggested as the embryonic forms from which diplomatic relations could develop. The Polish regime, however, while not rejecting the principle of expanding trade with West Germany, has spurned this as a method of developing diplomatic contacts.

Cultural Contacts

Cultural exchange and cooperation between Eastern Europe and West Germany is unsystematic. No formal comprehensive agreements on it have been signed. But there is considerable exchange in some fields.

Poland and Czechoslovakia both have press exchange arrangements with West Germany. Leading West German newspapers such as *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* and *Die Welt* (Hamburg) have permanent correspondents in Warsaw, while their Polish counterparts are accredited in Bonn and West Berlin. In 1957, the West German news agency DPA concluded "an agreement in principle" with the official Czechoslovak press bureau Ceteka for an ex-

* A coal glut in Western Europe in 1958 caused a crisis in the West German coal industry as a result of which the Bonn government cut imports and levied a duty on them. World prices have also declined for meat and egg exports.

change of news material and stories.⁶ Czechoslovak Foreign Minister David, in an interview with three West German journalists in July 1957, said that his government was in favor of exchange of newspapers, books, films and radio programs, "provided, of course, that they are imbued with a humanistic spirit and do not serve to spread ideas of hatred between nations, of chauvinism, racism, etc."

In television, East Germany converted its entire system to conform to that of West Germany in 1957. This makes it technically possible to connect Eastern Europe to Eurovision (the West European international network.) In some parts of Eastern Europe, West German and Austrian telecasts can easily be picked up now. In western Hungary, for example, television sets can receive Vienna, which often broadcasts West German programs, but cannot pick up the program of the Budapest station. A West German television drama on the Hungarian Revolt transmitted over the Vienna station last year provoked vociferous protest in the Hungarian Communist press against West German "television propaganda."⁷

West German movies—carefully selected and edited—are shown in Eastern Europe. A venture in joint film production by Poland and West Germany in 1957 came a cropper: this was the movie version of the celebrated Polish novel "The Eighth Day of the Week," which was filmed in West Germany with the assistance of the author, Marek Hlasko. Hlasko subsequently declining to return to Poland (he went from West Germany to Israel), the Polish government dis-



A satirical Polish comment on Adenauer's audience with the Pope. PAP Weekly Review (Warsaw), February 1960

avowed the film and refused to distribute it either abroad or in Poland. The film was, however, shown in West Germany and other countries in which West Germany had the distribution rights.

Private travel between West Germany and the East European countries consists primarily of tourists visiting families and relatives. Poland had over 10,000 tourists from West Germany in 1959, a fourth of the total number of tourists to Poland from the West.* West German tourists to Hungary increased from 1,500 in 1956 to over 7,000 in 1959.

The Czechoslovak regime has made much of alleged subversion of its tourists visiting West Germany for use in its anti-German propaganda campaign, charging that "NATO spies" in West Germany were approaching Czechoslovak citizens with nefarious schemes and offers. The January 25, 1959 issue of *Rude Pravo* (among others) cited a number

of such cases in detail, describing the activities of "West German revanchist" and espionage organizations against Czechoslovak citizens who visit the GFR. They try to extract and wheedle out of them such information which would make it possible for the revanchists in West Germany to move closer to their goals, one of which is the revision of the frontiers with Czechoslovakia." (Clearly part of the objective of this propaganda was to keep Czechoslovak tourists aloof and suspicious while out of their own country.)

In the summer of 1960, the Prague government handed a protest to Bonn accusing the Bonn government of "failing to take necessary measures to prevent" some 19 cases of border violations by West German citizens. These were evidently inadvertent acts by tourists and there were no espionage charges, arrests or trials.⁸

SOURCES FOR THIS ARTICLE

- ¹ *PRAWO I ZYCIE* (Warsaw), November 27, 1960
- ² *RADIO SOFIA*, January 18, 1960
- ³ *PAP WEEKLY BULLETIN* (Warsaw), January 13, 1961
- ⁴ *RUDE PRAVO* (Prague), June 23, 1960
- ⁵ *TRYBUNA LUDU* (Warsaw), April 14, 1960
- ⁶ *MLADA FRONTA* (Prague), March 16, 1957
- ⁷ *MAGYAR NEMZET* (Budapest), April 30, 1960
- ⁸ *RUDE PRAVO* (Prague), August 5, 1960

Letters to the Editor

Soviet Technological Progress

DEAR SIR:

Your issue of February 1961 carried an extensive review of *Value and Plan*, a collection of essays on East European economics edited by me. The purpose of this communication is not to take issue with the reviewer, Professor Lynn Turgeon, over his appraisal of the book—altogether a positive and constructive appraisal, I might add. Rather, my present purpose is to suggest an alternative interpretation of developments to which Professor Turgeon refers.

In his review, Professor Turgeon brings up the point made by me in the book that the 1957 reorganization of Soviet industry may have an adverse effect on technological progress in the Soviet economy by virtue of having severed the "vertical" industry-by-industry lines of communication and having replaced them with regional economic authorities (*sov-narkhozy*). My hypothesis rested on the

great importance of constant pressure from above in bringing about technological advance in the Soviet economy, which has now been endangered by the realignment of communication in industry, and by the dispersion among many *sov-narkhozy* of such "growth-inducing" establishments as research institutes, project-making organizations (i.e., design bureaus), training institutes, construction enterprises, etc."

Professor Turgeon takes exception to this hypothesis, and points for evidence to the record of Soviet economic development since 1957. He finds it "difficult to see any slowing down in Soviet growth" since that year, "and in fact the reverse may be true." A bit further he says, "It would probably be going too far to give credit for the recent spurt [in Soviet economic growth] to the reorganization of 1957, but it certainly does not

seem to have interfered with the channels of communication responsible for growth." May I point out that the evidence is not entirely pertinent, leaving aside the question whether there has in fact been a spurt in Soviet economic growth? Professor Turgeon is speaking of growth, the end result of many factors. I was speaking of the pressure from above for technological progress, which is only one of the factors.

On the contrary, it seems to me that the Soviet regime has, since the 1957 reorganization, been showing unusually strong concern for the adequacy and effectiveness of the "channels of communication responsible for growth." This is demonstrated by such facts as (1) the creation at the very time of the 1957 reform of special State Committees for those industries in which the regime was specially interested (aviation, chemicals,

defense goods, electronics, shipbuilding), followed in the spring of 1959 by the establishment of a State Committee on Automation and Machine Building; (2) the holding of two special Central Committee Plenums on the subject of technological progress (in June 1959 and July 1960); (3) the stress on the topic at other high-level meetings—Central Committee Plenums, the 21st Party Congress, sessions of the Supreme Soviet, etc.—; (4) the creation, mostly in 1959, of a vast number of local committees—Party and extra-Party—to spur management to technological advance; and, most recently, (5) the formation of a State Committee for Coordination of Scientific Research, one of whose chief functions is reported to be the "supervision of the quickest possible introduction into the economy of the newest scientific and technological discoveries."

It is perhaps not too far-fetched to suppose that all these urgent, not to say frantic, measures are somehow connected with the problem of channels of communication in the above sense, and that the 1957 reorganization may in some measure be related to this problem. This, of course, is not to say that those channels were fully adequate and effective even before the 1957 reform (they certainly were not), nor that we should have expected an immediate and appreciable decline in Soviet economic growth on this account.

GREGORY GROSSMAN
Associate Professor of Economics,
University of California

PROFESSOR TURGEON writes:

At the time when I was reviewing *Value and Plan*, I was also engaged in the exhumation of the Soviet 6th Five Year Plan, which had been abandoned in 1957 and replaced by the current Seven Year Plan. My findings indicated that there had been a rather surprising increase in the Soviet rate of growth in both 1959 and 1960, as compared with the previous three years, with the result that the initial over-all industrial targets of the scrapped plan were very nearly met. A question naturally arose as to the factors which might have been responsible for this unexpected spurt in the rate of growth. Considering the stepped-up domestic housing construction program, the shortening of the compulsory work week in many sectors and industries, and the increased Soviet assistance to Eastern Europe as well as to the developing areas abroad—all of which should have tended to slow down the internal rate of growth—the recent fillip to Soviet industrial development appears all the more surprising.

My tentative conclusion was that the reorganization of industrial administration in 1957 may have been partly responsible for this spurt, and that rather than hindering innovation the reform may actually have facilitated it. In this connection, if we go back to the July, 1955, plenary session of the Party Central Committee, we find an exposure of serious defects in the organization of research by the former Ministries. Specifically, certain Ministries were accused of

failing to introduce completed research into production. At that time, it was claimed that one obstacle to the rapid introduction of research projects into production was the fact that many of the scientific institutes were physically isolated from their industrial bases as a result of their location near the former Ministries in Moscow. It is perhaps of some significance that one of the specific objectives of the reorganization—one which was mentioned at the February, 1957, plenary session—was the improvement of the geographical distribution of the scientific institutes.

In general, it seems to me that Western observers of the Soviet scene are inclined to exaggerate the relative importance of constant pressure from above in bringing about technical advance, perhaps because our own technological progress is almost exclusively a function of management. In the Soviet-type economies, it seems more likely that "grass roots" or rank-and-file initiative—aided and abetted by the trade unions—may be at least as important as a source of technical progress.

Professor Grossman has certainly collected some impressive evidence of Soviet concern for technical progress in recent years. But would not this concern also be just as explainable in terms of the growing labor shortage, and the resulting need to increase labor productivity, as it would be by any frantic attempt to restore the "vertical" channels of communication?

Hofstra College, N. Y.

NO ELIJAH IN PRAGUE

"What a historical moment! The whole world is agog. Radio receivers are on all day. And I, like everybody else, sit at my set turning the dials and listening to broadcasts from all continents. I listen to every detail. Thus, they said on Saturday morning: 'Major Yuri Alekseyevich Gagarin slept for ten hours, jumped out of bed in the morning, did his usual setting-up exercises, had breakfast, drove to the airfield, entered the elevator taking him up to the cabin of the space vessel, waved to his friends for the last time, and ascended into the universe in a cloud of fire. . . .'

"Gentlemen—straight into heaven like Elijah in a fiery chariot! But he had a return ticket, and a precise and reliable one at that. . . . I tried to imagine what it would have been like if the same attempt had been made in our country. I imagined the telephones, tele-

graph and television humming, the announcer of Radio Prague reporting on Saturday morning: 'Major Elijah slept for ten hours, jumped out of bed in the morning, did his usual exercises, ate breakfast, went to the airfield, entered the elevator—but it didn't work. The major returned. The elevator is out of order.'

"How one envies the Soviet people. They are aces indeed. And since they have all those technicians, and our relations with them are so good, couldn't somebody politely request them to send us a few of their trouble-shooters? Not for the purpose of building a space ship, but just to teach our elevator operators the meaning of responsible work. If there are ships in the Soviet Union that ascend to the universe, perhaps we could get the elevators in our country to rise at least as far as the sixth floor."

Achille Gregor in *Dikobraz* (Prague), May 5, 1961



New Felicia convertibles lined up outside the Skoda plant at Mlada Boleslav. Last year Czechoslovakia produced about 56,000 automobiles.

Czechoslovak Life (Prague), April 1959

The Pathetic Chariots

Czechoslovak Literature Discovers the Automobile

by GEORGE KARNET

THE CZECHOSLOVAK literary critics call for a "positive Socialist hero" whom, they say, Czechoslovak literature has so far been unable to create. At the same time, the critics rather uselessly discuss the problems of Socialist realism and "revolutionary romanticism." To a reader who has a chance to go through the pages of Prague publications such as *Literarni Noviny* and *Plamen*, it seems that Czechoslovak authors have successfully solved both problems and that it is the critics who have not taken any notice of it yet. He has a feeling that Czechoslovak literature has long since discovered its "positive hero" and that quite a precise adjective for Socialist realism has also been found.

Who is this "positive hero"? As reflected in the 1960 issues of *Plamen*, it is quite unmistakably the automobile, the motorcycle, the motorscooter, simply everything with wheels that can move itself.

Together with the solution of the "positive hero" problem, the exact form of Socialist realism has also emerged. Czechoslovak literature (it is the first in the "peace camp countries" to do so) has discovered a new and original type of realism which might aptly be called "motoristic realism" or "spartakistic realism."*

* "Spartak" is the name of a popular family car.

This was well defined recently by A. Klim in an epigrammatic pronouncement:

*"By the principles of motorism
I do not profess any -ism.
Let others fight for the world with verve
I just drive around with reserve."*

When you read Czech magazines you find that automobiles and motorcycles have soared to a position which they did not have even in the early period of American motoring, as reflected, for example, in Sinclair Lewis' novels. And when we compare this phenomenon with Soviet literature and works written in other "Socialist" countries we see that this motoristic realism in Czechoslovakia has developed quite independently, in a spontaneously pioneering way. The car appears not only in almost every piece of prose and many poems but is a topic even in crossword puzzles, one of which had the following "secret message":

*My girl-friend zoomed by
in my rival's sedan.*

The most important point is the role assigned to the car by Czechoslovak authors. Automobiles, motorcycles and scooters do not function merely as means of transportation; almost invariably they are given a prominent and separate

symbolic role. Writers use them to depict psychological nuances, even class and social stratification. True, poetry is more preoccupied with the romantic motorcycle. But with this picture of a motorcycle the poets manage to portray subtle moods, as does Vaclav Honse in the following verses:

*"Sunday with clouds, neighbor boy steps on motorcycle
and the village square faints with the sun"
The girls walk through with arms drowned in heat
thinking about boys, wind, tandems
highways and him: I'll take you anywhere you want . . .
The boys know, with fresh grins they step on the gas
over the handle bars' bluish Sunday flag."*

Karel Tomanek is also lyrical:

*"We live with combustion
driving laughter
stamps, exhausts and bombs
and a sob, too,
starter and a plug
and, at last, a heart."*

By these means, young Czech poets express the motoristic romanticism of today's youth whose life feeling is well depicted by Milan Schulc:

*"Merriment in the street, the gal sits in a Fiat
Thirty-five horses in the front that drive
her into a fairy tale
houses above, below, a streetcar banging
what the hell,
see how she cuts the curve, dashing swell
The gal is going, the gal is going."*

Kveta Kozevnikova's poem "I Drive" portrays the present day youth's materialistic view of love:

*"Where's the bridegroom, you ask
Where's the bride.
Why so much funny fuss
when it's only a steering wheel, a clutch?"*

Then Kozevnikova spells out the joy of emotional and amorous awakening in the verse:

*"This metal brat, the beast, that shiny shape
I firmly, firmly steer."*

All these excerpts show a rather superficial motoristic romanticism. But quite a few writers and poets use motor vehicles as far more refined literary instruments to penetrate far deeper problems. For example, Karel Siktanc in his poem "The Day Sees the Sun" sees in the car—as Lenin once saw in electrification—the means to change the face of the world and bring about a "Socialist future."

*"The drivers will pull the plastic over their eyes
to drive their thousand times cursed human misery
closest to the sea of the world . . .
After that, just hoses,
sandpaper the car
at the end of this joyous trip
away from bitterness and dirt."*

Less simple is the view of a motorized Socialist society Vaclav Jurina gives in his poem "Everybody . . ."

*"Everybody would like to own a car
He can have it
Everybody would like to have a garage for his car
He can have it
Everybody would like to have his own
road for his car . . ."*

However, Vaclav Lacina asks in his satire:

*"When in Communism all people will have
what they need, and the Lottery will still exist
and I win a car there
Who will envy me?"*

The Class War

THE SPARTAKISTIC realism of contemporary prose is clearly different from the motorized romanticism of the poets. The first striking difference is in the number of cylinders and amount of horsepower. Poets usually ride a motorcycle, while heroes of prose sit behind the steering wheels of luxurious automobiles. And if a motorcycle appears in prose, it usually has a satirical function, as in Ema Rezacova's story "The Equation Unknown," which tells about a Jawa 250 motorcycle inherited by the widow of a painter of artistic trash. Hermina Frankova ridicules a motorcycle owner quite in the style of the courtroom scandal reports: "Suddenly a red Jawa stops before me and that man says: Ain't you lonely, lady? C'mon, I'll give you a ride. Well, I never in my life took a ride with a stranger but as I'm full of pep, oooops! So I climbed aboard. There was a hum from the houses: Look at her! And he's motorized! Listen, Venco, was it 250 or 500 cubic centimeters? . . . So that's how I started going with him."

Needless to say, this woman made a mistake in giving her heart to a treacherous, unreliable motorcycle—the same way the motorcycle disappointed that widow of the painter.

A wrecked motorcycle is used by Vladimir Minac as counterpoint in his story "The Offended One." Its protagonist is an interesting type: one of the henchmen and little dictators of the Stalinist era who dutifully executed the reign of terror according to Party instructions. When the policy line changes after Stalin's death, the Party mercilessly disposes of such men. He is shipped out to teach in a tiny, lost village where he ponders bitterly on the injustice of the world of "Socialism." There he speeds into a curve and crashes—a symbol of his political fall. "It was stunning to see in this mess how the headlight jumped on the washed-out road as if in a merry defiant dance. One could hear the driver curse. The engine went silent. The driver spat and said: Dammit! A woman's voice asked: What's the matter. . . . What? We're damn stuck, that's what. I stepped forth and offered them help. The driver shrugged his shoulders: This damn thing, he cursed. Hell! They had a skid and hit a sharp rock on the side. It cut a hole in the gasoline tank. All the gas is gone, he said in anger. Can't do a thing. We're in hell of a mess. Come on, encouraged the woman. We'll push. Not an inch, said the driver defiantly. Not this lousy heap."



The car and the girl: are they popular symbols of the New Class?

Photo from Czechoslovak Foreign Trade (Prague), No. 3, 1960

The motorcycle accident symbolizes the whole story of a debased and dejected Stalinist who was "treated unjustly" although he was a "man of the regime," whom people now "laugh at" although he was "never a careerist or a parrot"; today he is "finished," "nobody even says hello" to him. He says bitterly that he would "offer his life for his convictions" but he cannot sacrifice "his honor as a Communist" and complains it is inhuman when the Party now "puts blame on him." Minac is rather at a loss over this man's fate and his wrecked motorcycle. Both belong to the past while the Party men of today have for long been enjoying their automobiles on the "ride to a joyous future."

Cars in contemporary Czechoslovak literature symbolize the class status of their owners in much the same way as the old aristocratic titles. To own a car is to belong to a new class. A sensitive author, however, is not satisfied with general characteristics, he makes a careful distinction among the social ranks of Socialist heroes according to the make of their car. A worker and Party member, who rose through innovations or moonlighting, belongs to a new class just as a successful playwright does. But there is just as much difference between the two as there is between a poor Gascon cadet and the son of a princely family. The author underlines the distinction by placing the innovator and moonlighter in a modest Wartburg while the playwright steps out of a pure-blooded Felicia:

"On Thursday the Fialas came to see us. Comrade Fiala works for a gas company. Our mom is with that gas-works, too. She just returned from work when the Fialas parked their new Wartburg in front of our house. 'Nice heap,' says dad, 'but I wouldn't want a Wartburg. You'll have a lot of trouble with the spare parts, you know, Joe.'"

With these words M. Jilek characterizes his foreman mechanic Fiala whom the entire gas company suspects of getting the Wartburg by crediting some jobs to his own account. But what a difference when compared with the playwright of Petr Karvas: "Cyprian Plintovic, talented and successful young playwright, a sympathetic athlete and a Nordic blond, turned the steering wheel sharply to the right, missed a trolley-bus by a hair, squeaked the

brakes in front of the house and parked his BMW convertible like a virtuoso."

This process of identification of various makes is so far-reaching that an author sometimes directly identifies the car and talks about the automobile instead of about the hero himself. Each vehicle determines the class status and thus also the social behavior of the owner. A scooter insists on getting back even the smallest change while Felicia pays with large bills. When Party members gather at a meeting, they may create an illusion of a classless society while together, but when going home every policeman and every gas-station attendant knows exactly the distinction between an "overtime pay" Jawa 250 and an elegant, overbearing sedan. The difference in horse power reflects the difference in social power.

Thus, it is no wonder that the car in Czechoslovak prose has an important role in the story itself and is a symbol, a meaning, almost a hero of the story. It is interesting, however, that the automobile is almost always presented in unfavorable colors and is condemned as the source of the spreading bourgeois tendencies within Communist society, of new class differences. It even creates a new class hatred which has found its way into Communist society and literature. In Jilek's short story "Automobile Troubles" from which we quoted above, the new Wartburg sets two workers' families against each other:

"Is that the only color they had?" said mom in a singing voice to the Fiala woman.

"Don't you like it?" mewed back Fiala.

"Oh, I do, but if I could I'd take a blue one," sighed mommy, looking at the sky like a saint. The Fiala woman was boiling . . . Joey Fiala toolled up in their mortgaged Wartburg like a rubber float. I pretended not to see him . . . When the Fialas used to come to play rummy with us, they were a lot of fun, but that Thursday it was hell. Dad couldn't wait till they scrammed, mom was maliciously sweet and I was mad . . . 'So they have their Wartburg,' sneered mom.

"When there's luck, even an ox calves," said dad.

But it is even worse with Fiala's comrade-workers at the gas-works. "Can you imagine," says mom, "that nut Fiala came to work in that new Wartburg? As if he didn't know better. Now it's one big scandal. Where they got the dough. First, people rushed over to him like he was some government minister. Dufek from the yard gang said the car was no good for our lousy roads, that he'd rather add a few thousand and get himself a Spartak."

"He'd first have to have the money," muttered dad.

"That's what I said but that old bag from payroll sneered and said I shouldn't worry about Mister Fiala that with his moonlighting he could get himself a six-o-three like nothin'. What moonlighting, Missis, I says. You know what she said? Missis, she says, you know nothin' what the mechanics do on the road. And Fiala is tops. He makes money on everythin'. Fiala fills out job sheets. Wages go by job sheets and the dough goes to Fiala and Co. Who would have said that, finished mom, they looked like such decent people?"

A car plays the same role in Matusikova's story "The

Sunday." The author pictures the greediness of the new class motivated by their desire to own automobiles and weekend places. What is even worse: a worker-innovator does not want a car just to be able to get around, but primarily to boast and give himself airs, to make his relatives and friends envy him: "I say to my wife: Listen, Katka, how about taking a ride to visit Martin? Katka wasn't against it and started shopping. I had to admit: Katka is right, if you go, you make it worth while, let their eyes pop out with envy. So the relatives came, neighbors asked questions, my Katka skillfully, just by the way, mentions the refrigerator, the television set. She is an intelligent woman, that's for sure. She sits there like a queen and her pea-green dress goes well with the color of her lips. Here and there she puts her hand on the table to show it is carefully well-kept.

"So we said the proper good-byes, only my brother-in-law's boy was greedily sizing up our car's body. Brother-in-law frowns, the boy is glued to the automobile but he can't punish him in front of everybody, the little rascal, and he can't tear him away from the car either, the rascal hasn't a bit of pride in himself . . . Well, dear brother-in-law, even a small kid now knows that a car is a car. . . . Watch it, don't scratch that thing of yours on the pole, said my brother-in-law, and as he squeezed those words through his teeth it was absolutely clear to me he was yellow with envy although he was trying to hide it."

Almost every single sentence in this story bares the envy that grips the "new Socialist man." And hand in hand with envy goes hatred. It is unmistakably a class hatred—as shown in a well written story "The Right of Way" by Bedrich Skodopole. This portrays a young student who makes some extra money by working at a gas station on Sundays somewhere on a highway outside of Prague. Right in the first paragraph the story sharpens the contrast between the "clouds of humanity that pour out of every single bus, God knows how they get in there" and their luckier comrades in automobiles. Around nine in the morning, a Felicia sport-car stops at the station "as if cut out of a factory promotion leaflet, brick-red, with fresh 25 koruny simonize, white wall tires, polished shine of silver disks. Behind the steering wheel sat a girl, exactly like the one the ad photographer arranges in front of the Tatra Mountains background. He wiped his palms on his overalls. Goodness, goodness, he thought.

"Good day," she greeted him first.

"Good . . . Gasoline?"

"What else? You selling soda?"

This reply is to make it clear to the poor student that there is an enormous social mileage between him and the girl, and his embarrassment is understandable—although, as the author emphasizes, the girl is not too pretty. She simply is Comrade Miss and he is Comrade Nobody.

"To look straight at her was as difficult as when one is suddenly confronted with a miracle. At a café I'd ask her to dance, she is like those I know. Those I can ask when I do not know they have a sport-car parked outside. 'Oh, there's always someone to take care of the car,' she said. 'Daddy has a wonderful mechanic at the factory.'

"She talked the way people sometimes do—carelessly, casually, to achieve a greater effect."

The student is eagerly fixing a small defect in the girl's car. "As he suddenly lifted his head he caught her expression. A face without a smile, drawn with boredom. One corner of her mouth twitched. Maybe she was mad. But right away she got control of herself and spread a contrived smile over her lips and eyes."

After a while, the poor student begins to hate the rich girl. He makes her handle a dirty gasoline pump to humiliate her and the girl senses his attitude.

"Why are you mad at me?" she said, almost with sorrow. "Because of my Felicia? Because you're dirty and not dressed!" A flash of anger sounded in her voice. "So what, you have a Sunday shift and I'm on the way to Slapy. What do you actually do?"

"Film academy. Does that make you mad, too?"

"Again he had to give her a look. Bent slightly forward, she looked the perfect model of a 1959 girl, like an animated image of what is contemporary and modern, an image by which they pick fashion models and draw pictures for magazines.

"You know, the conductors are as nasty as you when people go to a ball!" she said.

"It occurred to him to ask her what her father did, what he actually was, since the Felicia cost forty-two thousand.

"Director of a research institute. It's not my fault. And I don't sneer at you, if that's what you'd like to think. We are not like people used to be, don't get it wrong!"

"Again he did not answer. As if he pitied her. He felt she was standing a step in front of the line while wishing she'd fall in with others, both at the same time.

"You have the right of way, it occurred to him, and he actually said it aloud.

"It was too late, she belonged to that car the way people belong to their dearest things, self-assured, polite, so polite it hurt, when she shook hands with him, thanking him."

The dialogue is full of emotional tension, class tension and hatred. The author lets his girl, model 1959, get killed in front of the reader's eyes. And how he does it may be significant. The girl, having taken off, tries to avoid a bus—a transportation medium that in a people's democracy belongs to the masses—and collides with a big, gray American Ford which completely wrecks her elegant sport-car, killing her. Is this perhaps a *deus ex machina* to take revenge on the new class?

Correspondents Inside

Mrs. Kowalska Stands in Line

The newspaper Die Welt of Hamburg recently asked its foreign correspondents to report on social tensions in the countries where they were stationed. Here are the impressions of Warsaw correspondent Ludwig Zimmerer, as printed on April 3.

ALMOST IN hatred, Mrs. Kowalska stares at the elegant young woman who stands in line in front of her in the State-run delicatessen and who freely buys instant coffee, smoked salmon, Chinese canned fish, and chocolate . . . and casually places three hundred-zloty bills on the counter. Mrs. Kowalska, who has to count every zloty, would like to know who this stranger is. Perhaps, she thinks maliciously, the woman is being kept by a foreigner.

Perhaps she is the wife of a well-to-do doctor or architect. Perhaps she owns a little basement workshop, in which they make cuff links or rosary beads. Perhaps she is the wife of a high official who frequently travels abroad and is thus able to do a little private business of his own. Perhaps her husband is a petty official in the housing commission and accepts bribes. . . .

Then it occurs to Mrs. Kowalska that a few weeks ago, when it was her husband's birthday and she had a few friends in, she spent 500 zloty—representing two weeks' income. Perhaps, she thinks a little more leniently, this woman is also celebrating a birthday.

Enviously, Mrs. Kowalska compares her face with that of the stranger in the mirror behind the counter. Perhaps Mrs. Kowalska is only a few years older, but she looks rather run-down. The years of the occupation, the factory work, the daily difficulties of keeping house . . . she has no time to take care of herself.

She doesn't understand how some of her co-workers can turn an inexpensive little rag into a pretty dress. When it turns out that the two-zloty pudding mix which is her children's favorite dessert is not to be had, she leaves the store angrily.

Mrs. Kowalska is often in bad humor. If asked whether she believes that Socialism is the best of all systems, she would probably only laugh. She is angry at the rude sales-girl; she is angry because she couldn't get the pudding mix, whereas French cognac at 400 zloty a bottle is always to be had; she is angry that fate has treated her like a step-child compared to the elegant young lady. She is angry at God and the world, but she cannot say whom she would blame for her poor existence.

Six or seven years ago she might have been able to say. At that time there were still stores with "yellow curtains," where one didn't have to stand in line and where everything was available, but where only the members of a privileged caste—the people with credentials—could purchase. The "yellow curtains" were regarded, even by this unpolitical woman, as an unambiguous symbol of a hated regime.

At that time Mrs. Kowalska—and with her the entire population—was simply angry at this regime of the new masters, who sat in their mansions and promised the poverty-ridden people a rosy future. The riots in Poznan in June 1956 were a clear expression of how the Poles felt about this regime.

In the Gomulka period there has also been unrest; but a new Poznan seems unthinkable. The "yellow curtains" and the many other symbols of the previous regime have disappeared. Mrs. Kowalska is dissatisfied, but she no longer hates the Communist masters.

One can say of the Gomulka regime that it functions badly, that it has not been either courageous or consistent in making necessary reforms. But it tries seriously to institute social justice. In recent years it has raised the salaries of those who earned the least and worked the hardest; it has increased pensions; it has fought against the "big shots" and has tried to eliminate special privilege.

Today there are many confusing social tensions in Poland, but these can no longer be attributed to the old villains—people vs. the regime or the poor vs. the rich. The tensions actually seem to be different in every enterprise. One can no longer speak of a general conflict between the management appointed "from above" and the rank and file. There are repeated cases of workers and technicians who want to stop the fraudulent manipulations of their managers, and to assure regularity in their plant, being discharged without notice as troublemakers and disturbers of the peace—without the local Party and trade union organs raising a finger for them. And there are plants in which a good working atmosphere prevails, where the management is highly appreciated by the employees as a body of experts. . . .

There are hundreds of priests who cannot get used to the fact that in the new Poland they are not entitled to supervise the mayor or to drive out the village teacher who does not go to church. On the other hand, there are Party functionaries who make life miserable for the clergy. And there are little towns in which the clergy and the Communist mayor get along very well.

Some tensions in recent years have erupted suddenly and spontaneously. In May of 1957 there was the strike of the Lodz streetcar workers, a genuine strike for higher wages by a group of badly-paid workers.

Half a year later the students of Warsaw went to the streets because Gomulka stopped the publication of their newspaper *Po Prostu*.

At the end of April 1960 there was unrest in Nowa Huta

because the authorities removed a cross from the site where a church was to be built.

In each of these disturbances there were a number of casualties; every time a few demonstrators were arrested; but in no case was there the trial of ringleaders which had formerly been customary. The events were mere episodes. The demands of the Lodz streetcar workers, the Warsaw students and the Catholics of Nowa Huta remained unsatisfied.

No segment of the population is completely satisfied with the regime; but there is also nobody who thinks basic changes in this regime possible or who even has a conception of what could take its place.

In Poland a state of suspense has been stabilized.

The Yugoslav press frequently comments on life in the countries of the Communist bloc, and publishes dispatches of more than passing interest from correspondents stationed inside those countries.

China: Light Industry Still Lags

The chronic problem of consumer goods.

THE LATEST plenum of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in January pointed out among other things that last year light industry failed to fulfill the plan. The reason for this was the unequal development of heavy and light industry, to the detriment of the latter. The consequences were serious difficulties and shortages in supplying the market with consumer goods.

"To tackle these problems, the decisions of the Plenum announce a reduction in the volume and rate of capital construction on the one hand, and, on the other, the launching of measures indispensable for the further development of light industry and an improved supply of its products for market.

"All this clearly shows that the problem of light industry is very acute in China, that the reasons have been considered, and that the measures taken to correct it are necessary and essential. Will the settlement of this problem really be undertaken seriously? This is an appropriate question, for the tale of 'the one leg which is lagging behind' . . . is not a new tale. For quite some time, year in and year out, the problem of light industry lagging behind, with all the consequences this entails, has been noted in China. Measures to solve this problem are constantly being announced. Yet somehow it does not get solved. . . .

"In his theoretical work, 'On the Question of a Correct Settlement of Contradictions within the Nation,' published in February 1957, Mao Tse-tung wrote: 'It is necessary that the period of gaining experience in economic development should be far shorter than the period of acquiring revolutionary experience and, at the same time, that this experience should not be paid for too dearly.'

Experience with light industry so far has been paid for very dearly in China."

Djordje Bogojevic in *Borba* (Belgrade) April 2, 1961

Poland: What Is the Theater?

Some recent controversies in the lively Polish theater.

"IS SARTRE'S play *God and the Devil* really in strict contradiction to Socialist ideology? This question was asked by Polish theater people last summer after the Sejm [Parliament] discussion on repertoire policy which characterized this play as a drama 'non grata.'

"The director of the Warsaw National Theater tried to soften this sharp criticism . . . by demonstrating that the Sejm discussion affected the disproportion between domestic and foreign works. Figures were produced which were tantamount to a confession. Of a total of 430 first-night performances in the 1960 season . . . there were only 160 domestic plays.

"Professionals and numerous theater fans started a wide discussion in the press which is still continuing. (It is well known that the theater is a hobby of Poles and has a great tradition. . . . There exist 76 theaters and 30 operas and operetta theaters, as well as many satirical theaters, etc., attended by 12 million spectators annually.)

"Even this more or less basic question was discussed: Whom is the theater for and whom must it serve? This discussion resulted in a meeting of the Association of Theater and Film Workers at which the view was advocated that the theater is an elite art (not in regard to class but intellectually) and should serve a select circle of aesthetes.

"This attitude quite naturally provoked indignation.

... 'Is the future of the theater not rather in its broad cultural expansion, in the conquest of the masses?' . . . There are enough examples in Poland which confirm this. The People's Theater in the huge worker settlement of Nowa Huta always has a capacity-filled auditorium and enjoys great respect all over Poland. Does the travelling Teatr Mazowiecki not go to the most remote places in Poland? . . .

"The question was put whether every theater in Poland should show everything from *Kordijan* (a romantic play by Slowacki) to Saroyan. The author and critic Andrzej Wirt states that good theater distinguishes itself by its inability, among other things, to play everything. This is a conscious self-limitation in the selection of artistic works. . . . Wojciech Natanson answers in an article, 'Specialization or Polarization.' In his opinion, the present-day theater has an even more universal character than before.

"The theater discussions also affect more delicate subjects. That is, the Poles like to look for original solutions

and their own expressions in the arts generally and the theater particularly.

"Why did Grotowski's staging of *Faust* provoke so many discussions? In his concept . . . he deals with it as a contemporary play. The original text is reduced to 90 pages. The director has 'dismantled' Goethe's text and composed it into a new play, a mosaic of scenes and ideas, a free paraphrase of the subject of *Faust*.

"The critics are of the opinion that Grotowski . . . has altered the philosophical meaning of the original. They ask: Is this possible at all with *Faust*? And why? However, the director and theater representatives believe they have the right to experiment. 'We wish to nurture a "theater of our own" in which the text is only the source of creative inspiration for those who have their own stage vision.'

"These are only some excerpts from the extensive discussions in Poland. . . . And they have not ended."

Borba (Belgrade), January 15, 1961

ALIEN CORN

"A little more than two years ago the Party introduced a change in its policies. This change was preceded—also in the press—by sharp Communist criticism of the mistakes committed during the course of Socialist construction. During this period, among a number of journalists, there appeared serious ideological and political doubts reflecting on the contents of our newspapers, periodicals and radio programs. . . . A certain segment of the journalists found themselves in positions alien to Party policies and ideology. They succumbed to the influence of revisionist views and political disorientation. . . . The Party Central Committee subjected these harmful attitudes and false views to sharp criticism more than once, patiently explaining to the journalists

the sense of the Party's policies. When these arguments failed, however . . . the Party was forced to shut down the opposition and revisionist publications and to bring about personnel changes in various other editorial offices and radio stations.

"Now this period is behind us. . . .

"In 1958, especially during the second half of 1958, a change became clearly apparent. At the present time the healthy atmosphere of a sense of unity with the Party and corresponsibility for the implementation of its policies is prevailing."

Mieczyslaw Rakowski, head of the Journalist' Union, at the Party Congress in March 1959

THUMBS OUT

Hitchhiking has become a recognized way of travel in Poland. In an effort to encourage it, the Polish Tourists' Association issues special coupons to young people going on vacation. They give the coupons to drivers who pick them up, and the drivers collecting the most coupons receive prizes. According to statistics published by the Association's "Autostop" committee, there were 80,000 card-carrying hitchhikers in 1960; they received lifts from 5,300 drivers of cars and trucks, and traveled a total of 24,747,250 kilometers.

Among the registered hitchhikers were 68,225 students and 12,524 manual workers. The majority were under 21, and fewer than 5,000 were over 25.

POLISH PERSPECTIVES (Warsaw), February 1961

Schweik Says: "Take It Easy!"

One of the better-known personalities in Czechoslovakia today is *The Good Soldier Schweik*, a fictional creation of Jaroslav Hasek. Schweik is the hero of Hasek's popular book of the 1920's which satirized the Austro-Hungarian government—its police, its army, its bureaucrats. Schweik, often compared to Sancho Panza, is the simple man whom society can never quite organize for its higher idiosyncrasies—whose philosophy is never to get excited about anything, never to hurry, never to look beyond the next meal. The Communists have done much to popularize him because he supposedly represented the people's resistance to militarism and bourgeois exploitation. In recent months, however, Schweik has become embarrassing to the Communists themselves. All over Czechoslovakia his face has begun to appear on the walls of offices, restaurants and other public places along with the slogan: "Take It Easy!" His new popularity seems to be a response to the government's incessant appeals for greater efficiency in carrying out the Third Five Year Plan, and the concern it gives the authorities can be seen from the following essay in the weekly *Kultura* 1961 (Prague), March 30.

THREE WORDS, with a picture. Schweik preaching, his forefinger lifted. Sometimes he is addressing the public, sometimes an old man. Sometimes he is in the company of a half-naked girl. Or half naked himself and holding his pants in his hand. Or even sitting on the toilet. It all depends on the idea, on the manner of presentation, on the amount of taste, and, well, on the audacity of the artist. Under the picture are those three words, always the same, with an exclamation mark or two if necessary.

What mass creativity! No one has asked anybody, no one has passed a resolution, but all of a sudden there are people everywhere who are taken by this wonderful scheme and who do not hesitate to display their philosophical credo in conspicuous places. In the shops, at the markets, in the Pramen chain stores, in restaurants, hotels and bars, in factory canteens, in schools, in public vehicles, in offices and in workshops. Maybe we have some unrecognized talents who are making a tour of our Socialist institutions to disseminate the products of their minds throughout the country. Maybe the pictures are painted by salespeople, janitors, waiters, cooks, chauffeurs and managers. Three words and the picture: for God's sake don't get excited, it's no use anyhow, don't complain, it doesn't lead anywhere, it's no good, it's complicated, difficult. Simply and well: take it easy.

Is it clear? The petty bourgeois has found a guide, he has found out how to handle things. He wants peace for



Czechoslovak Life (Prague), December 1960

himself and the others. He has cloaked his apathy and indifference in a primitive philosophy, thrown his passivity in the way of the eager activity and creativeness of our time. The rest simply repeat it after him. Indolence is catching. Simply and well: take it easy. And that is that. At the Free Household laundry, they will wash your clothes for you in six weeks. They will clean your coat in three months. That house painter you arranged for six months ago never shows up, and doesn't even bother to tell you that he has a more important job. You move into a new apartment and try to install a light fixture and discover that there are only three inches of wire in the wall—just window-dressing. The tailor will have your suit in a week, then again in a week, and he leads you by the nose. And everywhere you see the picture with the caption: take it easy.

But this philosophy doesn't satisfy you at all. You have a proper feeling that you should work yourself into a passion and say what you think of it. Communist morality often dictates this to you. Then the face in the picture seems to nod, to smile, to sink down between shrugging shoulders. It doesn't have to speak. The message is written above it. You are a fool to get excited, you are silly when you try to set something straight. This philosophy of taking it easy, this petty bourgeois mentality, eats up everything.

No, not everything! Fortunately!

György Lukács

by
GYULA BORBÁNDI

The last of three articles on the great intellectual figure of Hungarian Communism. The author, formerly a student of philosophy in Budapest, now lives in Western Europe where he edits a Hungarian-language magazine.



György Lukács, center, representing the World Peace Council when, in 1955, it awarded a posthumous Peace Prize to composer Béla Bartók. Bartók's widow receives the prize from Zoltan Kodoly.

Hungary (Budapest), July 1955

THE ATTACKS of 1949 again brought to the surface Lukács's explanation of the Marxist doctrine concerning uneven development. As he had done in Moscow, Lukács again explained that the literature, art and culture of an economically superior society are not necessarily higher than those of the economically inferior society. In an essay entitled *A marxista kritika feladatai* (The Tasks of Marxist Criticism), published in 1947 in *Forum*, a periodical of the People's Front, he became more specific: "Marxist-Leninism," he wrote, "is truly the Himalaya among world perspectives. Yet a little bunny capering over it is not a larger animal than the elephant of the plains." As his critics took this observation very much amiss, Lukács, in his self-criticism, stated that his assertion was not directed at Soviet society but at class societies. However, his apology was not accepted.

It is a grave accusation against a Communist to say that he looks down upon Soviet culture. Lukács was reproached with viewing "nascent and triumphantly unfolding" Soviet literature with indifference. Lukács claimed in his defense that he was unprepared to tackle this field, his knowledge of it being deficient. He confessed, "In my analysis of the classics of realism, the censure of decadence gained concrete formulation, while about Soviet literature I spoke only in declarations." According to Marton Horvath, he slighted Soviet literature. "Had he not looked down upon Soviet literature," wrote Horvath, "he would have gotten acquainted with it and appreciated it."

His views on "Party-line poetry" and partisan literature were fiercely impugned. Citing the example of Balzac,

in one passage Lukács pointed out: "there are cases when a politically and economically reactionary *Weltanschauung* cannot prevent the creation of the greatest masterpieces of realism . . . and there are cases where the political progressivism of bourgeois writers takes such forms as will hinder the realism of characterization."

Laszlo Rudas censured Lukács for having unduly broadened the doctrine of the partisan character of literature. Leninist Party literature, his warning reminded Lukács, is not equivalent to the Party-line poetry of Engels! Leninist partisanship, his critics maintained, implied much more than Lukács expected of literature.

György Lukács repudiated the error of his ways and promised to improve. Self-criticism did not satisfy the Party. According to Revai, Lukács's confession did not go deep enough and was not consistent enough. Lukács came to be discounted, he lost his lofty place in the formulation of the Party's literary policies; for a time his critics continued to pursue him. It was only in the summer of 1950 that the attacks stopped. He was not thrown out of the Party, but he had lost all his official functions and his professorship, and was abandoned by his comrades. At the 1951 writers' congress József Darvas once more attacked him, but after that he was left alone. He was surrounded by complete silence and his gradual reintegration into public life, as one of the leading members of the peace movement, passed almost unnoticed. For a number of years he went to various peace conferences, wrote his fight-for-peace articles and declarations with great equanimity, without being allowed to contribute to the discussion of literary

and political subjects. For about two years he concerned himself with Soviet books, writing critiques on them, proving his interest in Soviet literature.

In the spring of 1955 he was first awarded the Kossuth Prize and then unexpectedly feted on his seventieth birthday. The papers commemorated the event, the literary periodical *Csillag* greeted him warmly with a salute by Thomas Mann, reminiscences by Anna Seghers and an appreciative article by Istvan Soter, a fellow-traveling university professor who once was a Catholic writer.¹ He was accorded a similarly warm celebration in East Germany where, after 1945, practically all his works had been published in German and his books were being used as texts by Communist and pro-Communist professors. In East Germany he was regarded as the leading "German" Marxist philosopher along with Ernst Bloch, and even in esthetics his fame was similar to that of Hans Mayer, with whom he attended Heidelberg University. (Today, like Lukacs, Ernst Bloch and Hans Mayer are regarded as "revisionists.") In 1955 the German Academy of Science, with headquarters in East Berlin, elected him a corresponding member. *Neues Deutschland*, official organ of the SED, published a commemorative article on his birthday and Aufbau-Verlag, the leading East German literary publishers, had a commemorative album published in his honor. In the decade following the war, Lukacs's works sold approximately 250-300,000 copies in the Soviet-occupied eastern zone.

It seemed now that everything concerning Lukacs had settled and, in the new political situation that was brought about by Stalin's death, nothing stood in the way of his rehabilitation. He again came into the foreground of interest in Hungary, it again became a distinction to be one of his disciples and those who had once flung mud at him now confessed their errors or explained their former anti-Lukacs stand as the result of the tyranny of the Stalinist years.

Before the Revolt

In 1955, a collection of essays entitled "Az ész trónfosztása" (The Dethronement of Reason) was published in Hungarian,² after having been brought out in East Germany in the previous year.³ Previous to this, a small collection of Lukacs's studies on esthetics⁴ had come out, but these did not evoke great interest. "Az ész trónfosztása," on the other hand, being a new declaration of war against Western bourgeois culture, against various literary and artistic directions and popular concepts persisting in philosophy, elicited wide discussion. Lukacs in this work showed a lack of comprehension for the Western world, an insensitivity toward Western ideals of freedom and a narrowly Marxist perspective. He found fault with modern Western philosophical tendencies because they are irrational, because they agitate against reason. According to Lukacs, the present world struggle is one between dialectical reasoning and antialectical irrationality. He spoke of "the imminent rationality contained in the spontaneous movement of society and history"⁵ and judged everything from the point of view of reason against irrationalism. He stated that "a standpoint for or against reason at the same time de-

termines the essence of a philosophy as philosophy and the role it plays in social progress."⁶ He wished to rally an army on the side of reason not only in philosophy but also in the peace campaign; for, according to him, there is no greater danger than the triumph of irrationalism in the world. We shall see later how these thoughts became proofs of his "revisionist" views and weapons with which to attack him in the latest anti-Lukacs campaign, started in 1957.

Gyorgy Lukacs's public and formal rehabilitation took place at the philosophical discussion held by the Petofi Circle on June 14, 1956. The audience gathered to hear and see Lukacs gave a tremendous ovation to the philosopher who had again entered the limelight of interest; whose views and conceptions were borne out by time, by the developments taking place after Stalin's death and the Twentieth Congress of the Soviet Communist Party. At that discussion, which lasted six hours, into the small hours of the night, he told his audience that Marxism in Hungary was in a more difficult predicament than it had been in the days of Horthy, because the Stalinist leaders had made the development of Marxist thought, independent research and ideological progress impossible. He warned his audience that it did not suffice to condemn Stalinism and supplant it with Leninism: the change had to be a basic one, especially as concerned the methods employed: "The Twentieth Congress substituted Leninist methods for Stalinism; but it must really be the *method* of Lenin that replaces it, for . . . Lenin can be used to create a 'citatology' and dogmatism no different from that of Stalin."⁷

A lecture he delivered in the summer of 1956 at the Political Academy of the Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party on "The Struggle of Progress and Reaction in Contemporary Culture"⁸ similarly evoked a wide response, at a time when revolutionary unrest among the intelligentsia and the students was already gathering momentum and the discussions in the Petofi Circle were going on. This lecture stressed the possibility of avoiding war and the necessity of peaceful coexistence. Coexistence, the peaceful existence of the two systems side by side, must be interpreted literally, in the sense that both worlds can live according to their own laws of internal development.⁹ Lukacs pointed out that it was possible to carry on a dialogue between the Communists and many leading representatives of the Western intelligentsia. He was expecting much from such a dialogue and stated that according to him it should be stimulated by every available means. Quoting the Catholic theologians Brokmöller, Wetter and Reding, he asserted that "the possibility exists to engage the ideological representatives of the Church with those of Marxism in a dialogue, a debate that would have been completely unthinkable in previous years."¹⁰ At the conclusion of his lecture, he drew attention to the tasks and responsibility of the Communists: "It is our duty to break once and for all with the epoch that has just come to an end: this is not only decisive for every one of us as far as our respective Parties and countries are concerned, but it is also an important factor in world development, in the victory of progress over the contemporary forms of reaction."¹¹

Treachery

LUKACS'S LECTURE caused a perceptible stir in Hungary, and Western Europe as well. They heeded it rather late in the West: when it came to be discussed the preludes of the Hungarian uprising and the intellectual revolt had already advanced to a more mature stage.¹² On October 23, 1956 the Hungarian Revolt broke out and a few days later, when Premier Imre Nagy formed his new cabinet, including former Smallholders' Party members in the government along with Communists, he asked Gyorgy Lukacs to head the Ministry of Education. Lukacs had not assumed his duties as minister when, following the first victory of the Revolt, a coalition government, composed of the representatives of the four democratic parties, was formed, in which Lukacs did not participate. During the Revolt he came into contact with the public on only two occasions. The first of these occurred when he granted an interview to one of the newspapers and the second when, after the dissolution of the Hungarian Workers' (Communist) Party, he took part in the foundation of the Hungarian Socialist Labor Party. He was a member of the committee which, besides himself, consisted of Imre Nagy, who was to be executed later on, Geza Losonczy, who died in prison, Sandor Kopacsy, who is a prisoner to this day, Ferenc Donath, granted amnesty in April 1960, Zoltan Szantho, deported together with Imre Nagy and allowed to return from Romania with Lukacs, and Janos Kadar, who was to assume power after November 4. When the Soviet forces attacked Budapest on November 4, Lukacs, together with Imre Nagy and his associates, took refuge at the Yugoslav Legation, only to be deported to Romania by the Soviet army, as a result of a trap set for them by the Soviet government and Kadar in collusion.

In the spring of 1957, a short communique appeared, stating that Lukacs had returned to Budapest from Romania. According to the news bulletin released by MTI, the Hungarian news service, "Professor Gyorgy Lukacs requested the Hungarian Workers' and Peasants' Government to allow his repatriation. He wishes to resume his research work at home. The Hungarian Government has granted Gyorgy Lukacs's request."¹³ In literary and political circles his repatriation was interpreted as permission to resume his activity unmolested with the tacit understanding that he would not be prosecuted for his past role. This exceptional treatment was attributed by some to the alleged fact that at the Revolt cabinet meeting which had decided on Hungary's withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact and the country's neutrality, he was the only one to oppose the abandonment of the Warsaw Pact.

During the first few months it indeed seemed as if Lukacs' case were to be forgotten after his five-month exile. In this period he sent to the Classen Verlag, his Hamburg publisher, "A félreérte realizmus ellen" (Against the Misrepresentation of Realism) and sent a few articles to left-wing Italian and French magazines and a Polish journal of philosophy. Western readers were surprised to find that Lukacs had not modified his pre-Revolt views concerning Soviet literature and Socialist realism in either the book or his other writings and, in 1957, resumed

almost without any perceptible break his philosophical and esthetic monologue in the same direction it had been moving in 1956. In the fall of 1956, that is, still before the revolution, he had told a correspondent of *Vie Nuove*, Italian Communist pictorial weekly, that: "during the Stalinist period, Marxist philosophy was often regarded as a completely closed theory which was purported to have solved all the unsolvable or not perfectly and for us unsatisfactorily solved problems of traditional philosophy." More than half a year later, in an essay written for a Polish periodical, he asserted that: "one of the manifestations of the bureaucratic-sectarian bigotry of the Stalin era was, among other things, the constant overestimation of the significance of Communist awareness in questions relating to the representation of reality."¹⁴

It appears from these two quotations that, after his return to Hungary, Lukacs took notice of the new political situation created after the overthrow of the revolution, but did not modify his philosophical and esthetic views. This fact was demonstrated when Stalinism, dogmatism and sectarian errors began to be again forgotten. For, even then, Lukacs did not hesitate to speak out.

We must look for the motives of the attack that came to be organized against him in the second half of 1957 in politics: the overwhelming majority of the works that were denounced had been published before the Hungarian Revolt and had met, not with indignation but, on the contrary, with approval on the part of Communist ideologists and estheticians. It is highly unlikely that they would have suddenly discovered Lukacs's errors and deviations had they not received a cue or command from political leaders to do so. Incidentally, it was realized in Poland that the latest anti-Lukacs campaign had political strings attached to it and that his esthetic and political outlook came under attack because the present regime politically did not agree with him, that is to say, wished to punish him for his conduct during the Revolt in this manner.

Socialist Realism

But let us return to the book he sent to Hamburg in 1957, published in German in 1958 under the title "*Gegen den missverstandenen Realismus*"¹⁵ (Against the Misrepresentation of Realism). This work, like his entire esthetic activity after the war, is characterized by a battle waged on two fronts. He passionately fights against the artistic directions of the West on the one hand and against so-called revolutionary romanticism on the other. Lukacs calls revolutionary romanticism the phenomenon that, to everyone else, is known as Socialist realism. This would seem to be a paradox, since it is well known that Lukacs is a supporter and exponent of Socialist realism. That is indeed so, but Lukacs's Socialist realism is a fantasy, an imaginary literary tendency and an ideal literary direction that has so far never been realized or rather some of its characteristics have been found only in a handful of writers (Gorki, Sholokhov, Dery). What is called Socialist realism by the whole world is mercilessly thrashed by Gyorgy Lukacs himself. Only he calls it revolutionary romanticism.

"*Gegen den missverstandenen Realismus*" consists of three parts. The first and second parts—"The Foundations

of the Theory of the Avant-Garde in the *Weltanschauung*" and "Franz Kafka or Thomas Mann"—deal with contemporary Western literary tendencies, while the third, "Critical Realism in a Socialist Society," discusses the relationship of criticism and Socialist realism.

Lukacs's judgments on contemporary Western writers are rather disparaging. His basic tenet is that the prevailing tendencies of contemporary Western literature (which he labels anti-realism, decadence, avant-gardisme and formalism, equating these concepts with each other) are characterized by a total estrangement from reality and a precedence of form over content. The majority of contemporary Western writers, according to Lukacs, have nothing to say and respect only technique, artistic perfection and virtuosity. This literature, turning its back on reality, is incapable of correctly representing today's society, cannot answer the problems posed by the age and what is being produced by writers is essentially intellectual legerdemain. Such is Lukacs's opinion. Then he states the following. If this literature has anything to say at all, it is nothing else than the affirmation of man's existential loneliness, nihilism, decadence and the joys of self-destruction.

This certainly is a bleak and hopeless picture. The question is whether it is a true one. Lukacs's manner of viewing Western literatures and intellectual currents is much too primitive. A scholar of his erudition and background should not simplify and schematize the complex and manifold problems of modern literature in this fashion. While examining the contemporary Western trends, he inexcusably discards the fine distinctions he makes use of in his treatment of critical and social realism. He disregards important facts and details and thus it is little wonder that we wind up with a distorted image. This method also manifests itself in his grouping together of writers of such disparate constitution, outlook and literary creed as Kafka, James Joyce, Musil, Beckett, Benn, Gide, Hoffmannsthal, Camus, Thomas Wolfe and Hemingway. Lukacs adopts the tone and criteria of philistine and conservative estheticians while speaking about contemporary Western literature. And some of his phrases are reminiscent of the terminology applied to the "degenerate" art forms by German Nazism. Someone very aptly remarked that what Lukacs calls decadence used to be called *Kulturbolschevismus* by Goebbels.

Western Criticism

Western, and especially German, criticism was rather negative. Hans Egon Holthausen,¹⁶ noted German esthetician, forcefully rejected Lukacs's arguments as peremptory. Lukacs is not acquainted with and does not understand the real nature of contemporary Western literature, the real problems of form and content. He constantly mistakes esthetics for politics, mixes the claptrap of everyday politics in with esthetic concepts. Theodor W. Adorno finds it inexplicable that Lukacs thinks that style, form and representation are overvalued in modern art, as though he did not know that art differs from scholarship exactly on the basis of these characteristics. Lukacs rejects everything in modern literature that does not fit his critical-realistic and Socialist realist patterns.¹⁷ Willy Haas calls the



Gyorgy Lukacs, left, greeting the Rev. Hewlett Johnson when the "red dean of Canterbury" made a visit to Hungary early in 1951.

Beke es Szabadsag (Budapest), April 1, 1951

book an assault on the avant-garde. According to him, Lukacs's supposition that solitude, melancholy, nihilism, guilt and the externally disconnected quality of today's social situation characterize bourgeois society in the age of imperialism are false. Such phenomena always occurred, even during the culminating points of bourgeois society.¹⁸ Karl Korn mentions in Lukacs's favor that, though he is biased concerning contemporary Western literature, he carries on a brave struggle for the recognition of his favored tendency, critical realism, even within the Communist orbit.¹⁹

"*Gegen des missverstandenen Realismus*" bears out admirably Karl Korn's thesis. The third part of the volume contains a convincing proof of this. According to Lukacs, the most outstanding representatives of critical realism in our age are Thomas Mann and Roger Martin du Gard, but especially the former, who could hardly wish for a more devoted worshipper than Lukacs. Incarnate in him are all the literary qualities and artistic endeavors that, according to Lukacs, have the exclusive merit of correctly interpreting bourgeois society and artistically representing reality. In the second part of the book he draws a sharp line between critical realism and so-called anti-realism, showing Mann as the most characteristic representative of the former and Kafka of the latter. Lukacs found in Thomas Mann's social criticism and mode of representation the transitional form pointing to Socialist realism as the proper literary form of Socialist society. The thorough and severe criticism of bourgeois society, the recognition of the decadence of capitalism and the anticipation of a new social order, Socialism: these characteristics propelled Thomas Mann, perhaps unwillingly, in the direction of Gyorgy Lukacs's Socialist realism.

Though he appears to think that the most significant artistic trend in world literature is critical realism, his heart yearns for Socialist realism. Critical realism, from his point of view, is merely an ally in the battle. Critical realism, as the creative and stylistic trend peculiar to the transition to Socialism, faces a continuously more restricted field of operation in the measure that capitalist society is transformed into Socialist society. For under Socialism,

in Lukacs's opinion, Socialist realism is the only method that possesses the social and ideological opportunity for representing reality in its fullness and in a plastic manner. Why this should be so is not indicated by Lukacs at greater length. Yet he adds that the alliance with critical realism is not a tactical move but an ideologically and esthetically established cooperation. It cannot be compared to those indeed tactical alliances that Socialist realism, at the time of the anti-fascist struggle, had to conclude with other literary trends or to such collaborations as even now exist in "the fight for peace." According to Lukacs, critical realism itself will one day die out, but its death cannot be achieved by proclamations and resolutions, the way Stalin, Zhdanov and their associates tried to do.

One of the most interesting sections in Lukacs's book is the criticism of "revolutionary romanticism." What are the chief traits of revolutionary romanticism? First of all, the literary technique that "equates perspective with reality," that is, shows a picture of the future, claiming it to be a representation of present reality. Stalin and Zhdanov forced writers to show the future—a future invented by propaganda—as an already realized condition. In other words, they forced them to lie. As a result, they had to write about people and situations who and which did not exist in reality. Consequently their stories took place in a vacuum.

Agitator's Tasks

Lukacs reproaches the representatives of this type of literary policy with exacting nothing but the fulfillment of an agitator's tasks from the writers. Just as an agitator has no time left for reflection, for a calm consideration of a given problem, for the careful collation and lucid weighing of available evidence, so the writers could not probe the depths of their subjects, could not produce artistically faultless work. Agitation impatiently demanded "contemporary" works. Revolutionary romanticism is a literature without conflict. The writer is allowed to indicate difficulties and aberrations only if he immediately dispenses justice. If for instance a village speculator plays a part in a novel, he has no other choice than to be converted or to face a trial. Even when some conflict does occur in the works of revolutionary romanticists, the author must solve the problem within the confines of the same book. If there are conflicts in Socialist society, nay, irreconcilable conflicts, such works are bound to deny them.

Lukacs raises the question of the origin of revolutionary romanticism. According to him, this phenomenon may be traced back to the dominant economic trend in the Stalin era, so-called economic subjectivism, being its esthetic manifestation. Economic subjectivism blurs the dividing line between what is desirable from a personal viewpoint and what represents objective reality. Accordingly, revolutionary romanticism does not show reality but instead what some persons would like to see as reality, what they consider desirable.

Lukacs even provides an answer to the question of why he had failed to pass such a severe sentence in former times, why he had not previously appeared with such a merciless and devastating criticism of revolutionary ro-

manticism. His criticism, he maintains, is new only insofar as it concerns its present mode of formulation; in its essence and in other connections it has appeared in earlier works. Yet during the twenty years that this conception was enthroned he could not use the term "revolutionary romanticism"; nevertheless, without naming this tendency by the term proper to it, he fought against its concrete examples. A more pronounced opposition would have been impossible during the life of Stalin and the ideological reign of Zhdanov.²⁰ On the other hand, right now it is imperatively necessary to make a determined stand against sectarian and dogmatic literary policy. We cannot fight revisionism itself effectively, he states, if we do not break once and for all with the theory and practice of Stalinist dogmatism. His standpoint is *tertia datur*, that is, we have to oppose with equal determination both revisionism and dogmatism.

Revisionism

In the meantime, he has been ranked among those revisionists against whom a merciless and bitter campaign is now being waged. The attack against Lukacs's "revisionism" was not started in Hungary but in East Germany and in the Soviet Union. In East Germany the leaders of this campaign came from the ranks of those who, from 1945 to 1949, had praised him to the skies and who, at his rehabilitation following a period of silence after his 1949 condemnation, in the spring of 1955 had again written panegyrics on his exceptional merits and his unshakable Marxism.

This series of attacks was opened by Dr. Hans Koch who, in the spring of 1957, criticized Lukacs's incorrect philosophical and esthetic beliefs in the SED organ *Einheit*.²¹ At approximately the same time, an East German poet by the name of Kuba²² published an article in the official SED journal²³ and then, in September, in the literary magazine *Neue Deutsche Literatur*. The attacks from East Germany did not stop at that point: in June 1958, the East German Writers' Association held a so-called ideological conference, centering around the views of Lukacs and other "revisionists." The August 1958 issue of *Neue Deutsche Literatur*²⁴ contained a symposium in which East German writers, mainly Willi Bredel and Alexander Abusch, recounted how they had been hindered in their literary activities by Lukacs's incorrect outlook. In the Soviet Union, J. Elsperg specialized in anti-Lukacs dialectic. He wrote two essays in which he endeavored to prove that Lukacs is no real Marxist and that his studies are rife with grave fallacies.²⁵

The Flood

IT WAS against the background of these preliminaries that the flood of Hungarian criticisms started. The first to throw a stone at Lukacs was a former student, Jozsef Szigeti, promoted to Deputy Minister of Education in the Kadar government. Szigeti had disowned Lukacs in 1949, then dutifully confessed his error, hailing his former professor in an article published in 1955 in the daily of the Hungarian Communist party: "Comrade Lukacs's figure and lifework belong to us, the Party, the international revo-

lutionary workers' movement, the Hungarian and international working class. . . . Comrade Lukacs's studies in the history of philosophy and literature explore, with incomparable extension and comprehension, the rich cultural heritage, the broad democratic and historical foundations on which rests Socialist humanism, a new form of humanism that is higher than any of its versions so far advanced.²⁶

This enthusiastic praise nevertheless did not prevent Szigeti from later referring to Lukacs as a damned revisionist and "liquidator" who subscribes to anti-Marxist theories. In the ideological periodical of the Hungarian Party he published three long essays, calling Lukacs every name in the book.²⁷ Szigeti's first study, published in November 1957, signalled that Lukacs was an outlaw, that is, everyone could add to the list of his deserts in Moscow or in the Budapest Party center by using him as a target. A whole landslide of attacks followed.²⁸ All and sundry felt prompted to give an account of why they thought Lukacs's ideas dangerous and why it was the duty of every Communist intellectual to fight them wherever he found them.

The second great campaign against Lukacs (the first one had taken place in 1949) was primarily concentrated on his philosophical and ideological views. This is understandable because the ultimate reason for it is to be found in Lukacs's attitude before and during the 1956 Revolt. Gyula Kallai, who at present appears to be the first in line after Kadar in the Party hierarchy, said that Lukacs judged erroneously the basic problems of the class war. It is a fallacious view that the main conflict exists not between Socialism and capitalism or the working class and the imperialist bourgeoisie but, instead, between the powers of progress and reaction. Kallai similarly impugns Lukacs for having become "the banner of the enemy" in October 1956 who "has not been able to separate himself from them ever since."²⁹ Jozsef Szigeti similarly finds fault with the insufficient attention Lukacs devotes to the subject of class war, stating that the emphasis on the conflict of dialectic rationalism and anti-dialectical irrationalism sweeps under the rug not only the fight between idealism and materialism but also class war. He severely reprimands Lukacs for obscuring the class war, the fight between capitalism and Socialism, by unduly emphasizing the contradictions between progress and reaction, democracy and anti-democracy. According to Szigeti, this is the result of his "bowing to bourgeois and petty-bourgeois class interests."³⁰

Bela Fogarasi also considers Lukacs's tenet that the central conflict in historical development resides not in the conflict between capitalism and Socialism but the one between progress and reaction as a view that must be discarded, together with Lukacs's tendency to place the war between reason and irrationalism instead of that between idealism and materialism at the center of attention. According to Fogarasi, Lukacs "mystifies the concept of anti-Fascism into a positive ideology, whose function is nothing less than the substitution of Socialism."³¹ One of the speakers at the discussion held at the Institute of Philosophy of the Hungarian Academy of Science went even further by accusing Lukacs of wishing to widen the ide-

ology of the Party with his conception of ideological coexistence into an ideology including the views of all temporary and potential allies. "But this aim can be reached only through one road: the liberal watering-down of Marxism, the muffling of the inevitability of class war, that is, the theoretical disarming of the working class."³²

The accusations against Lukacs' esthetics were partly repetitions of former observations, partly objections of a more recent vintage. His detractors were served by his two latest works, the previously mentioned German-language "Gegen des missverstandenen Realismus" and the first part of a projected multi-volume esthetics, a fundamental work on singularity.³³ In the former, as we have seen, Lukacs strongly rejected revolutionary romanticism, which at present happens to be the official artistic trend in Communist literary policy; in his work on singularity his views again run counter to partisanship and the Moscow conception of the Communist Party's role as chief literary arbiter. In the thirties Lukacs had criticized the methods of administrative control in literature and the bureaucratic spirit that reigned particularly in the Stalin era, tendencies that could not understand the spirit of creativity. In the 1949 Lukacs campaign it had already been said that he advocated fallacious views in the matter of partisanship and that he stood closer to the Party-line poetry of Engels than to Lenin's Party literature. In 1956 Lukacs stated that Lenin's famous declaration on the partisan nature of literature in 1905 did not refer to writers in general but to party workers in the employ of the Socialist press. For this he was severely criticized and accused of having falsified Lenin's declaration. With regard to his work on singularity, one of his critics brought up against him the fact that he "substitutes the Leninist interpretation of partisanship with a classless partisanship which does not accord to Lenin's conception but Lukacs's own ever-repeated ideas on a united anti-Fascist front."³⁴

Party functionaries do not agree with his standpoint on the role and significance of critical realism either. In this, as in everything else, they see a disarmament before the bourgeoisie, a bourgeois watering-down of Marxian esthetics. Jozsef Szigeti, for example, notes in a previously mentioned study that: "Gyorgy Lukacs's third road in *Weltanschauung* is an effort to formulate a new *citoyen* ideology. He seeks to find the traces of such a *citoyen* ideology in his various studies, especially in his essay on Thomas Mann. Nowhere does he heed the fundamental Marxian position that the essence of the *citoyen* is the bourgeois; the *citoyen* is merely a transitory form of the bourgeois."³⁵

In another study, Szigeti doubts whether Lukacs is an adherent of Socialist realism. According to him, in Lukacs's work the concrete Leninist class interpretation of partisanship is lost, its connection with the war the Party wages fades away. (This accusation itself is a manifestation of bureaucratic and dogmatic tendencies: what else could have caused the impatient dissatisfaction Lukacs elicited by condemning the Stalinist methods of the Party directorate and criticizing the bureaucratic meddling with literature?) Partisanship is the essence of Socialist realism, writes Szigeti and, referring to Lukacs, he adds a threaten-

ing note, "whoever fails to understand this, whoever openly or covertly denies this, can give merely formal adherence to Socialist realism."³⁶

György Lukács could not take a stand regarding all these accusations and intimations and has not been able to participate in the discussion raging over his philosophical and esthetic works for the past three years. This scholar who is waging a war on two fronts, who is being attacked, on the one hand, by impartial and unbiased Western critics because of his lack of comprehension of modern literature and his Marxist, restricted literary views and, on the other hand, because of his independent thinking and original statements by his own comrades, answers with his writings, without participating in the discussion about his works. Yet it would not be true to say that he meets only with opposition from both the bourgeois and Communist sides. In the Western world, though his philosophy and esthetics are rejected, he is respected for his erudition and scholarly approach. In the Communist world, it is harder to praise him, for the risks that a stand in his favor involves are not to be discounted. Yet one can discern signs that his views have more adherents than opponents behind the Iron Curtain. Let it suffice to point out that in Poland he found some people to take his side when the attacks started.³⁷

This fight has not yet been won by either side. In his previous conflict, he ultimately triumphed over the bureaucrats. Will developments again bear out his views?

NOTES FOR THIS ARTICLE

- ¹ *CSILLAG* (Star), April 1955, pp. 779-784.
- ² *AZ ÉSZ TRÓNFOSZTÁSA* (The Dethronement of Reason), Akadémiai kiadó, Budapest, 1955, 680 pp.
- ³ *DIE ZERSTÖRUNG DER VERNUNFT*, Berlin, 1954.
- ⁴ *ADALÉKOK AZ ESZTÉTIKA TÖRTÉNETÉHEZ* (Contributions to Aesthetic History), Akadémiai kiadó, Budapest, 1953.
- ⁵ *AZ ÉSZ TRÓNFOSZTÁSA*, p. 98.
- ⁶ *IBID.*, p. 4.
- ⁷ *TÁRSADALMI SZEMLE* (Review of Sociology), June-July 1956, pp. 68-87.
- ⁸ *IRODALMI UJSÁG* (Literary Gazette), June 23, 1956.
- ⁹ *TÁRSADALMI SZEMLE*, June-July 1956, p. 73.
- ¹⁰ *IBID.*, p. 79.
- ¹¹ *IBID.*, p. 87.
- ¹² This essay was published in East Germany only in the fall of 1956.
- ¹³ *NÉPSZABADSÁG* (The People's Freedom), April 11, 1957.
- ¹⁴ *STUDIA FILOZOFICZNE*, March 1957.
- ¹⁵ *GEGEN DEN MISSVERSTÄNDENEN REALISMUS*, Classen Verlag, Hamburg, 1958, 153 pp.
- ¹⁶ Hans Egon Holthausen, "Georg Lukács und die, moderne Literatur" (György Lukács and Modern Literature), *NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG*, November 1, 1958.
- ¹⁷ Theodor W. Adorno, "Erpreste Versöhnung" (Forced Reconciliation), in *MONAT* (The Month), November 1958.
- ¹⁸ Willy Haas, "Avantgardismus—das Rote Tuch" (The Avant-Garde: A Red Kerchief), in *DIE WELT*, August 16, 1958.
- ¹⁹ Karl Korn, "Literatur-durch Lenin zu heilen" (Curing Literature with Lenin), in *FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE ZEITUNG*, October 18, 1958.
- ²⁰ In an article published in the West, under the title "Complement to My Autobiography", the following appears: "In past years, I used willingly to subordinate all my points of view . . . to the exigencies of the moment. . . . For this reason, I had to wage a partisan war for my scientific concepts; I ensured the publication of my writings by stuffing them with quotes taken from Stalin and others; on the other hand, I expounded my own different standpoint with the greatest caution." *FRANCE-OBSERVATEUR*, September 25, 1958.

- ²¹ Dr. Hans Koch, "Politik, Literaturwissenschaft und die Position von Georg Lukács" (Politics, the Study of Literature and the Position of György Lukács), in *EINHEIT* (Unity), July 1957.
- ²² His real name is Kurt Barthel.
- ²³ Kuba, "Wie steht es mit der Ehrlichkeit des Schriftstellers" (On the Dignity of the Writer), in *NEUES DEUTSCHLAND*, July 21, 1957.
- ²⁴ *NEUES DEUTSCHE LITERATUR*, No. 9, September 1957. Other attacks in the East German press: Elemér Balogh, "Zur Kritik des Irrationalismus, Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Georg Lukács" (The Critique of Irrationalism; A Discussion With György Lukács), in *DEUTSCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR PHILOSOPHIE*, Nos. 1-2, 1958. Josef Szegedi, "Georg Lukács und die Folgen" (György Lukács and Consequences), in *AUFBAU* (Construction), Nos. 5-6, 1958. Willi Bredel, "Vom Glauben an die schöpferische Kraft des Proletariats" (On the Creative Power of the Proletariat), in *SONNTAG*, June 15, 1958.
- ²⁵ J. Elsberg, "Problems of Realism and the Tasks of the Study of Literature", in *VOPROSZI LITYERATURI*, No. 4, 1958. J. Elsberg, "On György Lukács's Erroneous Views", in *LITYERATURNAJA GAZETA*, No. 3906, 1958 (in Hungarian: in *UTUNK*, Kolozsvár, No. 34, 1958). A. G. Jigorov, "Against Revisionism in Esthetics", in *VOPROSZI FILOSZOFII*, No. 9, 1958.
- ²⁶ *SZABAD NÉP* (Free People), April 13, 1955.
- ²⁷ "Még egyszer a Lukács kérdésről" (Once More on the Lukács Problem), in *TÁRSADALMI SZEMLE*, November 1957. "Lukács György filozófiai és politikai nézeteinek összefüggései" (Interconnections between György Lukács's Philosophical and Political Views), in *TÁRSADALMI SZEMLE*, February 1958. "Művészeti alkotás és pártosság Lukács György esztétikájában" (Artistic Creation and Partisanship in György Lukács's Esthetics), in *TÁRSADALMI SZEMLE*, July-August 1958.
- ²⁸ *NEMZETKÖZI SZEMLE* (International Review), November 1957. Speech by Imre Kondor, Rádió Budapest, December 21, 1957. "Lukács György hibáiról" (On György Lukács's Errors), in *MAGYAR NEMZET* (Hungarian Nation), May 6, 1958. Gyula Kállai, *AZ MSZMP KULTURÁLIS PÓLITIKÁJA* (The Cultural Policies of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party), lecture, May 6, 1958. Imre Trencsényi-Waldapfel, "Revisionizmus az esztétikában" (Revisionism in Esthetics), in *ELET ÉS IRODALOM* (Life and Literature), November 14, 1958. Elemér Balogh, "Az irracionalizmus kritikájához" (On the Criticism of Irrationalism), in *MAGYAR FILOZÓFIAI SZEMLE* (Review of Hungarian Philosophy) Nos. 1-2, 1959 and Nos. 3-4, 1959. "A Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Filozófiai Intézetének Vitája Lukács György filozófiai munkásságáról" (The Discussion of the Institute of Philosophy of the Hungarian Academy of Science Concerning György Lukács's Philosophical Activity), in *MAGYAR FILOZÓFIAI SZEMLE*, Nos. 3-4, 1959. Béla Fogarasi, "A marxizmus és a revisionizmus harca a tudományban" (The War of Marxism and Revisionism in Science), lecture at the plenary session of the Hungarian Academy of Science, published in *MAGYAR FILOZÓFIAI SZEMLE*, Nos. 3-4, 1959. Béla Fogarasi, "Lukács György filozófiai koncepciójáról" (On György Lukács's Philosophical Conceptions), in *A BÉKE ÉS SZOCIÁLIZMUS KÉRDESEI* (Problems of Peace and Socialism), No. 6, 1959. Dr. Pál Földi, "Mégegyez a Lukács-kérdésről", (Once Again On the Lukács Problem), in *NÉPUJSÁG* (People's Paper) June 2, 3, 4, 5, 1959. László Nagy, "A Lukács ügyről" (On the Lukács Case), in *PÁRTELET*, August 1959.
- ²⁹ See note 27.
- ³⁰ *TÁRSADALMI SZEMLE*, February 1958.
- ³¹ *MAGYAR FILOZÓFIAI SZEMLE* (Review of Hungarian Philosophy), Nos. 3-4, 1959.
- ³² Mária Makai, *MAGYAR FILOZÓFIAI SZEMLE*, Nos. 3-4, 1959.
- ³³ *A KULÖNÖSSÉG MINT ESZTÉTIKAI KATEGÓRIA*, Akadémiai kiadó, Budapest, 1957, 255 pp.
- ³⁴ Béla Fogarasi, "A marxizmus és a revisionizmus harca a tudományban" (The War of Marxism and Revisionism in Science), in *MAGYAR FILOZÓFIAI SZEMLE*, Nos. 3-4, 1959.
- ³⁵ *TÁRSADALMI SZEMLE*, February 1958.
- ³⁶ *TÁRSADALMI SZEMLE*, July-August 1958.
- ³⁷ The Warsaw weekly *POLYTÍKA*, which was edited by Stefan Zolkiewski, then Minister of Higher Education, (Jan. 11, 1958.)

Silence

by

ROMAN BRANDSTAETTER

The first two acts of this play appeared in the May issue. Produced in 1957, it is perhaps the most powerful indictment of Stalinism that has yet appeared in Poland. Roman Brandstaetter, playwright and poet, was born in 1906.

The Ponilowski family's one-room apartment. Door in center opens into kitchen, door on right leads to small anteroom. Window on left looks out on neighboring building. A picture of Our Lady of Czestochowa hangs over divan. The action takes place in 1951, in Warsaw.

KSAWERY is a disillusioned writer, a former Communist who has become an alcoholic. When his boyhood friend PIOTR NIEDZICKI, whom he has not seen in years, comes to him in flight from the political police, Ksawery agrees to let him stay for several days in the apartment while he arranges to escape from Poland. But Ksawery's daughter by a former marriage, WANDA, an ardent Communist, discovers the arrangement and tells the police, who take Niedzicki away. FELIKS WITOWICZ is a State prosecutor who lives next door. As Act III opens, it is evening of the same day. The room is in semi-darkness. IRENA, Ksawery's wife, is sitting in the armchair. Ksawery is lying on the divan.

IRENA: It's just been a few hours, but it seems to me as if a whole eternity has passed (*Ksawery is silent*). Or maybe it's only a dream? (*Ksawery is silent*). I touch my hands, my knees, my head, just to convince myself I actually lived through it all (*Ksawery is silent*). Yes, it is reality. A horrible reality.

KSAWERY: What reality are you talking about?

IRENA: The one that has caused your downfall.

KSAWERY (*smiles*): Nonsense. There is as much reality as there are moments, and each is different. The reality of suffering is different from the reality of happiness (*he raises himself. Sits up*). The reality of the victor is different from that of the loser. The reality of night is different from the reality of day.

IRENA: Where am I? What's happening to me? Is it possible? Is it possible? (*Ksawery goes to radio and turns it on. He tunes in to a discussion about the fall harvest. He turns the dial again. Stops when he hears the strains of Ravel's "Bolero". Put on the light.*)

KSAWERY (*sits down*): I want to sit in the dark.

IRENA: You're afraid to look into my eyes.

KSAWERY: I prefer to sit in the dark, that's all. It helps me feel I don't exist.

IRENA (*covers face with hands*): Judas! (*she bursts out crying*).

KSAWERY: I didn't turn him in (*Irena cries. Ksawery says violently*): I didn't turn him in! I didn't! I didn't!

IRENA (*sobbing*): You're lying, lying!

KSAWERY: I've been telling you over and over for an hour that I didn't turn him in!

IRENA (*sobbing*): You're lying!

KSAWERY: I didn't turn him in! Wanda went to them!

IRENA: You sent her.

KSAWERY: I didn't send her. Irena, I beg you . . .

IRENA: You sent her! Out of cowardice! Out of fear! There's nothing in you but fear! Nothing! Every nerve in your body, every bone, every cell, every one of your words, every thought is made of fear!

KSAWERY: I swear on all that I hold sacred in my life that I didn't send Wanda!

IRENA: What sacred things do you have in your life? What? God? The Party? Your country? Your children? Me? You don't believe in God. You don't believe in the Party. Your country is just as unimportant to you as your children! And me? My dear, I can't go on living with you any longer (*Ksawery turns off radio*). Why should I keep on hiding matters that should be brought out into the open for both your good and mine? We probably don't love each other any more. You don't have the courage to admit it. And I have no other feeling for you, save pity. You killed love in me. When I sit next to you I feel as if all the darkness of the world were flowing over me. Your words and thoughts are to me an unfathomable darkness. That is punishment, Ksawery, I know it's punishment!

KSAWERY (*whispers*): What punishment?

IRENA: You left your wife because of me, I broke up your marriage, I married you in a civil ceremony. But I was stupid, naive. I thought I'd be able to reform you, that under my influence you'd change your way of life and become another man. That you'd stop drinking. That you'd write. I was wrong! (*Ksawery is silent*) There was evil in my love and evil in my actions, though, God knows,

my intentions were good and pure. It's done now. There was no simple and just road, but I tricked my conscience (*Ksawery is silent*). I deserve my suffering. After sleepless nights I ask God for the grace to have power returned to my prayers. Ksawery, I want to be reconciled with God. You're standing in my way.

KSAWERY: Are you going to leave me?

IRENA: Yes.

KSAWERY (*whispers*): Where will you go?

IRENA: To my sister. Then, later, I'll decide what to do with myself.

KSAWERY: Go on. Go. Do what you want. Leave me. Curse me! But I ask one thing. Please don't believe that I turned Piotr in. Irena, listen . . . it wasn't I . . . Really, not I . . . How could you suspect it was I? Irena . . . Wanda should be back soon and she'll tell you, Irena . . . (*Wanda enters. Irena goes to window and stands with her back towards Ksawery and Wanda. Ksawery goes towards Wanda, his lips are quivering, he grabs her hand violently*). Talk, you bitch!

WANDA: Are you crazy? What do you want from me?!

KSAWERY: Talk, you bitch! (*he pushes her. Irena whirls around. Wanda falls into a chair. Ksawery raises his arm as if to strike her*). You!

WANDA (*shields her head with both arms*): Father! Father!

IRENA: What are you doing? You're hitting the girl!

KSAWERY: Get out of my way! (*with a violent movement of the hand he pushes Irena away. He grabs Wanda by the shoulder, shakes her and yells*). Talk! Did I send you! Talk! Talk! Tell the truth! Let Irena hear it! (*Wanda is silent*) Talk! (*Wanda is silent*) Talk! (*Wanda is silent*). I want Irena to hear the truth!! The whole truth!

WANDA: Yes, you sent me.

KSAWERY (*stops dead. His voice is strangled*): I? I sent you?

WANDA (*rises from chair and speaks calmly*): Yes. You.

KSAWERY (*helplessly*): Irena . . . Irena . . . that's not true. It wasn't I! It was she . . . It wasn't I . . . (*he stretches his arms towards Irena*) Irena . . . how can I prove to you that she's lying? How?! I don't know how . . . (*he sits down. Irena puts on her coat*) It wasn't I . . . It wasn't I . . . (*Irena exits. Silence. Ksawery stares ahead indifferently. Wanda stands under wall with head down*). What have you done? (*Wanda is silent*) What have you done? How could you do it? I am . . . (*Wanda is silent*) But it's . . . Wanda, tell me . . .

WANDA: I couldn't let you find yourself on the other side of the barricade, next to Irena and Niedzicki. Was I supposed to look on calmly at everything that's been happening under this roof? I realized that all your roads are leading straight to the enemy's camp . . . irrevocably. I felt the hour would soon strike that will determine your fate and that I cannot remain silent any longer. I realized that one more false step and you'll be standing on the other

bank, from which there is no return.

KSAWERY: And that's why you went to . . .

WANDA: Yes. I went and said you sent me. Anyway, I couldn't say I had come without your knowledge or against your will. I believe that I have bound you again to our cause by what I did.

KSAWERY: And that's why you lied when you told Irena that I had sent you?

WANDA: I want to free you from Irena. She doesn't understand you, or your struggles, or reality. She's living in another time. It's enough to look at her when she listens to the London radio to understand the nonsense by which she lives. She thinks that one day when she looks out the window she'll see white horses and storybook lancers galloping through the square. That's her Poland. What does she care about the struggle with illiteracy? The construction of a new oven in a cement plant? Our cares are not her cares. Our achievements are not her achievements. Father, Irena must leave you. That's why I spoke so contemptuously of you whenever I talked with her, because I wanted her to hate you. Father, I want Irena to leave you. I want you to return to my mother. You deserted a wonderful, brave woman, who was your companion in every trial and difficulty, who suffered so deeply and lived through such hard times when you were in jail, in Hitler's jail. I'll never forget her tears.

KSAWERY: Do you think you can remake a man in the way you have chosen?

WANDA: If my mother were threatened with danger I would try to warn her and defend her against the enemy. There is no power on earth which could keep me from helping her. My ideal is my mother. It speaks to me with her words, it has her eyes and her voice. I love her. And you ask me to remain silent when I see a hand reaching for my mother's throat? And you ask me when danger threatens her to turn my head and not see the hand which is aiming at her?

KSAWERY: You have no feelings any more, Wanda. And that's why, perhaps, you're happy. It's good that you're happy, Wanda (*places his hand on her shoulder*). You're still young. You haven't yet experienced anything in life. There's still much you don't know. You don't know the meaning of disappointment and that horrible moment when you see your face in the mirror, but don't recognize it. You really can't tell whether it's your own face, or just a mask. And suddenly you begin to doubt whether your face exists at all. Whether these wrinkles, grimace of mouth and shine of eyes are not just one face out of the thousands man wears. Is it at all possible to see the true countenance of man? Every face is a mask. I know that I'm not myself. I know that my mask has become so closely glued to my face that sometimes it's difficult for me to tell what in me is a lie and what truth. When you grow wiser, Wanda, you'll remember my words. And you'll understand then. Now do what you want.

WANDA (*grabs Ksawery's hand*): Tomorrow you'll go to give your testimony (*Ksawery frees himself from Wanda's embrace*). You'll give your testimony.

KSAWERY: If I go I'll have to lie that I sent you. If I go and say that I didn't send you I'll be passing sentence on myself. If I don't go. . . . A labyrinth! A horrible labyrinth with no way out! You pushed me into it, Wanda! You! I'm smashing my head against its walls because of you! But I'll never be able to smash them with my head! I can't! Wanda! Get out of my sight! Get out of my house! I don't want to see you here! Go! Go! Go! Do what you want! Go!

WANDA: Are these your last words?

KSAWERY: The last! The last! the last!

WANDA: Remember, father, whatever happens you can always count on my help (she exits).

KSAWERY (goes to window, opens it wide. *Breathes deeply. Sounds of a piano playing can be heard from far away. Someone is playing Chopin's "Rain Prelude."* Ksawery goes to sideboard. Looks for something. Doesn't find it. Goes to the closet and continues his search there. After a few moments he takes out bottle of vodka from behind hanging dresses. Brings glass. Sits at table and starts drinking one, two, three glasses. Smiles): Old drunkards like me can get drunk on two glasses. That's good. It costs less. And Irena says I drink all our money away. She always exaggerates (drinks again. Bends head down and remains unmoving, only pouring and drinking a glass of vodka from time to time. The strains of the "Rain Prelude" can still be heard from afar). They've been playing that Chopin from time immemorial and they still haven't learned about Poland. Or maybe it's not Poland at all! Maybe it's death that's in his music? Who can tell? Anyway, it can't be so bad if it's as beautiful as Chopin (he laughs). The hell with such music! (Silence. He drinks one more glass of vodka and looks at bottle with disgust. Drops it on the floor). Boredom, gray boredom. All of life is boredom. All my life I never even once got to enjoy the fruits of my work. Wanda—that's the fruit of my life. Does boredom begin when we're deprived of the fruits of our labors? And maybe my whole life is only an illusion? It keeps rushing by so fast now. Before, at least, it could be stopped, if only for a minute, to create the illusion of possession, existence, permanence. And today? There is no contemporaneity (he laughs). The past melts right into the future. And that's that . . . that's that . . . Nothing more (stares ahead). Autumn. Smoke lingering over dying fields. Cows returning from meadows through the fog and the rain. The shepherd, in a burlap coat, plays a sad melody on his fife . . . Fatherland. My fatherland . . . Why has there always been so much sadness in this fatherland? So much miserable, hopeless sadness? The Polish road . . . I walk ahead, knowing I go nowhere, without a goal, always without a goal. Clouds are milling somewhere on the horizon, the wind blows more and more sharply, whistling in the rushes, wailing in the reeds, wheedling out the smoke from low-lying, dirt huts and bunching it into tiny wisps. A stormy autumn night is breaking. Why are there so many cloudy nights in Poland? And so few fair days? And why do people in Poland cry so much? For centuries they've been crying, crying, crying . . . Is that all Poland is, just tears? The Polish road.

. . . (Witowicz enters). You've come. It's good you've come.

WITOWICZ: Have you been drinking again?

KSAWERY: That's about it, my friend. One has to get loaded at times. They're playing. Do you know what it is they're playing?

WITOWICZ: Chopin.

KSAWERY: And do you know who Chopin was?

WITOWICZ: No. I don't.

KSAWERY: No? Well, I'll tell you. He had TB. Like you. But they didn't know anything about collapsing lungs and streptomycin then. If they had they probably would have saved him. Health. Hygiene. Vigor. The hope of the nation! Culture was made by people with TB, syphilis, guys with split personalities, cardiac troubles, unbalanced metabolism. And what of it? Now get out of this labyrinth, Feliks? There's no way out, no way out . . . (the music stops. Witowicz is silent). I watched you at dinner.

WITOWICZ: So?

KSAWERY: I saw your pinched face, hollowed eyes and trembling hands.

WITOWICZ: Your hands were shaking, too.

KSAWERY: You saw?

WITOWICZ: Yes.

KSAWERY: They taught us to look at one another's hands, eh?

WITOWICZ: What are you talking about?

KSAWERY: About the same thing that you're thinking about right now.

WITOWICZ: I'm thinking of Irena. And you?

KSAWERY: About that louse, Niedzicki (Witowicz indifferently shrugs his shoulders. Ksawery slaps him on the back). Did what you said happened in court really happen?

WITOWICZ: What?

KSAWERY: The story you told us so nicely at dinner.

WITOWICZ: You must have been drunk. I talked about something that happened in court? What are you dreaming about?

KSAWERY: Don't make an idiot out of me (Witowicz is silent. Silence). You talked to Irena?

WITOWICZ: I did.

KSAWERY: Did she tell you everything?

WITOWICZ: Yes. He wanted to skip out of the country?

KSAWERY: I think so.

WITOWICZ: You think?

KSAWERY: How could I tell?

WITOWICZ: Didn't he tell you?

KSAWERY: He told me nothing . . .

WITOWICZ: You're afraid of me?

KSAWERY: Only as much as you are of me (*Witowicz is silent. Silence*). Wanda eavesdropped on my talk with Niedzicki. She went to the militia and reported that Piotr wants to get out of the country. She wanted to save me. Some cure, eh? Irena doesn't believe me. She's convinced it was I who sent Wanda. Do you believe me?

WITOWICZ: I believe you.

KSAWERY: It's good that at least you believe me. What sort of a sentence can Niedzicki expect?

WITOWICZ: I don't know.

KSAWERY: He wanted to skip out of the country.

WITOWICZ: Yes.

KSAWERY: Well?

WITOWICZ: But he's an innocent man.

KSAWERY: You think so? (*Witowicz smiles*). You think he's innocent? (*Witowicz is silent*). And how about me, am I guilty?

WITOWICZ: No.

KSAWERY: Is Wanda guilty?

WITOWICZ: Also no.

KSAWERY: And Irena?

WITOWICZ: No.

KSAWERY: So who is guilty (*Witowicz is silent*). Somebody must be guilty! (*Witowicz is silent*). The cause?

WITOWICZ: No.

KSAWERY: The system?

WITOWICZ: No.

KSAWERY: The people? (*Witowicz is silent*). Which? (*Witowicz is silent*). Which Feliks?

WITOWICZ: The people who have come to believe they are gods (*silence*).

KSAWERY: Feliks, I have something important I want to ask of you.

WITOWICZ: I'm listening.

KSAWERY: Tell Irena it wasn't I who informed on Niedzicki. Convince her of that. You can do it. You alone can explain it to her. You see . . . I can't reconcile myself to the thought that Irena believes me to be a scoundrel. The realization hurts me, eats away right here, at my heart. It's a terribly painful, degrading feeling.

WITOWICZ: I'll try to convince her.

KSAWERY: You swear?

WITOWICZ: I swear.

KSAWERY: Feliks . . . (*Witowicz raises his head and looks at Ksawery*). Are you in love with Irena?

WITOWICZ: Yes, I am.

KSAWERY: Very much?

WITOWICZ: Yes.

KSAWERY: Do you need her to live?

WITOWICZ: Yes.

KSAWERY: You can't live without her? (*Witowicz is silent*). I thought so, too, once. Take her. I'll give her to you. (*Witowicz looks at Ksawery. Irena enters*). You've come back? We were talking about you (*she takes off her coat*). Aren't you interested in what we were saying?

IRENA: Why don't you go to bed?

KSAWERY: I will. I'll go and lie down in the kitchen, on Wanda's bed. I ran her out of the house. What do I need a daughter like that for? Take it easy, Irenka, you, too, Feliks. Adieu (*he exits into kitchen. Silence*).

IRENA: He's been drinking again. He'll ruin his health completely. Did he really throw Wanda out?

WITOWICZ: I think he did.

IRENA: Everything he does is senseless. The girl will roam the streets. It's night.

WITOWICZ: Nothing will happen to her. She'll sleep at her girl friend's and come back tomorrow morning. In the meantime Ksawery will have a good night's sleep and get up tomorrow sober and reflective (*silence*).

IRENA: I don't have any one to ask for advice, Mr. Witowicz. I don't know what to do.

WITOWICZ: I'd be glad to advise you.

IRENA: I've decided to break with Ksawery (*Witowicz is silent*). I can't live with him any longer. I just can't. It's beyond my strength.

WITOWICZ: I think you will do right to leave Ksawery.

IRENA: Why?

WITOWICZ: I doubt if he really needs you. Some problems must be viewed realistically. Ksawery spells your downfall. He cannot give you any values and you can offer him no more of yours. Sometimes there comes a moment when a man, wanting to start a new life, must admit the bankruptcy of his past desires and goals.

IRENA: I don't know whether I am doing right, leaving Ksawery at such a difficult moment in his life. Perhaps what I'm doing is immoral. Maybe I should stay with him and help him get out of the trap he's fallen into. I should try to save him. I know it.

WITOWICZ: Do you want to complicate your life even more? Is it still not complicated enough? Mrs. Irena, don't bother your head about Ksawery who should be left alone with his fate. You won't save him, but you will drown yourself in the fluid of deterioration swirling all around him.

IRENA: There are duties, my dear Mr. Feliks, which one must bear even against one's own will (*silence*).

WITOWICZ: I remember when I once came into this room. You were still asleep. I stopped on the threshold. I could hear your measured, calm breathing and I remember thinking that only a person with a clear conscience could sleep so peacefully.

IRENA: What are you saying? I have a clear conscience? (*she smiles bitterly*).

WITOWICZ: Your sins are a civil wedding ceremony and

not going to confession. Is that right? Those are your sins. Silly superstitions! You don't know what sin is! In my dreams people cry for justice, they cry for the joy of life, the right to be happy, to trust! In my dreams, Mrs. Irena, there are endless lines of ruins, ruins of human beings, a hundred times more terrible than the ruins of cities, houses, and factories, crushed lives, mutilated human fates! When I wake—I am silent. I must be silent. Because what could I say? How? How can I scream out my bitterness, my pain and my despair? How? Tell me how can you scream, how find the bell that must be struck to sound the alarm, a bell with a heart, a true heart! It doesn't exist. I must remain silent! And that silence is a terrible sin. Not against your God, but against humanity! Against all those who want a peaceful life, a secure home, work that gives satisfaction and the realization of those ideals for which they suffered so in prisons and camps, for which they vomited their lungs, like me! Like me! *(he coughs)*. It's hot in my room, stifling hot. My bed clothes are hot. Very hot. Maybe from my punctured lung, or perhaps from my thoughts. And then I look for you beside me. Ksawery doesn't need you. I need you.

IRENA: Perhaps he really doesn't need me. Maybe there's nothing more I can do here. How can I help a man who consciously behaves as if he wanted to sink all the way down *(covers her face with her hands)*. How can I live with a Judas? How can I live with a Judas? *(Witowicz looks at Irena)*. I don't have the strength *(silence)*.

WITOWICZ: Mrs. Irena? *(Irena lifts her head)*. I will ask you a question and you must give an honest answer.

IRENA: Go ahead.

WITOWICZ: Would you decide to stay with Ksawery if it turned out that he . . .

IRENA: Why did you stop?

WITOWICZ: That Ksawery is not a Judas?

IRENA: If it turned out that Ksawery . . .

WITOWICZ: Yes.

IRENA: If it turned out?

WITOWICZ: Please answer honestly.

IRENA: I would try to help him.

WITOWICZ: And you would go back to him?

IRENA: There are duties, my dear Mr. Feliks, which one must fulfill even against one's will *(a long moment of silence)*.

WITOWICZ *(lights cigarette, paces room several times, stops in front of Irena and, after a moment's hesitation, speaks*

out matter of factly): Ksawery didn't send Wanda.

IRENA: I don't understand.

WITOWICZ: I think I've made myself clear enough.

IRENA: What?

WITOWICZ: I meant exactly what I said.

IRENA: How do you know?

WITOWICZ: So you don't want to believe me either?

IRENA: Wait a minute . . .

WITOWICZ: I think that after all we have said to each other you should not doubt my sincerity. Ksawery did not send Wanda. Wanda lied. She had the best of motives. She wanted to save her father. Anyway, anyone who knows Ksawery even a little should know that he is not capable of making any decision—good or bad. He is a man who today knows only how to vacillate, cruise back and forth along his own beaten track, wearing out himself, and others, in a completely senseless struggle . . .

IRENA: Mr. Witowicz!

WITOWICZ: It's all right, Mrs. Irena, it's all right.

IRENA: Mr. Witowicz!

WITOWICZ: Go and wake him up. Tell him you believe in his innocence.

IRENA *(after a moment's hesitation)*: All right, I'll go *(goes out to kitchen and leaves door ajar. Witowicz sits in armchair, lights a cigarette. Irena, from kitchen)*: The bulb's burned out . . . *(Witowicz is silent. Irena calls from kitchen)* Ksawery . . . *(Witowicz is silent. Irena calls from kitchen)* I can't find the matches . . . Aha . . . here they are . . . *(sound of match being lit)* Ksawery . . . *(louder)* Come on, wake up. Get up, Ksawery . . . Let's talk *(Witowicz still sits lost in thought. Irena, from the kitchen, much louder now)* Ksawery! Ksawery! What's the matter with you?! What's happened?! *(silence. Suddenly Irena screams terribly)* Jesus, Mary! Jesus, Mary! *(Witowicz jumps from chair, runs towards kitchen door. Irena enters room, barely able to stand up. She is deathly pale. Her hands are trembling. She whispers hoarsely, conveying desperate misery)*: What have you done, Ksawery? What have you done? *(she bursts into violent sobs. Witowicz dashes into kitchen. Irena, sobbing)* How could he do it? How could he do it??

WITOWICZ *(enters from kitchen. Whispers)*: He preferred to remain silent, Mrs. Irena. He preferred to remain silent.

(Curtain descends slowly)

Book Review

An Almost Perfect Guide

RUSSIA AND THE WEST UNDER LENIN AND STALIN, by George F. Kennan, Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1961, 411 pp., \$5.75.

BERTRAM D. WOLFE

AFTER THE FLOOD of tracts in journalese which serve up yesterday's warmed-over headlines and news stories as current history, it is a pleasure to come upon a book like George Kennan's latest. It is a history of our diplomatic and "undiplomatic" relations with Russia over three decades written against the background of the history of the period from World War I to the death of Stalin. Its author has spent much of his life in our diplomatic service in posts that are central to an understanding of the events narrated here and their meaning. He brings to his interpretation the intimate knowledge of an insider, the patience of an historical investigator and the engaging personality of a moralist, along with the simple, clear and vivid style of a man who knows what he thinks and how to say it. Moreover, the fact that it is made up from lectures originally delivered at Oxford and Harvard, the style of which has not been too much altered, gives it accessibility for general reading as well as for use as a text in courses on Soviet-American relations. It is good to know that it has been selected by the Book-of-the-Month Club, for it should be read by every

literate American. It should be read by every Russian too, if only Khrushchev could be persuaded to admit into his body politic the "poison" of this honorable, honest, tolerant and detached account of the relations between our two lands over three crucial decades. However, it has less chance of getting to the Russian people than *Doctor Zhivago*, and if its author were to take to the radio in his excellent Russian, Khrushchev would take good care to assure that this gentle and wise voice should not be heard above the jamming.

Before examining the riches to be found in this book, I must make one *caveat*. I should like to be able to say, with perhaps a minor reservation here or there, that the book is brilliant and unexceptionable from first to last. But, itemizing it by chapters, I can only say that it is good from first to *next to last*. The twenty-four chapters which deal with the matters promised in the title, namely our relations with Russia under Lenin and Stalin, are truly first-rate. But in the final chapter where, without the prolonged thought and systematic research that he has devoted to the rest, Mr. Kennan undertakes to offer some *obiter dicta* on the age of Khrushchev and on the nature of totalitarianism, he becomes in this reviewer's opinion a poor guide for our current thinking and conduct of affairs. However, this is not the first time that George Ken-

nan has proved to be a most brilliant historian of yesterday's diplomacy and an uncertain guide to today's. One need only think of his Reith Lectures—*Russia, the Atom and the West*—with their proposals for "disengagement" in Central Europe and his strange "personal guarantee" that if we followed his advice he could assure us of the future of Germany and other threatened areas. But before we consider the last chapter of Kennan's new book, we must have a look at the twenty-four brilliant chapters which precede it.

Democracy's Handicap

The author's first concern is to put the "conflict of two worlds" with which he deals into its setting as an aspect of the general crisis of European and Western civilization which has marked the years since 1914. The crisis is evidenced by—and in large measure derived from—the two world wars that have occurred in the course of it, each succeeded by an uneasy and doubtful peace and a powder train of revolutions and conflicts.

Both these wars were total: total in scope, total in their mobilization of men, materials and passions, total in the illusions men nourished concerning their meaning and the results to be expected from them. Both wars, the author rightly contends, involved a false estimate of what a war might be expected to accomplish (a world safe for democracy; a world free forever from militarism and aggression; one world made up of united na-

Bertram D. Wolfe, whose articles on Soviet affairs have appeared in many magazines, is the author of *Three Who Made a Revolution* (1948), *Six Keys to the Soviet System* (1956) and *Khrushchev and Stalin's Ghost* (1957). His *Communist Totalitarianism* will be published by Beacon Press in October.

tions), and indeed a false estimate of war as a means to an end. In both wars we failed to realize to what extent prolonged warfare, with its fearful expenditure of blood and substance, its complete breakdown of entire systems and areas of the earth, was bound to be self-defeating and create more problems than it solved.

Democracy, the author gloomily suggests, is prone to misunderstand the meaning of the wars it engages in, although in less ideological ways than totalitarianism. Universal suffrage, universal literacy, and universal military service have brought inexperienced millions into the arena of response to and influence upon foreign policy. The age of limited wars and specialist statesmen, military men and diplomats, has given ground to that of the summit conference enacted before radio and television, devoted to hectic conversations between heads of state imperfectly briefed on the problems they must hurriedly "settle," and absorbed with matters of mass impact and public relations. Summity may be all very well for the permanent and infallible authority on everything who heads a totalitarian state, but, as Kennan demonstrates, it is a harmful way for a democracy to carry on diplomacy.

Moreover, when a whole nation is to be set into voluntary action by elected leaders whom it raises out of its own midst and who reflect and share its misunderstandings, it is hard indeed to set realistic and limited war aims, hard to see the possibility and need of compromises, hard to see the enemy as anything but the incarnation of absolute evil, hard to see one's own land as anything but incarnate perfection. It is hard to see one's allies, even one's accidental and reluctant allies like a Stalin, as anything but total and unmixed good, as fit company in all things for a "crusade." It is hard to remember one's own imperfections and to take stock of one's own errors, harder to perceive an opponent's possible virtues, hardest of all to remember the transitoriness of alliances in history, and the transitoriness of enmities, too. It is hard to keep in mind that, on the day after an enemy's surrender, one may begin to wish that he had not created

a dangerous power vacuum and chaos where was once an enemy country.

On this background of secular crisis and misapprehended war, Mr. Kennan gives a narrative of the major events of our time which have determined the relations between Russia and the West and between Germany and Russia. He has paid scant attention to Italy, and looked at the other continents only to consider the relations of Russia and the United States to China and Japan. The events he has chosen to examine are narrated with great clarity and examined with penetration and profound understanding. Many of the principal actors, notably Wilson, Lenin, Chicherin, Rathenau, Molotov, Hitler, Ribbentrop, Stalin and Franklin Roosevelt, are sketched in remarkably vivid profiles. Their errors and shortcomings are treated both clearly and compassionately, which is indeed a rare combination. The events come to life, the outlook of the participants who do not, like the historian, have the benefit of hindsight, is understood and explained before it is judged. When Kennan interrupts the narrative to make his own wry reflections on what might have been, it is always with becoming diffidence. So well is the story told, and so just the vast majority of the judgments, that one scarcely notes the hard digging that must have gone into the research, or the hard thinking that must have gone into arriving at a judgment. The specialist as well as the general reader, indeed even the high-level participant in these events, will get a deeper understanding of them and of the age through which we have lived.

A First-Rate History

It is impossible in the space of a review to give an exhaustive account of the many insights to be found in this book. Among the high points, I should like to note the following: an analysis of how the Allies helped Lenin to power by failing to realize that Russia neither could nor should be coerced into attempting to continue the war after the collapse of her government and the breakdown of her capacity to wage war; an account of the way in which the Entente called for a revolution in Germany, and,

when they got it, ignored it and attempted to force an impossible peace upon the Weimar Republic; an examination of the way in which this policy helped to bring Hitler to power; a study of the Comintern as an instrument of war on the free world; a report of the disputes between the leaders of the two worlds arising from mutual misunderstanding which become talk-at-each-other without ever being a true dialogue, and of treaties which never represent a true agreement; a forthright—yet never harsh—appraisal of the major errors of a Wilson or a Franklin Roosevelt that have contributed to the bringing about of the present state of the world. I could enlarge this list of good things in the book considerably, for almost every page contains some fresh insight and every chapter does well what it attempts. In short, Mr. Kennan has written a first-rate history of our time as it expresses itself in the conflict which today dominates it. It remains only to consider the final chapter, which goes beyond the promised theme of "Russia and the West under Lenin and Stalin" for a cursory glance at the age of Khrushchev.

Dangerous Conclusions

Reading the chapter on "Stalin as Statesman," I began to suspect that there might be something askew in Kennan's appraisal of Khrushchev, for he makes somewhat too much of Stalin's undoubted malevolence, suspiciousness, secretiveness and paranoia in his last years, and not enough of the durable features in the closed system of Soviet totalitarianism. The last chapter is absorbed with the discontinuities, real and hopefully imagined, between Khrushchev's regime and that of Stalin; it voices some of those illusions which arise from decency and from the longing to wish the hard facts of the protracted conflict in which we are engaged well on their way to oblivion.

Now there can be no doubt that Khrushchev is not Stalin, as Stalin was not Lenin. In a personal dictatorship, as in an autocracy (and indeed any system with a strong executive), the personality of the dictator, autocrat or executive is bound to set its

imprint upon his period of rule. But it is folly for Kennan to assure us that it is "hard for any other Stalin" to appear; folly to use such beguiling and inappropriate formulae as "normal level of recalcitrance" from which Khrushchev's rule and foreign policy is judged to differ "only as a matter of degree"; folly to compare the "normally strong competitive elements in international life" (the basic fact in Anglo-American competition or in American-Canadian is the tolerance of the competitive system under the rule of live and let live) with this unending war to bury us and transform the world according to the blueprint of the men in the Kremlin. It is folly, too, to speak of Khrushchev's use of the Central Committee to destroy his opponents in the Presidium as a "rudimentary parliamentarism." And, in the face of Khrushchev's ruthlessness in Hungary, his reaching out into Cuba, Laos and the Congo, his attack on the United Nations, it is folly to remind us that no one center can really aspire to rule the world. This last is true, though through missiles and rockets the world is still shrinking under our eyes, but a determined ideologist of a world system with "allies" and puppets can make quite a mess of it through subsidies, subversion, support of hostile rulers and movements, and the kindling of fires on all continents.

To do Kennan justice, every one of these falsely comforting formulations is hedged and limited by some explicit qualification and glance at its opposite. But the total effect, even as qualified, is to leave the reader more than ever a prey to the illusions with which, under Lenin and Stalin as now under Khrushchev, we have always been ready to delude ourselves. Having been born in an open and rapidly changing society, we are prone to imagine that such degree of muta-

bility is a general law of history, and to forget that despotisms have a rigid institutional framework which can last for decades and centuries and that they can absorb within this framework changes which in open societies would bring about alterations in the basic structure itself. The framework of continuities which Khrushchev inherited, and can and does guard as "the apple of his eye," include such things as an atomized society; a centralized, monolithic, monopolistic single-party state; a regime of absolute force supplemented by persuasion and by continuous "psychological warfare" on its own people; a managerial bureaucracy accustomed to take orders and execute them (with a little elbow room for regularized evasion); a centrally managed, totally state-owned and party-directed economy including farms, factories, banks, transport and communications, and all trade domestic and foreign; an established dogmatic priority for the branches of industry which serve the power of the state and the party; a bare subsistence economy for the bulk of the producers; a completely statized and "collectivized" agriculture; a powerful, one-sided forced-tempo industrialization and militarization, centralized even beyond the point of rationality from the standpoint of totalitarianism itself; the techniques and momentums of a succession of one-sided, speed-up Five and Seven Year "Plans"; a completely managed and controlled culture (except for the secret recesses of the spirit); a monopoly of all the means of mass communication and expression; a state-owned and monopolized system of "criticism" and "self-criticism"; an infallible doctrine stemming from infallible authorities, interpreted and applied by an infallible party led by an infallible leader; a method of advance by zigzags to basically unchanging goals domestic and

foreign; a system of promotion, demotion, removal, condemnation, correction of error, modification of strategy and tactics and elimination of differences by fiat from the summit or the leader, implemented by purges of varying scope and intensity; a commitment to continuing revolution from above until the Soviet subject has been remade according to the blueprint possessed by the men in the Kremlin as interpreted by the man at the top, and until Communism has "buried us" and won the world. Moreover, where there are no organized checks on the flow of power to the top, dictatorship will invariably beget its dictator, infallible doctrine its infallible interpreter, totally organized and militarized life its supreme commander, and a voiceless people its arbitrary and even off-the-cuff spokesman.

It is essential to note the differences in personality and style of each successive dictator, and to do what one can to make use of them. But where our statemen have erred, as indeed all the rest of Kennan's book beautifully demonstrates, it has been by concentrating their gaze on these differences and exaggerating their import. What is more important for our guidance in the protracted and indefinitely long conflict in which we are engaged, is to understand the basic framework of totalitarianism, and to still the longing for illusion which is such a poor guide, while we experimentally make the most of every secondary difference. If, in place of Kennan's last chapter, we could add to his remarkably fine history the tiny hard-cover pamphlet by Salvador de Madariaga called "The Blowing Up of the Parthenon," we would have an ideal guide for every perplexed American, and an ideal textbook for every course in "The Soviets in World Affairs."

Eastern Europe at the UN

This department is devoted to a running chronology of the more significant activities and statements of the Soviet bloc representatives at the United Nations.

THE CONGO

March 28 Addressing the General Assembly, Poland's delegate Winiewicz declared that the UN Command in the Congo should provide military assistance to the "central government" of Antoine Gizenga as part of its drive to maintain unity and the rule of law in the country. Winiewicz also insisted that UN Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold could not escape responsibility for the fate of Patrice Lumumba and for the present situation in the Congo. In this regard, Winiewicz stated that Poland did not accept the Secretary General's argument that the UN Command in the Congo had behaved the way it had because of its strict neutrality toward various political factions in the Congo. Under this guise, Winiewicz maintained, the UN had actually prevented the "central government" of Gizenga from uniting the Congo. The Polish government, he declared, had lost confidence in the present Secretary General and called for his resignation because, by remaining neutral between law and lawlessness, he had played into the hands of the enemies of Congolese independence and had thus undermined the principles of the UN charter.

March 29 Eduard Mezincescu, chairman of the Romanian delegation, described to the General Assembly the "indisputable fact of the United Nations' failure in the Congo." He stated further that all the difficulties in the Congo were the result of a "colonial plot." As an antidote, he proposed: condemnation of and sanctions against Belgium; the restoration of order by recognizing Gizenga; the withdrawal of UN forces after one month; and the reconvening of the Congolese parliament. Echoing the Soviet line, Mezincescu said: "Sooner or later the great majority of members of the General Assembly will come to recognize that the United Nations cannot live up to the obligations entrusted to the organization by the Charter if the implementation of its decisions is left in the hands of the representatives of one group of powers—precisely, the NATO powers, which, whatever one may say, join all the colonial powers in a nice bouquet."

March 30 Making similar charges, Bulgaria's Milko Tarabanov declared before the General Assembly that the political assassinations in the Congo were the result of an organized scheme by the "colonizers and their agents." Belgian machinations, he said, had received the support of all the Western powers, the UN Secretariat, Kasavubu and all political leaders of the Congo with the exception of Antoine Gizenga. Tarabanov concluded, however, that

the Congolese people would "triumph over the sinister world-wide plan of the colonialists." Like his Soviet colleagues, Tarabanov demanded that Hammarskjold resign and that the Secretariat be split into three parts. Such a reorganization was urgently needed, he said, to make certain that the "crimes" committed in the Congo were not repeated in the rest of Africa.

March 30 The problem of financing UN operations in the Congo received the attention of the Czechoslovak delegate Miroslav Nacvalac, who supported the Soviet position that only the Security Council (where the USSR wields a veto) was competent to decide all budgetary questions in this matter. Nacvalac deplored the Budgetary Committee's "dangerous action" in circumventing the Security Council (by treating an Indian resolution granting Hammarskjold temporary authorization to continue committing UN funds to the Congo) and charged that Hammarskjold makes decisions that properly belong to the Security Council in gross violation of the UN Charter and in the interests of his "imperialist masters." Nacvalac pressed for Hammarskjold's resignation and declared that Czechoslovakia would not feel bound by any financial decisions taken by the Budgetary Committee in regard to the Congo.

April 2 Expounding on the same theme, Romania's delegate spoke against the Indian resolution, ridiculing the "dramatic exhortations" of its backers. He pooh-poohed the "sudden sense of emergency" which led to the resolution's presentation, and scoffed at the idea that continued action in the Congo was needed for the UN to survive. "Nothing could be more damaging to the prestige and authority of the United Nations," he insisted, "than the fact that the whole world knows right now that the Belgian colonizers are getting what they want under the flag of the UN." (The Indian resolution passed by a vote of 51 in favor and 10 against—the latter comprising the Soviet bloc, Mali and Guinea. There were 22 abstentions.)

April 3 Poland's delegate Czarkowski also disputed the "legality" of the Indian resolution, claiming that only the Security Council could determine the strength of the force and the duration of the Congo operation and that decisions in this regard were fundamental to decisions concerning the costs of the Congo operation. Therefore, he declared, it would be contrary to the UN Charter for the Budgetary Committee to take any action. Czarkowski declared further that, in view "of the biased actions of Mr. Hammarskjold, how can we be expected to contribute even

one dollar for the conduct of this operation?" Czarkowski charged Hammarskjold with attempting to make the Congo operation part of the regular budget and said that such efforts weakened if they did not destroy the UN. He concluded with the implied threat that the Soviet bloc would not only refuse to pay its assessment in such an enlarged regular budget, but also that it would rather resign from the UN than take the risk of losing its voting rights because of non-payment.

April 6 Avoiding the theme of "plots" and "conspiracies," Hungary's Ambassador to the UN Janos Peter insisted that the UN had to make a fresh new start in its approach to the Congo. Calling for reasonableness and freedom from prejudice, he asked for a thought-out analysis of the Congo situation, maintaining that UN action in the Congo had failed to achieve any of its mandates and had done nothing but harm. The Congolese, he said, with the help of other African statesmen, would have been able to solve their own problems perfectly had it not been for UN interference. Ambassador Peter also insisted that the UN, "by treating the Congolese like children," had created such distrust among them that only an entirely new approach would revive their trust in the UN. To convince them that a fresh start was in the making, Peter said, Hammarskjold should be discarded as head of the operation. Otherwise no new start would be possible.

SOUTH AFRICA

April 3 The Soviet bloc speakers continued their attacks on UN Secretary General Hammarskjold by claiming that he supported the apartheid policies of the Union of South Africa. The Soviet and Romanian delegates coupled this charge with the assertion that the color bar policy of South Africa had the support of the "colonial powers" and that

these countries were challenging the UN and world opinion. In attacking both Hammarskjold and the "colonialists," the delegate from Romania referred to the fact that Hammarskjold, on instructions from the Security Council, had visited South Africa last year and had issued a subsequent statement saying that his talks with Prime Minister Verwoerd were "most useful and constructive." The Romanian delegate argued that, since South Africa had hardened its apartheid policies after Hammarskjold's visit there, the Verwoerd-Hammarskjold talks were "a good cover for the Union government to continue its racial policy."

KOREA

April 10 Delegates from Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia and Albania expressed support for the Soviet Union's insistence that North Korea be represented during a discussion of the Korean question by the UN's First Committee. The Czechoslovak delegate declared that "it is realistic to recognize the existence of the North Korean government and the fact that previous shunning of North Korea has not led to a solution of Korea's problems." Poland's delegate said two principles were involved: that the Korean question be settled by the Korean people themselves and that "common sense, justice and impartiality" demanded that North Korea be represented. He charged pro-Western delegations with cold-war tactics. The Albanian delegate maintained that no progress had been made at previous discussions on the Korean question because of the refusal to hear both sides—a refusal that was the result of pressure by "certain Western States." The Bulgarian delegate reiterated similar points and the Romanian delegate declared that it was strange that US Ambassador Stevenson, who had "made some strong statements" on assuming his job, was now sponsoring a cold-war approach to the Korean problem.

Facts and Figures

Albania's Economic Ties with the Soviet Bloc

ONE OF THE STRANGEST developments in the strange history of Communist Albania has been Enver Hoxha's decision to side with the Chinese Communists in their ideological dispute with Moscow. That the Albanian leader has really cast in his lot with Mao to the point of defying Moscow seems indisputable on the basis of what has happened in the last year, although the circumstances

and issues of the quarrel are anything but clear. Neither is it clear what means of support Hoxha expects to have if he is thrown out of the Soviet family and told to fend for himself.

Since the end of World War II Albania has been an economic as well as political dependency of Moscow. Into that tiny mountainous enclave on the Adriatic the Soviets

have sunk more than a billion rubles of investment capital, largely for mineral exploitation. Practically all of Albania's foreign trade is now with the Communist countries, and more than half of it with the USSR. Albania's new Five Year Plan (1961-1965), which is aimed at further industrializing the country, seems to have been drafted on the assumption that Soviet assistance would continue in the future.

The speeches at the Fourth Congress of the Albanian Workers' (Communist) Party in February gave no suggestion that the Albanians expect the assistance to stop, despite the Chinese flavor of the statements on foreign policy (see *East Europe*, April). Premier Mehmet Shehu listed, among other enterprises, a fertilizer factory at Fier to be built with Soviet aid, a chemical factory at Lac to be built with Czechoslovak aid, and "a number of other factories to be constructed with the aid of the Soviet Union." Since then there have been reports from observers in the Yugoslav capital of Belgrade that the countries of the Soviet bloc were considering measures to bring Albania into line. If the Yugoslav experience is any guide, these measures would certainly involve economic pressures.

The only place Enver Hoxha can look for support against Moscow is, of course, Communist China. There is evidence that his stubborn attitude toward Moscow is based on assurances from Peiping of economic aid in case the credits promised by the Soviet bloc should not be forthcoming. In January 1959 the Chinese granted Albania credits of 55 million rubles to help finance the Third Five Year Plan in the years 1961-1965. In January and February of this year an Albanian economic delegation spent several weeks in Peiping negotiating further credits for this purpose of 500 million rubles. On the other hand, the Albanians have made no recent agreement with Moscow covering credits for 1961, although in December 1958 the Soviet government promised 300 million rubles in assistance for the period 1961-1965. The timing of the recent agreement with China suggests that Hoxha was assured of continued Chinese support for the position he took at the Party Congress in February.

Albania has in past years received economic and technical assistance from other East European countries as well. In 1958 Czechoslovakia advanced 100 million rubles toward the purchase of equipment for the ferro-nickel mines, and East Germany 40 million rubles for goods and industrial installations. Poland also lent an unspecified sum for industrial equipment. As recently as last February the Albanians were still signing commercial, financial and cultural agreements with their East European colleagues. On February 2 they signed a five-year agreement with Prague, under which the Czechoslovaks promised to extend credits and technical assistance for the construction of a chemical-metallurgical combine, the further development of ferro-nickel mining, the development of the chromium industry, the construction of hydroelectric power stations, "and so forth." The sums involved were not stated. On February 3 the Albanians signed a cultural agreement with East Germany for 1961, under which the number of Albanian students in that country is to be raised nearly ten percent.

AID TO ALBANIA

COUNTRY	YEAR	PURPOSE	AMOUNT IN
			MILLIONS OF OLD RUBLES
SOVIET UNION	1948-1953	Purchase of capital equipment (payment waived in 1957)	422
	1957	Purchase of wheat, rice, vegetable oil	31
	1957	Development of fishing industries, land reclamation, agricultural mechanization.	160
	1958	Delivery of equipment and technical assistance for projects of the 1961-1965 Plan	300
	1959	Equipment for petroleum industry and consumers' goods	66
EAST GERMANY	1951-1954	Purchase of capital equipment and commodities (payment waived in 1957)	61.5
	1956-1957	Purchase of commodities and potato-planting machinery	26
	1957	Purchase of machinery, equipment and raw material, and payment for technical services	n.a.
	1958	Purchase of goods and installations	40
BULGARIA	1949-1954	Purchase of manufactured products, foodstuffs, industrial equipment and other commodities	39.7
	1957	For economic development, 1957-1960	n.a.
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	1951	Not known	n.a.
	1958	Purchase of equipment for mining and transporting ferro-nickel ore	100
	Feb. 1961	Purchase of equipment and technical assistance for industrial development in 1961-1965	n.a.
HUNGARY	1949	Purchase of machinery and equipment	n.a.
POLAND	1949	Purchase of two ships, three diesel engines, oil tanks, coke, sugar, textiles, etc.	n.a.
	1958	Purchase of industrial equipment	n.a.
ROMANIA	1954	Not known	n.a.
	1957	Purchase of fuels, construction materials, chemicals and equipment	30
CHINA	1956	Purchase of commodities, including consumers' goods	n.a.
	1959	Purchase of industrial equipment for period 1961-1965	55
	Feb. 1961	Same as above	500

NOTE: This is a summary list of the agreements announced in official press releases, and may not be complete. Some of the figures for earlier years represent the sum of several agreements. N.a. means not available. The old ruble was valued at four to the dollar.

Men in the News

Archbishop Joseph Grosz



THESSE MEN have been associated with me for several years and I personally stand for everything they have done. If these arrested priests are guilty, then I must be guilty also. Please take me into custody too and put me together with my friends."

According to the British Catholic weekly, *Universe*, the above words are part of a letter written by Archbishop Joseph Grosz to Hungary's Premier Ferenc Munnich protesting the regime's latest persecutions of the Catholic clergy. In Hungary itself, no mention of the protest appeared in the press; on the contrary, official sources claimed that the Bench of Bishops (headed by Archbishop Grosz but not recognized by the Vatican) considered the mass incarceration of priests and monks justified because they had been plotting against State security. Charges of conspiracy, of course, have become traditional in the Communist battle to splinter and decimate the churches of Eastern Europe; and just as traditional has become the pattern of resistance, compromise, and further resistance by churchmen determined to survive concerted onslaughts against their institutions and beliefs.

As acting head of Hungary's Catholic Church since Cardinal Mindszenty took refuge in the US Legation in Budapest shortly after the failure of the 1956 Revolt, Archbishop Grosz has borne the brunt of Party leader Janos Kadar's recent and mounting attacks on the Church's authority. In the main, the Archbishop's policy has been to tread the path of compliance. To avert severe blows against the Church (two-thirds of the Hungarians are Catholic), he gave his support to the Soviet "peace" campaign, accepted the chairmanship in 1957 of the newly organized

Catholic "peace movement," *Opus Pacis*, attended a reception given by Khrushchev in 1958 and even voiced approval—though ambiguous—of the Party's farm collectivization drive. In "reward" for his cooperation, he received on his 70th birthday a decoration for "resolving difficulties in the relations between the State and the Roman Catholic Church and for rendering great service to the Peace Movement." "Rewards" also came in the form of increased State aid to the Churches.

Conciliation, however, did not bring the Church the respite it desired, and the Archbishop's letter appears to mark an end to the Episcopate's willingness to bend with the Communist wind. From the regime's viewpoint, it is apparent that the bending was inadequate to meet current policy needs. The internment of large numbers of priests and laymen close to the Church on charges of anti-State activity, immorality (homosexual corruption of young acolytes) and ties with the Nazis and the aristocracy indicates that the government itself intended to put the Episcopate in an impossible position.

Now ailing and old, Archbishop Grosz has spent the past fifteen years trying to find some dignified equilibrium for the Church within the Communist State. Born in 1887 to a relatively prosperous peasant family in the village of Feltorony, his character seems to have changed little since his early youth. He was and remained throughout his schooling a superior student, known for his gentleness as well as his diligence. With the help of his teachers, he was sent to secondary school in Gyor, and after graduation embarked on studies for the priesthood. In recognition of his potential, he was sent to the Pazmaneum in Vienna, then

the best theological school in the Austro-Hungarian Empire. From there he was transferred to the Gyor Bishopric and in 1927 became the assistant bishop. Further honors were given him in 1936, when he became Apostolic Administrator at Szombathely with the rank of Bishop. In 1943, at the age of 56, he was named Archbishop of Kalocsa.

In 1945, the year the Communists initiated their campaign against the Church by liquidating Church property during a national land reform, the Vatican made Joseph Mindszenty Archbishop of Esztergom and Cardinal Prince Primate of Hungary. He soon came into sharp conflict with the new regime over the question of nationalization of schools. Intransigent in his opposition to Communism, the Cardinal refused to follow the Protestants and Jews in signing an agreement on the separation of Church and State: he rejected any and all offers to negotiate the question. Further clashes with the Party ensued, with the result that in December 1948 the Cardinal was arrested and in February 1949 sentenced to life imprisonment.

Archbishop Grosz took over his functions.* Confronted with the bitter denunciations of "clerical reactionaries," large-scale arrests of members of religious orders and attempts to split the clergy through a combination of threats, promises and terrorism, the Archbishop tried to preserve a minimum of Church unity and activity by offering on June 20, 1950, to conduct talks with the government. Out of these emerged the August 30, 1950 Church-State agreement under which the Bench of Bishops promised to support the "constitution" of the "Hungarian People's Republic," condemn all "subversive activities," call upon Catholics to support the entire government program, especially collectivization, and the so-called peace movement. In exchange the Church was promised State support and a situation in which there would be complete "freedom of religion."

With this agreement under its belt, the Party took its

* Hungary traditionally has had three Archbishops. At that time the third Archbishop was Archbishop Czapik of Eger.

Photo on opposite page: Archbishop Grosz conducting a memorial service for Pope Pius XII in St. Stephen's Cathedral in Budapest. Below: Archbishop Grosz during a visit to a collective farm. (Photographs taken from *Hungarian Review* [Budapest], December 1958.



revenge. For being troublesome and hostile, Archbishop Grosz was selected to follow the path of Cardinal Mindszenty and in May 1951, he and eight colleagues were arrested. By the end of June the Communists had prepared his show trial in which he was accused of conspiracy, black-marketeering with foreign currency, of assisting people to escape the country and of anti-State activity; for this he was sentenced to 15 years in prison. In the more temperate climate of 1955, he was released from prison and upon the death of Archbishop Czapik shortly thereafter he was pardoned and allowed to resume his duties as Archbishop and Chairman of the Bench of Bishops. Should he go to prison again, the experience will not be new.

PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY

This version of an old college joke is now circulating among the students of Hungary.

Question: What is the difference between materialism, idealism and Marxism?

Answer: Materialism is like chasing a black cat in a dark room. Idealism is like chasing a black cat in a dark room that isn't there. Marxism is like chasing a black cat in a dark room that isn't there while shouting at the top of your lungs, "I've got him!"

Current Developments

INTERNATIONAL: *Soviet cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin acclaimed by Soviet bloc press and feted in Prague (p. 43).*

POLITICAL: *Tirana tries ten persons accused of espionage; two "Soviet spies" reportedly executed (pp. 1, 52).*

Bulgaria purges district Party leaders for failures to increase agricultural output (p. 50).

Hungarian "Bench of Bishops" terms arrests of priests "justified" (p. 46).

ECONOMIC: *Czechoslovak National Assembly hears evaluation of 1956-60 economic plan (p. 43).*

Hungarian regime presses for greater labor discipline in factories (p. 48).

Bulgarian Central Committee criticizes the performance in agriculture (p. 51).



Anti-American Propaganda Stepped Up

In the weeks preceding the 14-member May conference in Geneva to discuss the future of a neutral Laos, Communist propagandists blamed the United States and other members of the Southeast Asia pact for the civil war. Britain and the USSR were praised for their call for a ceasefire. Poland, a member of the control commission set up at the end of the Indochinese War in 1954, declared that "Polish opinion has greeted with joy the news of the agreement on the appeal for a Laos ceasefire and other measures aimed at restoring peace in this Asian country far from us." (Radio Warsaw, April 25.)

Cuba

Vituperative tones characterized the press and radio commentators when discussing the US-backed invasion of Cuba by anti-Castro exiles. A crowd of 500 Polish students demonstrated in front of the US Embassy in Warsaw, April 18. The following day, Politburo member Zenon Kliszko addressed a rally, attacking the anti-Castro rebels as "gangs of counterrevolutionaries, armed, organized, and trained by the United States, attacking the island of Cuba, threatening its people with serfdom and fascism." (Radio Warsaw, April 19.)

Budapest compared the Cuban landing to the 1956 Revolt: "The Hungarian people," said First Deputy Premier Gyula Kallai to a rally of workers, "already knows the imperialist slogans about freedom. In the autumn of 1956 in our country, too, they preached ideas of freedom while in the streets they murdered the best fighters for freedom and national independence. The Hungarian people have become acquainted with and do not wish to partake of imperialist freedom—just as the Cuban people refuse to partake of it." (Radio Budapest, April 19.)

Predictably, Tirana compared the "American aggression" against Cuba to the "tactics, aims and means used in the organized but abortive plot against Albania. . . . In the case of the plot against Albania, as in that of Cuba, the chief inspirer and organizer of the plot was American imperialism. . . . As in that of Cuba, an extensive propaganda campaign was waged to present peace-loving little Albania as a troublemaker in the Balkans." (Radio Tirana, April 19.)

All the nations declared their solidarity with Castro, and Czechoslovakia's message of support to the Cuban president was indicative of the Soviet bloc's avowal that "the Cuban people are not alone . . . they have friends on whom they can depend" in the event of further US "aggression." (Radio Prague, April 29.)

Yugoslav-Soviet Bloc Skirmishes

Relations between Belgrade and the other Soviet bloc nations remain uncertain, the detente of 1960 severely shaken. Albania, of course, has never let up in its choleric offensive.



Major Yuri Gagarin enters Prague. The Soviet cosmonaut visited the capital of Czechoslovakia on April 28 and 29. In photo on opposite page he is shown being hailed by the workers of the CKD Stalingrad machinery plant in Prague, who presented him with a bronze statue of a steelworker.

Svet v Obrazech (Prague), May 6, 1961

An article in the April issue of the international Communist monthly, *World Marxist Review*, reiterated the current Soviet theme that Yugoslavia cannot be considered a "neutral," claiming that Belgrade's "voices harmonize with the general bourgeois chorus of denunciation of the international Communist movement." In essence, Moscow contends that the Yugoslav Communists are trying to "sow discord within the Communist ranks . . . drive a wedge between the national-liberation movements and the Communist Parties—the mainstay of the struggle of the oppressed peoples for independence."

A similar criticism was directed at Belgrade by the theoretical publication of the Bulgarian Party, *Novo Vreme* (Sofia), April: "Together with the other enemies of Communism, the Yugoslav revisionists expected a rupture in the unity of the international Communist movement . . . and when the rupture did not occur [at the Moscow conference of 81 Communist Parties, December 1960], they declared the unity a result of 'unprincipled compromises.'"

Albania Strikes Back

In retaliation for Belgrade's expulsion of an Albanian Third Secretary at the Albanian legation in Belgrade who was implicated in the recent spy trial of Albanians in Ohrid, April 6 (see *East Europe*, May, p. 38), Tirana expelled a Yugoslav diplomat. The Yugoslav charge d'affaires in Tirana protested against "the unfounded charges and groundless expulsion." (Radio Belgrade, April 7.)

The Albanian Party organ *Zeri i Popullit* (Tirana), April 12, retorted to Yugoslav reports of the use of torture and terror in Albania (see *East Europe*, May, p. 38). Not only did Tirana categorically deny such "slanderous propaganda," but produced its own version of Yugoslav prisons. A repatriate from Yugoslavia recounted:



Watching the May Day parade in Warsaw.

Swiat (Warsaw), May 7, 1961

"I realize that the man who flees to that country becomes nothing but a tool in the hands of the [Yugoslav secret police], which tries to the hilt to exploit him against Albania. I went through tortures I never imagined could exist. . . . A rubber whip filled with lead was used most of the time. Before being tortured, I would be tied with my hands behind my back with a chain fixed to the wall. Another torture was to have my fingers crushed by boots. . . . Throughout the interrogation and torture I was alone in the cell, and what a cell! A cell so small that there was hardly room for one man. It was damp; it had a high ceiling from which drops of water fell continuously. For food I had only 100 grams of bread and a glass of water."

It was with such methods, so said the Albanians, that Yugoslavia obtained confessions from Albanian "spies."

Plots against their homeland, concocted by Yugoslavia, Greece and the United States, continued to obsess the Albanians. The latest version centered on a trip of Yugoslav Vice President Alexander Rankovic to Athens. The Party organ, May 2, said: "He goes there as a diplomat, ideologist and policeman . . . [but all] Yugoslav diplomats go to various capitals with bombs, daggers and plots hidden in their coats and aimed against peace and the freedom of peoples and the Socialist camp. They hide all these dealings in the service of world imperialism and reactionary bourgeoisie

behind grandiloquent phrases and demagogic. At the end of each enterprise and depending on the success achieved, the Yugoslav diplomats are tipped by their American bosses—in short, they are paid with dollars."

History Suppressed

The true postwar history of Yugoslav-Soviet bloc relations has been largely suppressed in the official Hungarian encyclopedia. Tito's break with Stalin in 1948 is largely glossed over, and the 1955 rapprochement, when Soviet Premier Khrushchev admitted Stalinist errors vis-a-vis Yugoslavia, goes unmentioned. (*Magyar Szó* [Novisad, Yugoslavia], April 2.) East Germany also distorts current history, at least from Belgrade's point of view. The official spokesman for the Yugoslav government, Drago Kunc, at a press conference, May 5, stated that in East Berlin on May Day, a globe, on which the division of the world into blocs was shown by means of different colors, depicted Yugoslavia as a capitalist State. Commented Kunc: "We know where we have been since 1941, and nobody's use of colors can change that."

Foreign Ministers To Meet

An announcement early in May that the Foreign Ministers of Yugoslavia and the USSR, Koca Popovic and Andrei Gromyko, would meet in the near future brought about a sudden lull in the current spate of recriminations between Belgrade and the bloc (except Albania). In any case, economic and cultural exchanges with other East European countries continued during April. These included an exhibition of Bulgarian architecture in Belgrade, the visit of a delegation of Bulgarian women to attend the Union of Women's Associations of Yugoslavia in Zagreb, and negotiations between Yugoslavia and Romania on the construction of a hydroelectric power and navigation system on the Danube.

Balkan Peace Conference

Delegates of the Communist-supported Movement for Peace and Collaboration in the Balkans gathered in Athens, April 15-18. Bulgaria, Greece, Romania and Yugoslavia were represented at the conference. The Greek government refused to issue a visa to an Albanian delegate, and Turkey was not represented. In spite of these omissions, the president of the Bulgarian committee, Sava Ganovski, reported that the meeting was successful, producing a final communique approving the well-worn Romanian proposal for turning the Balkans into a "zone of peace"—i.e., an area free of nuclear weapons and missile-launching stations. The next conference will meet in Sofia. (*Rabotnichesko Delo* [Sofia], April 27.)

May Day

This year in Eastern Europe, Soviet cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin and Cuban Premier Fidel Castro were enshrined in the gallery of Communist heroes. Their portraits were paraded next to those of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Khrushchev and local luminaries. The speeches of the Party chiefs

were undistinguished paens of praise to Communist achievements. Czechoslovakia's Novotny nostalgically compared the present massive display of working class solidarity with the pre-Communist days when "workers had to demonstrate for the mere right to go out into the streets on May Day and then the bourgeoisie tried in every way to prevent these demonstrations." (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], May 2.) The Albanians characteristically carried portraits of Stalin and none of Khrushchev, and used the occasion to berate "the imperialists and the revisionists." In particular, "American imperialism" was flayed as "wilder and more aggressive than ever, making preparations for a new world war." (Radio Tirana, May 1.)

Gagarin Hailed in Prague

Yuri Gagarin, the Soviet cosmonaut who orbited the globe, visited Prague for a festive reception, April 28-29. His appearance at the Prague airport elicited great enthusiasm, according to the Prague correspondent for Moscow's *Pravda*, April 29, who reported: "When [Gagarin's] TU-104 landed, a storm of cheering broke out. There are no words to describe what occurred at the airport. A human tide surged toward the aircraft and chanted Ga-ga-rin, Ga-ga-rin. The hero cosmonaut embraced and kissed the members of the Politburo and the Party. The entire route from the airport to the hotel which he occupies could be described as a triumphal procession. The car was literally submerged with flowers. Later Gagarin was received by [Party chief and President] Antonin Novotny and told him all about his flight. The President of Czechoslovakia treated him as a beloved son." In reply to the gratitude expressed by the cosmonaut for the warm reception, Novotny said: "The fate of our people is bound to the fate of the Soviet people eternally. This is the principle of our whole life."

American Astronaut Lauded

Although American astronaut Alan Shepard's 115-mile flight into space, May 5, did not rival Gagarin's orbital voyage, the Communist press was not ungenerous in its praise for what Moscow termed "a great achievement." Nevertheless, commentators were careful to point out that "the recent US experiment, though successful, does not approach the space flight of [Gagarin]." (Radio Budapest, May 5.)

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Parliament Debates New Bills

A new law providing for increased military preparedness was explained before the Czechoslovak National Assembly by Defense Minister Bohumir Lomsky, April 18. Discussing the measure in general terms, Lomsky declared that the "main pillar" of Czechoslovakia's defense was the Warsaw Pact (the Soviet bloc counterpart to NATO). The "leading role" of the Czechoslovak Communist Party in the defense of the nation was also embodied in the new act.



A hastily improvised float symbolized the flight of Soviet cosmonaut Yuri Gagarin in Warsaw's May Day parade.

Swiat (Warsaw), May 7, 1961

Local people's courts, similar to the "comrades' courts" in which fellow workers act as judge and jury, will be set up after July 1, 1961. (See *East Europe*, February, p. 39.) "It will be the task of the new courts to contribute to the strengthening of 'Socialist legality' by dealing with minor offenses." Local people's courts may use only "educational measures" as correctives for those brought before them. (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], April 19.)

Second Five Year Plan Reviewed

Before the National Assembly on April 17, Chairman of the State Planning Commission Otakar Simunek appraised the economic progress of the past five years (1956-60), criticized shortfalls and hammered at some of the problems that will have to be solved in coming years. Elation over the performance of industry and a critical view of agriculture ran through the report. While a 66 percent increase in industrial output (10.7 percent annually) was achieved during the five-year period as compared with a planned increase of 54 percent, agriculture—described as "still the focal point of our Party's problems"—produced only 11 percent more in 1960 than in 1955 as against the 27 percent anticipated.

FOR WANT OF A BEARING

From Czechoslovakia, the most technically advanced of the Communist countries, comes this complaint about the difficulty of finding spare parts for farm machinery:

"The telephone rings. An irritated voice from Ockov. For over six months their caterpillar tractor has been in repair at the State tractor station at Nove Mesto nad Vahom. They need it badly, but it seems nothing can be done. No spare parts is the standard answer. We have before us a letter from the members of the Veselé Collective Farm.

"At first we searched for spares in Trnava. There they advised us to try at "Mototechna" in Bratislava, whence we were sent to the emergency service in Bratislava only to be told to try at the emergency service in Prague II, Opletalova 10. There they would not sell us spare parts because, they said, we were from another region and district. We were advised to go to Prague-Karlin, to the central distributors of ball bearings. They forwarded our order to "Mototechna" in Bratislava, whence it was passed back to the State tractor station in Trnava. Six months were gone, we had made a full circle and now we began to correspond anew, still without the bearings."

"Is there anything to add? The very enumeration of all the organizations, the bureaucratic muddle experienced by the members of the Veselé Collective Farm, makes one shudder. Similar tribulations have been described by us before. In some cases relief was attained only to be followed by new shortcomings, new complaints. And how else could it be when paper work is given preference to deeds, when no one is responsible personally, when it is always the other fellow. . . .

"A few days ago a government ordinance went into effect introducing a new organization and distribution of agricultural machinery and spare parts. According to its terms the only distributor in the future will be the State tractor stations. However, there will be a new organization with new methods and responsibilities, but the people who will decide about spare parts will be the same."

Pravda (Bratislava), April 6, 1961

According to the planning chief, the output of capital goods rose by 74 percent during the period and that of consumer goods by 56 percent. The machine-building and chemical industries were, as usual, the most dynamic; each "more than doubled" production during the Plan. Structurally the machine-building industry was said to have undergone changes along lines of specialization recommended by COMECON, integrating body of the Soviet bloc: an intensive development of heavy machinery including rolling mill, chemical, power and transport machinery and equipment; and of equipment for the food and light industries. Machine-building increased its share of total production from 29 to 34 percent. The chemical industry increased its

output of nitrogenous fertilizer to 250 percent of the 1955 level, as well as expanding new lines such as synthetic fibers, plastics and synthetic rubber. Steel output rose by roughly 51 percent, reaching a total of 6.8 million tons in 1960. The fuel base was broadened by an increase in output of hard coal of roughly 29 percent, soft coal of 41 percent and electric power (which reached 24.3 billion kwh. in 1960) of 62 percent.

Criticisms

On the negative side, Simunek admitted that the performance was unbalanced, a number of branches having failed to reach their goals. In metallurgy neither the targets nor the prescribed range of products was achieved. One reason for this failure was the shortage of coking coal. The worst offender was the building industry (see below) where, despite an 80 percent increase in output, "success could have been greater." While the volume of investment during the Plan was 77 percent greater than in the 1951-55 period, industrial construction plans were not fulfilled because of the failure of the building industry. This was reflected in the late commissioning of key plants.

With reference to agriculture, Simunek largely recapitulated the shortcomings thrown before the public eye so often during recent months. (See *East Europe*, April, p. 53 and May, p. 47.) He decried the persistent tendency of agriculture to stagnate despite heavy increases in investment: capital construction had been 140 percent higher than in the 1951-56 period; deliveries of fertilizers had more than doubled; and mechanization had notably increased.

Productivity: The Key

The main strategic factor in Prague's economic planning, Simunek implied, is the problem of productivity. Excess manpower is a thing of the past, and future progress will depend increasingly on labor-saving technology and greater efficiency in the factories and fields.

"The economy of labor and equipment, higher labor productivity and cuts in prime costs in industry depend mainly on how rapidly the technical level of the national economy is raised. Notwithstanding certain successes achieved with this technical level, we still cannot be satisfied with the general state of affairs. Although . . . mechanization was raised, there still remain certain important problems in the technological level of our economy; for instance, the standard of mechanization of labor in material handling and inter-enterprise transportation is still low. The range of these operations under contemporary mechanization conditions requires more than one million workers in the entire national economy.

"As to automation, it is possible to characterize the Second Five Year Plan as an initial and preparatory stage. The small extent of automation was influenced mainly by the small extent of comprehensive mechanization, by the insufficient development of the technology that makes automation possible. . . ."

Improvements in the technical level, he said, were still hampered by the failure of research organization to meet deadlines as well as the failure of the industrial enterprises to introduce new ideas into the production process. Part of



A Romanian cartoon on the Cuba invasion: "Onward, for the liberation of our beloved fatherland!"

Scinteia (Bucharest), April 19, 1961

the difficulty was lack of cooperation between the scientists and the enterprises.

Living Standards

The growth of living standards was depicted in glowing terms. Four general price cuts were made during the course of the Plan, reducing the index of retail prices by 8.7 percent and the index of total living costs by 8.8 percent. The wage system was revamped and inequities were said to have been eliminated. The social security system was adjusted, and the number of old age and disability pensions increased by 446,000; annual expenditures on social security rose from 7.3 to 12.2 billion koruny. Average daily calorie consumption rose, Simunek said, by 8.6 percent. Although the housing construction program was short by 5,000 apartments in the private building sector, 326,000 apartments were built, or 26 percent more than in the 1951-55 period. Many of the improvements were designed to give preference to large families as part of an effort to offset a declining birth rate. Simunek noted that while the population increased by 14.6 percent in the less industrialized region of Slovakia, in the Czech regions it grew by only 3.6 percent during the five years of the Plan. (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], April 18.)

Building and Railway Troubles Aired

The Party Central Committee devoted a special session to the problems of the construction and railroad industries, April 12-14, and passed resolutions outlining future tasks and ways and means of coping with current shortcomings. The building industry was chided for "falling short of the needs of the development of the national economy." Its planned targets were "being accomplished either very slowly or inadequately." Labor productivity was said to be chronically low with the result that greater output had to be obtained chiefly through larger and larger employment. Modern techniques were not being introduced, and

the organization of work was said to be poor. The railway transport industry was arraigned for similar difficulties.

Housing—a nagging social and economic ill throughout the Soviet bloc—occupied much of the discussion. Last fall the government initiated a "nationwide discussion" on this issue, and the CC undertook to review, appraise and decide on the resulting "suggestions and criticisms" from the population. "The citizens demanded that higher housing standards, including a greater variety of apartments and residential houses and apartments with a larger number of separate rooms, be introduced as early and as widely as possible." Aside from the central problem of overcrowding, the criticisms covered the spectrum of vexations arising in daily life, from poor plumbing and the inadequate provision of shops and services to disproportions between the output of furniture and the needs of the population.

Housing Program

The CC's resolution prescribed the construction of 482,000 new apartments during the Third Five Year Plan (1961-65), or roughly 48 percent more than in the past five years. It urged a more "scientific" approach to the solution of long-range housing problems: "The rich experience along these lines gathered in the construction of towns and villages in the USSR should be used for this purpose." Special stress is to be given to housing workers at new industrial installations, with large families and low-income families to be given priority. Higher income groups must shoulder a large share of the financial burden through co-operative building programs, the resolution said.

On the building industry in general, the resolution called for better organization and greater productivity. Average construction time is to be reduced by 12 percent during the current year, with emphasis on completing projects already underway. Two work shifts will be introduced on all centralized construction projects. Decentralized projects will be cut back; cadres and materials will be shifted; and the scope of "Socialist competition" is to be broadened to encourage workers to increase output and suppliers to get materials to the right place at the right time. Finally, the resolution called for a comprehensive program of mechanization and automation; and in line with this development it urged that an intense drive be undertaken to increase the educational level, both political and professional, of workers and cadres: 30,000 skilled workers in the required trades will be trained for the building industry during the Plan.

(According to Radio Bratislava, May 7, the building industry fulfilled only 93.5 percent of its slated goal during the first four months of 1961, and, in consequence, failed to complete work valued at 125 million koruny.)

The Railroads

Czechoslovak railways, subject of the CC's second resolution, handled 195 million tons of freight and recorded 88 billion ton-kilometers of traffic during 1960, or 40 and 48 percent more respectively than in 1955; meanwhile, the volume of passenger traffic rose by 10 percent to 641 million persons. "In several respects our railroads compete successfully with the most mature capitalist countries,"

the resolution asserted; but it went on to admit serious defects and to issue a call for improved organization, better management, better planning and better discipline, and finally, higher technical levels. As for the latter, by 1965 steam traction will be reduced to 25 percent of the total, and by 1968 it is to be completely eliminated; an additional 1,044 kilometers of track will be electrified during the Plan; loading and unloading operations will be 90 percent mechanized, and in maintenance work and general overhauling, the corresponding figure will be 80 percent.

The investment needed to obtain these improvements is scheduled to be 43 percent higher in the new Plan than in the previous five years—when “funds were not always spent correctly.” Just as in building, the resolution proposed limiting the number of projects in order to reduce the time needed for commissioning new capacity. It also laid the framework for greater control over the disposition of the investment.

The importance of labor discipline was underscored sharply; the new motto is “Everyone his own controller on his own job.” “Socialist competition” was again stressed. (*Rude Pravo* [Prague], April 15.)

(Another conference, this time by the Trade Union, opened in the Czechoslovak capital, April 26, to discuss “difficulties in railway transport in which, since the middle of last year, the situation has deteriorated to the detriment of the whole national economy.” [Radio Prague, April 25.]

HUNGARY

Ex-Premier Dies

Lajos Dinnyes, the Premier of Hungary in 1947 who led the nation into the Communist orbit, died at the age of 60 on May 4. He was serving as vice president of the Hungarian national assembly at his death. As head of the left wing of the Smallholders’ Party, Dinnyes in his brief term as Premier signed a 20-year mutual assistance pact with Moscow, and alliances with Yugoslavia, Bulgaria, Poland and Romania. He was forced to resign from the government in 1948, accused of having lost touch with the masses. (*The New York Times*, May 5.)

Arrested Priests Condemned by “Peace Priests”

Due to international repercussions following the recent arrests of the clergy for “anti-State activities” (see *East Europe*, May, p. 44), the regime-backed “peace priests” voiced their support of the arrests. This action followed a declaration by the Hungarian “Bench of Bishops” (not recognized by the Vatican) on March 24 terming the arrests “justified.” In their statement the “peace priests” said: “We priests are grateful to our bishops for . . . raising their voices whenever dreams completely alien to the duty of the watchmen of the church, law-violating transgressions and irresponsible acts are included in the spiritual work of the Church in order to undermine intentionally

peace and good relations. . . . It has been proved that the irresponsibility of erring elements did not have a detrimental affect on the tolerance displayed by the State toward the Church.” (*Katolikus Szó* [Budapest], April 16.)

Further support for the State came from the Catholic weekly *Uj Ember* (Budapest), April 16, although the journal did not accept fully the fact of “a conspiracy against the State.” Nevertheless, the clergy suspected of an anti-State conspiracy and “unable to clear themselves of this charge” were said to have “violated the laws of the State.”

People’s Courts Dissolved

In a new attempt to erase the vestiges of the 1956 Revolt, the Hungarian regime has abolished the “People’s Courts,” set up in 1957 to try those who committed “counterrevolutionary crimes.” Any further action necessary due to the rulings of the “People’s Courts” will be dealt with according to the regulations of the Penal Code. (*Magyar Kozlony* [Budapest], April 16.)

Writer Commits Suicide

A Hungarian “populist” writer, Imre Sarkadi, committed suicide at the age of 40. While retaining his ties to a tradition often considered alien to the Marxist ideal of “Socialist realism,” Sarkadi managed to satisfy the regime without changing his style. He was highly honored by the government, the recipient of a Kossuth Award, and his script for the film “Merry-Go-Round” won an award at the Cannes Film Festival. His most recent work, a short story entitled “The Coward” printed in the April issue of *Kortars*, was characterized by a pessimistic depiction of life in Hungary today. The official Party organ, April 14, carried a lengthy obituary lauding his talent and deplored his early death.

A Marxist Education

In an effort to introduce Marxism into every aspect of academic life, the new high school senior examinations will force the student to demonstrate “a broad knowledge of and ability to apply Marxist-Leninist ideology.” In papers on history the student will be expected to give an account “of his knowledge of the Marxist standpoint on history; in physics the student will not have to prove his knowledge by repeating all the formulae but by showing that he analyzes the physical processes from a materialistic standpoint. . . . All these changes are merely the heralds of modifications to come.” (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], April 2.)

Debate on Sociology

“Marxist”—although not “Western”—sociology has been admitted as an acceptable discipline by the Party ideologists. A trend toward the use of Western sociological method has been evident ever since the presidium of the Hungarian Academy of Science approved the creation of a sociological committee within the social-historical section of the Academy early in April. Now in the literary weekly



Men and Demons

A new Polish film, "Mother Joanna of the Angels," has brought applause from Communist critics and disapproval from the Church. It is set in a 17th century convent somewhere in eastern Poland. The nuns, possessed by the Devil, have broken into scandalous demoniacal revels. A priest,

Father Suryn, is sent to exorcise them and meets Mother Joanna, "a woman at once beautiful and ugly, with a face marked by suffering."

"From their first meeting," writes one reviewer, "a thread of what seems purely secular sympathy joins the prim, uncompromising priest and the nun, a sympathy that is secret and shameful, and tragic in its consequences. During their exorcising prayers and scourgings, sentiment insistently breaks to the surface against both their wills, only to be pushed down and suffocated by a final effort of will power. Is it love? It is never made explicit, though its subtle colorings are pencilled in with great sensitivity."

Father Suryn goes to see a rabbi in hope that the old man's wisdom and rationalism will offset his own inexperience and mysticism. "This is the key scene of the film: the showdown between the two persons that are in Father Suryn, played as a monologue split up for two voices (in fact the rabbi and the priest are played by the same actor, Mieczyslaw Voit). The rabbi tries first to give a rational explanation: 'Demons?' he says skeptically, 'you come here and ask me what I know about demons? Don't you know yourself? Perhaps it's not demons, perhaps it's an absence of angels. The angel has abandoned Mother Joanna and left her all alone. Perhaps it's just human nature?' The frenzy, then, is just human nature asserting itself? When Father Suryn finally leaves, the rabbi falls back in his chair with a sigh. He too is helpless and incapable of settling the hopeless clash between the lust for life—the devil that no one can exorcise—and the rigid rules that shackle us."

Mother Joanna touches "some of the sensitive, shamefully hidden spots of the human consciousness . . . problems in face of which all of us, whatever our convictions, are a little helpless. . . . Possession and frenzy are seen as an attempt by human nature to free itself—a rebellion against the world's hypocrisy and all the conformist rules of life. . . . I do not think it was the director's intention to dig into demonology and exorcism, still less vulgarly to discredit religious belief and practice. He has taken this weird episode as the point of departure for examining the shameful recesses of man's nature and for confronting his aspirations with the system of rules and restrictions which engulf him."

Boleslaw Michalek in *POLISH PERSPECTIVES*
(Warsaw), March 1961

Elet es Irodalom, April 28, Sandor Szalai has suggested that "American bourgeois sociologists do not form 'a united reactionary mass,'" and that the methodology developed by them is objectively good and usable in Communist societies.

An immediate criticism of this position was forthcoming in the Party organ. Szalai came under fire for ignoring "work pursued for decades by the Communist Parties whose aim was to reveal scientifically the social conditions of their respective countries." Szalai's "conclusion"—that "sociology is not identical with bourgeois sociology"—was declared "unscientific and anti-Marxist." (*Nepszabadsag* [Budapest], April 29.)

Tractors Wanted

Efforts to fulfill the government's promises to the peasants in the new collectives and to help the farms along the road to prosperity are being hindered by lack of agricultural machinery, according to the political and economic weekly *Figyelo* (Budapest), April 19. "The slow pace of agricultural mechanization has political disadvantages which cannot be neglected, i.e., it might delay the consolidation of the collective farms, the majority of which were only recently established. . . ."

This shortage is closely linked with Hungary's foreign trade problems. Difficulties in finding sufficient exports to pay for critical imports have been severe for several years;

the pinch is now even greater, since the loans extended after the 1956 Revolt by other Communist countries are falling due. The weekly said that 80 percent of the domestically produced agricultural machinery is exported while the greater part of the tractor requirements of the countryside must be covered by imports. Being careful not to criticize the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance—the body charged with integrating the European members of the Soviet bloc—it urged authorities to retain enough domestically manufactured machinery to satisfy the demands of the countryside.

The shortage of tractors was evidently behind the recent government decree authorizing sale of Machine Tractor Station equipment to the more prosperous farms. No new machinery at all will be delivered to five counties in various parts of the country described as relatively well supplied, according to the organ of the Ministry of Agriculture, *Mezogazdasagi Technika* (Budapest), April. In compensation, these counties will be able to purchase 1,000 tractors from the MTS.

Factory Discipline and Norms

Production norms and labor discipline are again becoming favorite topics of discourse in the official press. The current drive to tighten slack norms and bonuses is slated to end in June when all industrial enterprises are to have completed the adjustments; but according to the Trade Union organ *Nepszava* (Budapest), April 23, "we shall continue to make this adjustment even during the time of our grandchildren and great grandchildren." In essence, the problem is one of giving the workers incentives while maintaining strict control over the growth of wages, and in order to do this the norms by which wages are calculated must be kept abreast of improved efficiency and technical change in the factories. However, the Trade Union daily remarked: "It would be a rather bold venture to call the reexamination of norms popular."

Judging from the tone and content of the current discussion, the campaign has not been altogether successful. The managers of some enterprises were said to have interpreted it as calling for a speedup of the work schedule. On the other hand, some managers were so conservative that the new norms contained too much slack. "If in such cases the calculator of norms is called to the scene again, he creates a bad atmosphere among the workers, however useful the work performed by him. . . ."

Evidently, the government has also found it necessary, in the wake of the norm-tightening, to combat lack of discipline in the factories. The official Party organ *Nepszbadsag* (Budapest), April 9, quoted one factory manager as saying: "It is impossible to keep order and discipline, for our sole instrument is propaganda. One can shout one's lungs out, yet no one listens. . . ." The newspaper reply:

"Who on earth requires a plant manager only to make propaganda and to implore. He should demand! He should punish the confirmed trouble-makers and offenders of work discipline with legal measures: putting them into a lower category, giving them another assignment or dismissing them. Apparently severity is unpopular. It might

cause temporary anger and sulkiness, or uninvited pettifoggers might talk in favor of work shirkers."

POLAND

Romanian Officials

A high Party delegation headed by Party chief Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and Premier Ion Gheorghe Maurer visited Poland, April 24-28. During their stay the Romanian group toured Silesia and the Baltic port of Szczecin. In the rally held in Warsaw on the final day of the trip, the Romanian Party leader stressed the agreements reached at the March session of the Warsaw Pact political-consultative committee in Moscow for defense against the "military preparations of the imperialist powers." Gomulka, in reply, emphasized the "Socialist" policy of "peaceful coexistence." He also referred to the results of the recent Polish national elections, which revealed that 94.5 percent of eligible voters went to the polls and over 98 percent cast their votes for the regime's single list of candidates. "The results of the election," he said, "testify to the fact that the propaganda hostile to People's Poland, conducted with such rage by foreign broadcasting stations, falls on deaf ears. The unreasoned and isolated political outbursts on the part of some dignitaries of the church were also to no avail. The Polish people, including believers, know how to separate the grain of truth from the reactionary propaganda chaff." (PAP, April 28.)

In the final communique it was announced that trade exchanges between 1961 and 1965 would be doubled compared with those during the previous five-year period. Machinery will account for some 50 percent of the total mutual deliveries. Romania is to furnish drilling gear, diesel-electric engines, machine tools and other equipment. Poland will supply high power maritime engines, shipping equipment, machine tools, building machinery and other installations. (*Trybuna Ludu* [Warsaw], April 30.)

New Head of Journalists' Union

The two-day Congress of Polish Journalists ended, April 25, with the election of Henryk Korotynski, editor-in-chief of the daily *Zycie Warszawy*, as head of the new 70-member council. He replaced Mieczyslaw Rakowski, editor-in-chief of *Polityka*. The Congress sent a letter to Cuban journalists expressing their solidarity with the Cubans' struggle against "imperialist aggression." The main speaker, Party Central Committee Secretary Witold Jarosinski, urged the press, radio and TV to stress "the unity of the Soviet bloc and Polish friendship with the Soviet Union." (Radio Warsaw, April 26.)

Secret Trial

Eight intellectuals and students were allegedly tried behind closed doors, according to the official French news agency, April 25. The defendants were believed to have

been accused of reconstituting an illegal organization for the purpose of infiltrating the pseudo-Catholic Pax group. Charges of anti-Semitism were also leveled against them. They were reported to have already spent more than a year in prison.

New Role for People's Councils

Some of the problems facing the newly elected People's Councils (organs of local government) concern the role of the district in the Polish national economy. The Party organ *Trybuna Ludu*, April 26, declared that in the eyes of the regime the district has become the main organ of local government, and the voivodship (or province), a coordinating and supervising organ. The rural commune has the role of an executive organ under the control of the district. With the district as the planning and managing organ, the

newspaper considered whether or not the powers of the district to regulate large portions of the economy under its care were adequate. The conclusion: they were not. For this reason it may be necessary to transfer all local industrial enterprises to the districts, extend wider powers to the districts and accord them the largest possible measure of self-government.

Polish-Soviet Friendship Feted

Sixteen years ago, on April 21, 1945, the then Polish Party chief Boleslaw Bierut and Soviet Premier Stalin signed in Moscow "the Polish-Soviet pact for friendship, mutual aid and postwar cooperation." According to Stalin, the pact marked "a basic change in relations between the USSR and Poland." From now on, said Stalin, "our countries can never again turn against each other." Each year

HOW I BECAME A POISONER

An amusing sally in the cold war between Prague and Belgrade occurred recently when the Yugoslavs claimed that one of their diplomats in Prague had been poisoned by a Czech author named Pavel Hanus. The alleged poisoner entered the following defense in the columns of Rude Pravo (Prague) on April 22:

"According to the press of all the capitalist countries, as well as the press of one non-capitalist country, I have become overnight an international villain of the first water, comparable to Landru except that my victims are not women but diplomats.

"With great cunning I poisoned a certain diplomatic official of a certain European 'power' under 'extremely suspicious circumstances' (Tanjug [Belgrade], April 10).

"As far as well-informed foreign sources could reconstruct it, the following is what happened:

"I lured the unhappy accredited victim: a) to my flat on the fifth floor of a gloomy apartment house; b) to my villa in the 'Prague diplomatic quarter'; c) to a dark dungeon, place unknown. (Circle the correct statement.)

"There I did the following to the poor counselor: a) drugged him using an unknown drug which I mixed with his wine; b) put him to sleep using a no less mysterious drug which I injected in his arm; c) handed him over to two members of the secret political police who drugged him without warning by piercing his posterior with a needle; d) sadistically tortured my drugged victim in an effort to extract from him the mobilization plans of the great power concerned, or perhaps only to obtain from him the telephone number of the general staff—on this point I am not quite sure.

"The rest of my criminal action is described more or less identically by all the agencies and newspapers. Placing the drugged and tortured victim with his head on the floor and his legs on the sofa, I robbed him of all his documents and arranged them neatly around his limp body, and then I called his colleagues from the embassy concerned. When they arrived and surveyed the scene in horror, I said to them cynically: 'Here he is,

take him away!' At this point the victim came out of his coma, inquiring listlessly what had happened. But I refused to elucidate. From all this it appears that I am, on the one hand, a terribly cunning villain and on the other, an idiot.

"Appalled by my own evil deeds, I confess my guilt before the whole world. All four versions are correct, but the fifth is the most probable. However, in order to make my confession complete I must add a small detail which seems to have escaped the well-informed foreign reporters. In order to make certain that the drugs I administered to my unfortunate guest would be fully effective, I made him drink under hypnosis a bottle of white wine and half a bottle of slivovitz. He had brought both these refreshing beverages in his brief case. After this the drugs took inexorable effect: the unfortunate legate became red in the face, took off his jacket, stood and pronounced speeches worthy of Army Chaplain Katz, God bless his memory, and in the end relieved himself on the carpet like Katz who was taken home by Schweik in the late hours on the floor of a carriage. [An allusion to Jaroslav Hasek's *The Adventures of the Good Soldier Schweik*, Vol. I—Ed.] Then he sat in his mess, declared that he was not a 'dogmatist,' and passed out.

"This is how I became a poisoner. As a matter of fact, I like this craft so much that it has become an obsession with me, a kind of hobby. Every night a certain clinic in Prague receives bodies in a state of complete torpor—all victims of my rum, slivovitz, cognac and other oriental drugs. The authorities remain unaware of all this; perhaps the news report from Belgrade will open their eyes at last. This is my confession, the confession of a villain.

"In my free moments, when I am not busy poisoning people, I marvel at how strange the world is. A man goes up into space, nations struggle for freedom—and people who call themselves journalists, even Socialist journalists, fill the pages of their newspapers with such splendid fictions."

since the signing, the Polish Communist regime has organized solemn ceremonies in honor of the occasion. This year was no exception. At the main celebration, held in Warsaw's Palace of Culture and Science, particular attention was paid to the representative of Castro's Cuba. The Cuban Ambassador, Salvador Massipa, was assured that "although far away from us, Cuba does not struggle alone today. It is joined by the Soviet Union and by all the other Socialist countries which will not leave the Cuban nation at the mercy of the aggressors." (Radio Warsaw, April 21.)

Collective Farms Uneconomical

Roughly 31 percent of all collective farms in Poland have proved themselves uneconomical because of the "lack of suitable conditions," according to a Ministry of Agriculture spokesman. (*Zycie Warszawy* [Warsaw], May 3.) This statement came at a special conference in Warsaw on May 2 devoted to the problems of the collective farms which now cover only about 1.2 percent of the country's arable land.

The failure was ascribed largely to the small size of the farms—which average less than 173 acres as compared with the giant farms in other countries of the Soviet bloc which average from 1,000 to 10,000 acres. The majority of the collectives have no more than 20 members in each village. Agriculture Minister Jagielski said that the chief concern in the future would be to strengthen the farms, merging them where possible and increasing their holdings from the State land fund. New collectives, he said, would be created only if the proper conditions were present.

Installment Buying Restricted

A number of items have been crossed off the list of goods available to the population on the installment plan—a form of retail marketing recently adopted from the West

THE PAPER BRIGADE

"Many government workers, especially in the districts and regions, prefer to stick to the old methods of work and to remain at their desks producing circulars, directives and reports. Instead of establishing close contacts with the people, they remain prisoners of their paper work.

"Revealing are a few figures from the Western Bohemian regional national committee in Plzen, where in three months they used for their 'directing' work 390 packets of duplicating paper, 7,500 stencils and 60 packets of letterheads. In this the agricultural sector consumed 2,215 stencils and over 73,000 sheets of duplicating paper, the planning section 1,504 stencils and almost 90,000 sheets of duplicating paper, etc. To this must be added thousands of sheets of foolscap and onion skin office paper. . . ."

Rude Pravo (Prague), April 6, 1961

but still in limited use in the Soviet bloc. The leading political weekly *Polityka* (Warsaw), April 22, had small praise for the government order announcing the restriction. "The authors of the communique did not hasten to add even a word of explanation, and their reserve is hard to understand or to praise. It only helps rumors, false conclusions, and arouses understandable concern."

The weekly offered its own explanation in terms of a larger supply of money in the hands of the populace which unexpectedly increased the turnover of retail trade, exceeding the five percent planned for the first quarter of the year by about 14.3 percent. "You can sell only what you have. . . . These decisions, dictated by necessity, raise no doubts; one can only hope that the reasons for them soon disappear." Installment purchases, the weekly said, make up less than 3 percent of the goods sold through the channels of retail trade and only about 5.5 percent of the turnover of industrial consumer goods.

BULGARIA

Washington Mugging

On the night of April 29, two Bulgarian diplomats assigned to the legation in Washington were "attacked and brutally beaten in a central Washington street by two unidentified persons." Sofia vigorously protested the attack to American authorities, and the US State Department "expressed sympathy to the Bulgarian legation over the 'mugging' of the diplomats." (*The New York Times*, May 7.) The Bulgarian government, however, excluded any "supposition" that the assault was "a hooligan or criminal act." Instead, the official note asserted that this was "a carefully thought-out, planned action, committed by organs and organizations whose discovery should not prove difficult for the authorities. The assault is an obvious manifestation of the intention to hinder the normal work of our mission, to worsen the relations between the Bulgarian People's Republic and the United States." (*Rabotnichesko Delo* [Sofia], May 7.)

Purges Continue

Two district Party chiefs were dismissed for failures to maintain work discipline and increase agricultural output. At a plenum of the Mikhaylovgrad district committee, April 22, Party First Secretary Spas Rusinov was expelled from the committee. On the same day, at a plenum of the Dimitrovo district committee, Aleksandur Dimitrov, also a district First Secretary, was relieved of his post. (*Rabotnichesko Delo* [Sofia], April 24, 25.) Earlier that month Party leaders Peter Chushkarov and George Milchev of the Pleven district Party committee were dismissed for reported failures in agricultural production and management in their areas. (See *East Europe*, May, p. 49-50.)

Editorial Shakeup

Chelkash, the editor-in-chief of the Sofia humorous weekly *Sturshel*, was dropped from this post and replaced by Asen Bosev. Angel Todorov, deputy chief editor was also dismissed, and the managing editor, Haim Benadov, was supplanted by Emil Robev. Last July Chelkash was not re-elected as a member of the presidium of the Writers Union. (*Sturshel* [Sofia], March 24.)

Zhivkov Reports on Agriculture

The Central Committee session on agriculture in Sofia, April 12-14, was a very different kind of affair from the one in Moscow the preceding January. There were no Khrushchevian diatribes against bunglers and swindlers; instead, there were several hours of technical rhetoric by Party chief Zhivkov on the problems of the countryside. However, Zhivkov said much could be learned from the Soviet CC session on agriculture, "because the basic problems discussed at this plenum are also our problems. . . ."

For the first time, figures were given that indicated how much agricultural production may really have grown during the 1958-60 period of the "big leap forward"; calculated in value terms at 1955 prices, the data point to an increase of roughly 21.7 percent for the three-year period, or about 6.7 percent annually (as compared with the targets of 73.9 percent slated for 1959 and 32 percent for 1960). "It is necessary to emphasize," said Zhivkov, "that this

production is not yet in a position to meet the constantly growing purchasing power of our population, and the growing requirements of our industry."

The focal point of the Party leader's minutely detailed address was the usual exhortation for greater productivity and lower production cost; but the emphasis seemed to have shifted from the traditional obsession with mechanization to greater soil fertility, better seeding and a more rational use of the land. This approach is plainly in line with the strikingly moderated pace of development slated for 1961 in contrast to earlier years.

While promising that industry would do "all within its power" to increase production of artificial fertilizers, he argued that great reserves exist in the use of natural fertilizers. Irrigation was one of the principal concerns. For the past four years, he admitted, the area actually irrigated fell critically short of the amount projected; in 1960 only 60 percent of the envisaged area was actually watered. Referring to the huge program launched in 1958 calling for the irrigation of 2 million hectares by 1965, Zhivkov said "the task is correct" despite the fact that a large portion of the capital investment slated for this purpose would have to be transferred to industry. A great part of the sowing was said to be with non-standardized seeds; former foreign markets for high-grade seeds had been lost, and in some cases the country was now obliged to import. "Why has this situation been tolerated for years?"

Specialization and Mechanization

Specialization of production was one of Zhivkov's main topics, and judging from his insistence on the subject, the regime evidently intends to take concrete measures in this direction in the near future.

"Correct territorial distribution and further specialization of agricultural production on a national scale must be carried out along with the development of our entire national economy. . . . In this connection it will be necessary to introduce a change in the structure of agricultural production in areas near large towns, industrial centers and health resorts which are being built, in order to supply them more efficiently and promptly with milk, eggs, fruit, and vegetables."

Areas should be determined where grain and other crops could be concentrated most efficiently, he said. The State farms would serve as models for specialized production (although Zhivkov admitted that the State farms closed the year with a loss in 1960).

On the question of mechanization, the Party leader noted that there were 40,000 tractors (calculated on the basis of 15 horsepower each) and 8,000 combines working on the farms in 1960, and by 1965 these figures would be increased significantly with the addition of 57,061 tractors, 14,312 combines and 6,730 trucks. However, more attention was focused on the poor utilization of existing machinery and equipment. The tractor park was said to have been utilized only 61.9 percent of the time in 1959; large DT-54 tractors worked roughly 190 days annually; and medium-size and light tractors were used only 150 days. Other examples cited: "There are 372 corn combines in

SAM, YOU MADE THE PANTS LOP-SIDED

From an editorial in *Pravda* (Plzen, Czechoslovakia), March 17, 1961:

"Consumers often complain in their letters to the editor of this paper about the quality of the things they buy. A mother complains about the slacks she bought for her little boy—one leg being longer than the other. Or tenants in new apartment buildings write that various gadgets do not work or that the paint is peeling. There seems to be no end of similar, sometimes more serious, complaints.

"Bad quality in our products causes serious economic and political harm to our country. How many millions are lost to our national economy through waste? In the Lenin works in Plzen alone this loss amounted last year to 52 million koruny. Even more serious is the fact that, judging from the results of the first two months of the current year, there is little hope that the situation will improve this year.

"We could estimate in a similar way the waste in all the enterprises in our country. The resulting figures would certainly not be small. . . . It appears that one of the main reasons is violation of standards in production, disregard of the norms set for consumption of material, and in some cases unqualified workers. The common denominator of all these shortcomings is poor workmanship."

our country, only 15 of which worked in 1960, harvesting corn from only 887 hectares. . . . Of 206 beet combines not one has been utilized." One of the reasons for this failure is the time wasted in repairs: "Repairs which could be carried out in 15-20 days at most are being delayed for months." Spare parts were scarce and incorrectly distributed.

Organization, Incentives and Administration

Zhivkov maintained that headway had already been made in improving the organization of labor on the collective farms and providing the peasants with greater incentives. The brigade system had been improved and the piece-work method of remuneration introduced on a wider scale. However, many mistakes and deficiencies remained, he said. Brigades were too large, often consisting of 250 to 400 members, and responsibility too widely dispersed. Tractor field brigades had been created, he said, where conditions were totally inadequate; "many collective farm managers, afraid of lagging behind the others in introducing 'innovations,' have created tractor field brigades with two or three tractors and 500-600 brigade members."

Inadequate attention was also being given to material incentives. In many cases, payment of bonuses had actually declined. On the other hand, Zhivkov noted that cases of overenthusiasm for shifting to the direct guaranteed wage system—now declared the most advanced method of labor remuneration throughout the bloc—were exhibited in some collectives where financial means were not available.

As for the management of the collective farms—no small task now that they have been merged into a total of only 932 farms in the entire country with an average of over 10,000 acres each—Zhivkov's main criticisms were levelled at the restrictions on "intra-collective democracy":

"There are collective farms where no delegate meetings are being held, and if they are held, they are a very rare, exceptional manifestation in the life of the collective."

"In such farms the elementary requirements for the correct organization of meetings are not being observed, delegates are not being elected, and on the day of the meeting trucks are sent to the villages to pick up anyone they meet as a 'delegate.'"

Administrative personnel were said to be too numerous—up to 12 percent of the income available for distribution in the collective was absorbed by these people. In some farms, one out of every 23 persons was not directly engaged in production, and in others the proportion was even worse, one out of every 10 or 15 members. Zhivkov called for a more intensive program for training cadres and technical experts, as well as making sure that those who are trained end up on the farms rather than in offices in the cities.

Key Goal: More Livestock

The repeated attention to increasing livestock production in the Party leader's report underscored the regime's concern with the stagnation, and even decline, in this sector of farming. Zhivkov urged a "decisive struggle" against the slaughtering of cows and stronger support for the private plots of the collective members who own 34.6 percent of the cows, 27.8 percent of the sheep, 33.1 percent of the pigs and 49.6 percent of the poultry. "The task here is that no member's plot should be without a pig, without a sheep, and without a cow in the next few years." (*Rabotnicheskoye Delo* [Sofia], April 14, 15.)

ROMANIA

Party Anniversary Celebrated

The 40th anniversary of the founding of the Romanian Communist Party was accompanied by a propaganda barrage directed at improving the quality of agricultural and industrial products. A "Socialist competition" for quality production was organized throughout the country; the radio and press regularly reported the results of the competitions in various industrial plants. Specific collectives and even individual workers were ridiculed for failing to live up to expectations.

Another way to celebrate the anniversary was to participate in "voluntary work." In this manner the Bucharest women's organization announced that their members had completed this year more than 700,000 hours of "patriotic work." Youth brigades were lauded for their contributions to the voluntary work program, Radio Bucharest (May 2) reporting that in the Arges region alone 1796 brigades for "patriotic" labor have worked more than 500,000 hours since the beginning of 1961.

ALBANIA

"Traitors" Tried

Ten persons accused of espionage were put on trial in Albania on May 16, according to sources in Belgrade. They were accused of conspiring with Yugoslavia, Greece and the United States Sixth Fleet to overthrow the regime. Belgrade also reported that Vice Admiral Temo Sejko, former commander of the Albanian Navy was among the defendants. (*The New York Times*, May 17.) (See also *East Europe*, April, p. 46.)

Texts and Documents

A CATHOLIC DEPUTY IN A COMMUNIST PARLIAMENT

Stanislaw Stomma is the leader of the "Znak group" in the Polish Sejm (Parliament). This is the small group of Catholic deputies—not to be confused with the representatives of the pro-Communist pseudo-Catholic PAX organization—who tend to favor the more libertarian aspects of the Gomulka government while remaining orthodox Catholics devoted to their faith. In the article below, published in the Catholic weekly Tygodnik Powszechny (Cracow) on March 26, he discusses the role of Catholic parliamentarians under a Communist regime.

IN CONNECTION with the elections to the Sejm, I should—as a candidate—present my views to the electorate and I shall do so at various pre-election meetings. In the meanwhile, however, I shall also take advantage of this occasion to express my opinions on the pages of *Tygodnik Powszechny*.

Many people are critical of the fact that I am a candidate for Sejm deputy. They question the effectiveness of former "Znak" deputies running for a second term in office. They say: you exert no influence on the government, therefore, all your social and political efforts must and will remain fiction. There is no need to explain the accuracy of this accusation.

And in order to refute such formulated accusations, as well as thoroughly clarify the entire matter, it is necessary to delve deeply into the problem and outline it in considerable detail. What is it all about? What is the sense of our participation in the Sejm of the Polish People's Republic?

It is of course perfectly obvious that any political goals we might set for ourselves would be pure fiction. Possessed of a sense of reality, we realize full well that we will not influence the policies of the State. But then that is not the point. Besides, according to the Constitution, it is not in the Sejm's province to rule the country. This must be clearly stated.

The Sejm's duty is to legislate and its function is to supervise.

During the last term all legislative activity was concentrated in the Sejm. The issuance of decrees constituted a rarity. New laws assumed the role of statutes passed by the Sejm. Debates on these statutes provided an opportunity for the deputies to voice their opinions. Such will also be the case in the newly elected Sejm and it is of concrete significance.

However, we, the Catholic deputies,

must also remember not to overestimate our roles in this respect. The legislative policies also belong to the Polish United Worker's (Communist) Party and remain under its deliberate control. We, the non-Party deputies—taken individually or in groups—do not have much influence over legislation. Our voice is rather that of advisor. That is why this matter—although an important one—does not constitute the most essential problem when evaluating our role and determining our participation in the Sejm.

The Sejm is also charged with the fulfillment of certain functions of control. This it does in two ways. First, as the national tribunal for formulating public opinion and, second, through the right of intervention and interpellation reserved to individual deputies. These two prerogatives are of great practical significance. And—independently of important political matters—they also give concrete meaning to each deputy's mandate. The last Sejm made this particularly clear. Within the framework of their right to intervene, deputies have free access to all authorities and the right to discuss every matter and obtain explanations. Frequently the deputy is unable to achieve his goal, but the very possibility of submitting each question to the minister and drawing his attention to it is important. As a result, the minister will hear in a relatively short time of a wrong suffered by an ordinary citizen who would have found it extremely difficult to scale the administrative ladder on his own. This, then, is the actual form of control over the authorities.

A similar meaning attaches to the matter of voicing questions during committee meetings where the discussion is always concrete and detailed. In touching upon concrete problems, a deputy informs not only the authorities, but the

other deputies, as well. Speeches at plenary meetings have a different significance. By nature they must have a general and public tone, thus, in a way, assuming the characteristics of facade. They are of considerable importance, however, in that they are a means of shaping public opinion.

Our Sejm is not a parliament of the type found in the political democracies of the West. Its tasks have been conceived differently and its role within the State is different. Our parliament is not an arena for skirmishes between social forces grasping for power. It is, above all, a supervising institution. One must be fully aware of this difference in order to understand the role of the Sejm.

This, without exaggerated phraseology, is the picture of the actual functions of the Sejm. Thus, as we can see, the individual deputy—especially a non-Party man—should not tend to overestimate his role. It would be an error, however, to negate the actually existing significance of the Sejm deputy's mandate.

It seems to me that the above should, to a large extent, constitute a reply to the question why we seek the office of Sejm deputy and consider it our duty to do so. If we are to serve a great ideological cause, the cause of Christian culture, we must serve it as effectively as possible. And it is perfectly obvious that by participating in the activities of the Sejm we greatly increase the effectiveness of our work. Such reasoning must surely be indisputable, although, of course, the practical aspects do not constitute the whole problem. Presence in the Sejm grants certain means of operation. One must only learn how they are to be utilized for the purpose of serving ideological goals.

II

It is not enough to have more or less well-defined ideological convictions and certain possibilities of operating in the public arena. One must know which tasks are relevant to concrete circumstances under given historical conditions. In other words, there is need for an intermediate link between ideology and practical action. It is usually said that one must have a "plan" or "program" of action adapted to the given concrete political situation. This is undoubtedly correct. And yet, I place these words in quotes. In this way I want to point out the inadequacy of their meaning in relation to our situation. It is difficult to talk about this with regard to our group of deputies because we have no influence on the government. That is why I prefer to remain cautious in declaring programs in order not to make announce-

ments in excess of possibilities.

Without announcing programs too hastily, we must, however, clearly outline our position regarding problems which are coming to light. We must understand reality, see the true sense of events, be able to anticipate problems which life will bring and comprehend how we shall have to react to them.

I am presenting the matter thus with full premeditation in order to eliminate all declarations "in excess of possibilities." This does not mean self-limitation to a passive role. One must definitely try to maintain an active attitude and practice initiative in proportion to possibilities. But when we appraise the situation realistically, we realize that we will have to face established facts over which we have no influence. Not speaking of program, we have a duty to speak of attitude. Our past activities have been rather clearly defined. Nevertheless, the coming elections create the need for another summation.

During the last election we were called "positivists." This term awakens certain reservations, nevertheless, it was rather widely accepted. It should not, however, be identified with the positivism of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.

Actually, though, we can use this term, despite certain terminological objections. We can admit that, to a certain degree, our attitude is "positivistic." We interpret this in a very simple way. In this case "positivist" means, more or less, the same thing as constructive. If we were to conduct a public opinion poll throughout Poland on the subject of the people's attitude towards political affairs, I believe we would discover that the overwhelming majority of the nation demands a "constructive" policy. Even the majority of those who criticize and who are in the opposition will be basically "constructive." This means that they wish to change and improve matters constructively, and that they have an aversion to negation and total political struggle.

Aversion to destructive negation is an understandable result of historical experience. For the past several centuries, destruction has raged through Polish territory. We were constantly fighting and destroying and as a result both our civilization and our politics decayed.

In the years of partition, the alien powers artificially retarded national development and sometimes even turned it backwards. Then came the destructive war of 1914-1918. After that the period of 20 years of independence and again the terrible disaster and destruction of

the new war of 1939-1945.

That is why "positivism" is a healthy reaction. "Positivism" is actually "constructivism." The duty of being constructive and creative despite conflicts over ideology, over culture and over various other matters.

We once said in *Tygodnik Powszechny*: we are building a common house. This formula expresses correctly the attitude and the duty which we have set for ourselves.

III

"Positivism," however, does not exhaust the entire matter. Whether we like it or not, problems of great dimensions are now facing us. And if we have an ideological attitude ourselves, then we cannot fail to regard them basically.

Authority and system are never the work of chance. They are the expression of something and the consequence of a certain structure of social forces, of certain historical processes. In Poland, the Socialist system and the power of the Communist camp are the logical and necessary consequences of a chain of events whose first link was the war of 1939-1945.

Great civilizational and political equalizing processes have begun. We are experiencing a great technological revolution fraught with sensational consequences. It is being accompanied by the development of various social processes which had been held back for a long time: the emancipation of the "lower" classes and the liberation of the exploited. The principle: "civilization for everybody" is the leading slogan and postulate of the epoch. It dictates the sense of the transformation, it is the leading directive determining the policy and the economy of the world. Humanity is feverishly searching for a formula to realize this imperative and undisputable demand.

In understanding this, one also finds an explanation for the basic sense of the Socialist system. Socialism is a gigantic attempt of countries previously backward and poor to implement the demand quickly and in a revolutionary manner. On this is based its dynamism.

Socialism has its philosophy, it is materialism. On the basis of this philosophy Marxists are trying to create a new, consistently lay culture. Why, then, should it be strange that this state of affairs leads to situations of conflict with cultural formations which do not recognize materialism? We know these difficulties very well. Ideological controversies do not arise only in philosophy, they reach back into life. This is all true. That is why the

encounter of the Christian cultural structure with the reality of Communism creates an enormous difficulty of confrontation.

And the matter should not be optimistically idealized. The confrontation is a very difficult one.

Yet just this creates a particular responsibility and a particular duty. Responsibility for an intelligent sense of that confrontation. It is necessary to detect its creative meaning.

Objectivism and its far-sightedness should not be lost. There are two great dangers of distorting this attitude. One is opportunism and the desire to pass over difficulties for secondary reasons. The second is general negation. Appreciating social facts from the point of view of our ideology, one cannot overlook the symptoms of dynamism functioning within the Socialist system.

This objectivism should be the basic characteristic of our attitude. This is precisely what we call an open attitude. Only an open attitude allows creative confrontation and should bind us.

I say with deep conviction that to be able to view matters objectively and to have a truly open attitude is the fundamental condition of one's own ideological success. Without it we naturally distort the sense of our own cause. I do not hesitate to say: true objectivism is already a part of ideological victory.

Catholicism is a great traditional force in Poland. It is common knowledge how in the past the Polish spirit and Catholicism became closely connected. This heritage of the past has its value and it is recognized even by the opponents of the Church. And on this factor is based the strength of the so-called people's religiousness.

We consider very highly this great traditional value. We cannot, however, consider it as the main attribute of Catholicism in Poland. While we render our respect to the Polish-Catholic tradition, we cannot see in it the main argument for the defense of the cause of Catholicism in Poland. In the first place, we appeal to the moral strength of the Church.

Catholicism is a transcendent truth, it is a universal phenomenon. We greatly stress its universalism. This outlines for us the sense of the ideological confrontation.

When we speak about the confrontation in our country, we cannot only compare two national phenomena, but also the universal moral value of Christianity with the dynamics of the social transformations within the framework of the

Socialist system.

While venerating the past, one has to turn one's eyes towards the future. The result of the confrontation of old ideas with the new psychological conditions of the industrial civilization of the atomic age will decide the cultural profile of future generations. We are sure that Christianity will pass this test by fire and will prove its value in all political conditions.

But in order to achieve this, the confrontation must take place in completely sterile conditions. For the settlement of accounts one has to bring only the clear idea of Christianity, not burdened by alien charges. Therefore, it is so necessary to see to it scrupulously that additional social-political considerations do not distort the attitude of the Catholics in Poland.

VI

I believe that these remarks outline our

attitude toward the problems of contemporaneity. I think that this is a proper declaration for a candidate to the Sejm. Of course, these are only general lines. However, they will determine the general attitude which will provide directives for all essential matters. Let the people evaluate this attitude.

We are convinced that the situation in Poland is stabilized for a long time to come. Hence, the conviction that one should think in terms of long periods of time. In spite of the difficulties, we are not giving up. New forms of life are being quickly shaped. We are not afraid of the future, because we are choosing a constructive and objective attitude. We accept everything that is good, because we believe that in this way we shall maintain contact with life through participation in the transformations.

The values which we represent and which we love are sometimes called "old." We know that they are both old

and new. They are eternal, but always young. We are fighting for their recognition, for a place for them in the new reality which is taking shape. We fight, revealing their beauty and their moral strength. Conceiving our ideological tasks in this way, we have to be present in this reality. We have to be really present, actively present, not as internal emigres, but as those who are participating in the shaping of our country under the conditions of a new political system. Therefore, we do not avoid responsibility. Hence the decision to stay in the Sejm. We think that in the Polish life which is now taking shape one has to be present. We have decided to do this with full premeditation.

In accordance with the above assumptions, we consider that the adoption of an active attitude is just and is a duty. This applies to all citizens. And therefore, it is the duty of citizens to participate actively in the coming elections.

Eastern Europe Overseas

The East European Satellites have played a little-publicized but important part in the Communist drive to win friends and influence among countries that are not allied to the West. Trade missions, technicians and cultural delegations are in constant movement between the capitals of Eastern Europe and the "uncommitted countries." We give below a summary of the most important contacts made in the last month.

April 6 A mutual cooperation pact on health services between Czechoslovakia and Cuba was signed in Prague. Czechoslovakia will send an organizational expert and a group of epidemiologists to Cuba for a six-month period. (*Lidova Demokracie* [Prague].)

April 11 Czechoslovakia won, in open world competition, a contract with Iraq to provide technical assistance in the construction of a sugar-beet factory in Sulejmania. (*Rude Pravo* [Prague].)

Guinean Minister of Public Health Accar arrived in Czechoslovakia, where he will study the organization of health services and consult officials in various fields of health care. The first group of medical workers from Czechoslovakia went to Guinea in January 1960, followed by another larger group. (CTK [Prague].)

April 15 A Hungarian government delegation arrived

in Ghana to discuss trade, credit, technological, technical aid and cultural agreements. Soviet, Chinese and Polish trade delegations are visiting Ghana simultaneously with the Hungarian delegation. (Radio Budapest.)

The head of the Central Bank of Iraq visited Romania April 6-12, where he toured the oil refinery at Teleajen, the Dobrogea and Galati regions, and the reed combine at Braila. Before leaving, he expressed the conviction that economic, financial, and banking relations between Romania and Iraq can be developed. (*Munca* [Bucharest].)

April 18 The "first Czechoslovak airplane to land on Iranian soil," a five-passenger transport plane, the L 200-Moravia, aroused "an enthusiastic reception among experts" in Iran. (CTK [Prague].)

April 21 A protocol for 1961 on the trade and payments agreement between Czechoslovakia and Tunisia en-

visages a more than 50 percent trade increase over the preceding period. An agreement on scientific and technical cooperation will shortly be signed between the two countries. (Radio Prague.)

Czechoslovak film director B. Safranka and cameraman Jan Spata will leave shortly for Havana to make two films on the life of the Cuban people and to film the traces of the "invasion battles." They will also shoot a film on the installation of the exhibition entitled "Czechoslovakia: Land of Friends" which will be opened in Havana. The Czechoslovak freighter *Republika* is en route with a load of 80 railroad freightcars to be shown at the exhibition. (Prace [Prague].)

April 22 An agreement was signed in Accra between Poland and Ghana for the delivery on credit of complete Polish industrial installations, including sugar cane refineries, distilleries, docks, steel foundries, and coke factories. An agreement was also signed on scientific and technical cooperation between Poland and Ghana. (PAP [Warsaw].)

The Czechoslovak government discussed and approved agreements made between government delegations of Czechoslovakia and Cuba. According to agreements now concluded, Czechoslovakia will build on long-term credit a plant in Cuba for manufacturing tractors, trucks, gasoline engines, motorcycles and scooters. Czechoslovakia will also assist Cuba in developing a power base by delivering six steam power plants. Czechoslovakia will train several hundred Cuban students and technicians in various branches of the national economy. The 1961 volume of trade between Cuba and Czechoslovakia will be 3.5 times that of 1960. (CTK [Prague].)

April 24 A TU 104-A airplane of the Czechoslovak Airlines made its first landing at Pnompenh airport in Cambodia. Regular weekly flights between Prague and Pnompenh begin May 13. (Rude Pravo [Prague].)

April 25 Guinea's first national museum is being established in Conakry with Czechoslovak assistance. Dr. Jan Jelinek, director of the Moravian Museum in Brno, has just returned home from Guinea where he spent three months and travelled some 3,000 miles into the interior of the country for surveys and discoveries. (CTK [Prague].)

A cultural agreement was signed by the Ministers of Education of Afghanistan and Czechoslovakia. (Rude Pravo [Prague].)

Poland and Morocco signed a trade agreement protocol under which Poland will import phosphorus, wool, seaweed, cork, canned fish, etc. from Morocco, and will send machinery and electrical and mechanical equipment, cotton textiles, coal, chemicals, radio sets, etc. (Trybuna Ludu [Warsaw].)

April 26 The first trade and payments agreement between Bulgaria and Cambodia was signed in Cambodia. Bulgaria will export complete plants, machinery, cement, cotton textiles, chemicals, medicines to Cambodia, and will import rice, spices, skins, dried fish and other goods. (Radio Sofia.)

Bulgarian specialists are completing construction of a

dehydrated onion processing plant in upper Egypt. (Radio Sofia.)

April 28 A Dutch ship was loaded in the Bulgarian port of Varna with 2,300 tons of goods—clothing, chemicals—for Cuba. This is the third shipload of Bulgarian goods sent from Varna to Cuba. (Radio Sofia.)

The Czechoslovak trade union delegation visiting Cuba signed an agreement with the Confederation of Cuban Working People for the exchange of labor experts and trade union directives. (CTK [Prague].)

The Belyoannis telecommunication equipment factory in Budapest is now filling an order for a 10,000-line exchange in Damascus. During the next five years the Belyoannis factory will also export 10 million dollars worth of telephone equipment to Cuba. (MTI [Budapest].)

Hungary and Cuba concluded negotiations on the sending of Hungarian experts in the manufacture of medical and pharmaceutical products to assist in the establishment of the Cuban pharmaceutical industry. (Radio Budapest.)

A delegation of the Czechoslovak trade union central Council left for Africa, where they will visit Guinea, Ghana, Morocco and Mali with a view to extending mutual relations with representatives of trade union organizations. (CTK [Prague].)

May 5 The Czechoslovak cultural delegation recently returned from a trip to Asia reported that Czechoslovakia will grant scholarships to Burmese students for university level institutes and fellowships for post-graduate studies. Czechoslovakia has also established scholarships for Cambodian students and will send professors to teach at Cambodian schools. Czechoslovakia will also grant scholarships and send teachers to Indonesia (and also open a cultural center in Jakarta), Ceylon and Afghanistan. (CTK [Prague].)

The General Supervisor of the Slovak Evangelical Churches and the Secretary of the Synodical Council of the Church of Czech Brethren are on a one-month tour of Africa, whose purpose is "to acquaint the Protestant and Orthodox Churches in Senegal, Guinea, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Togo, Ethiopia, the Ivory Coast and Dahomey with the aims of the Christian peace movement." (CTK [Prague].)

May 6 Indonesia and Bulgaria signed an agreement on loans, trade and scientific-technical cooperation. Bulgaria will extend loans totalling 5 million dollars to Indonesia and, under a 3-year agreement, export to it textiles, medicines, building materials, iron and steel, in return for Indonesian rubber, coffee, tea, copra. (Radio Sofia.)

May 7 A five-member delegation of Cuban youth leaders arrived in Warsaw at the invitation of the ZMS Central Committee. It is headed by the chairman of the Association of the Insurgent Youth of Cuba, Major Joel Iglesias. (Radio Warsaw.)

May 8 A Bulgarian government trade delegation left for Afghanistan to negotiate a trade and payments agreement between the two countries. (Radio Sofia.)

Book Notes

Communism, by A. G. Meyer (New York: Random House, 1960, 217 pp., \$1.95). The purpose of this book, 34th in the Random House studies in Political Science, is to provide a scholarly introductory survey of Communism. A brief introduction discusses various meanings of the term "Communism" and various aspects of Communism. The subsequent chapters are devoted to an examination of Marxist theory, the development of Marxism before World War I, the theory and practice of Communism and its relation to Marxism, the history of the Russian Communist Party until Lenin's death, the phases of Soviet rule, and the growth and fate of the Comintern. One chapter presents the official description of the Soviet social system; another examines the actual way of life. A chapter on World Communism after World War II includes, among other things, brief discussions of Communist China, Eastern Europe, Titoism, and the problem of unity and diversity in contemporary Communism.

The closing pages are addressed to the challenge of Communism today and the need to reach "a modern Peace of Westphalia without having to go through the nightmare of a modern Thirty Years' War." Despite its moderate size, the book contains a great deal of ably compressed information. Extensive bibliography.

Russia, America, and the World, by Louis Fischer (New York: Harper & Bros., 1960, 244 pp., \$4.50). Reporter Fischer gives in this book a comprehensive picture of world affairs today and an explanation, in terms of people and places, of foreign policy as it is practiced by the Communist powers and by the West. It includes chapters on The Cold War, Khrushchev, Nehru and the Future of India, Israel and Russia, and the Future of Communism. He writes: "Along the NATO line from Norway to Turkey, American military power has prevented a third world war and will continue to deter. This contributed to the moderation of the political system inside Russia. In the future the United States should be firm without being provocative and conciliatory without retreating." Index.

Marx's Concept of Man, by Erich Fromm (New York: Frederick Ungar Publishing Co., 1961, 260 pp., cloth: \$4.75, paper: \$1.75). The author of *Escape from Freedom* believes that the true philosophical views of Karl Marx are little known, both in the East and the West, and that they have been distorted by partisan writers. The bulk of the volume consists of selected passages from Marx's *Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts*, translated by T. B. Bottomore. In addition there are some excerpts from Marx's other writings and various statements dealing with the person of Marx himself. In an introductory essay, Dr. Fromm emphasizes the philosophical importance of the early writings of Marx, the concept of "alienation," and the humanist inspiration of Marx's thought, which he notes is one of the fundamental sources of recent East European revisionism. He criticizes and opposes the position of those who—both East and West—minimize the significance of the "young Marx" and who see a continuity between Marx's views and the official Soviet ideology.

A Forward Strategy for America, by Robert Strausz-Hupe, William R. Kintner, and Stefan T. Possony (Harper & Bros., 1961, 451 pp., \$5.95). Conceived and developed by members of the Foreign Policy Research Institute at the University of Pennsylvania, this book is a sequel to *Protracted Conflict* which was published in 1959 and which examined the principles and techniques of Communist strategy. In *A Forward Strategy for America* the authors offer a plan for a US strategy in the international struggle with Communism. "The resources of the Free World, both physical and spiritual, far outweigh those of the Communist bloc. If they were fully mobilized, the Communists could not hope to prevail. Yet, the Communists are confident, as the fascists were, that the great Western democracies are doomed by the inexorable laws of history—if not by their propensity for doing too late what need be done." The authors discuss the military, economic, technological, political, cultural, psycho-

logical and diplomatic aspects of US strategy. Specific topics include: suggested revisions in the governmental structure; nuclear and conventional weapons; the need for an expanding economy; the diplomatic corps; the lag in technology; disarmament; arms reduction and control; new programs for Africa, Asia and Latin America. Bibliography, index.

America and the Russo-Finnish War, by Andrew J. Schwartz (Washington, D. C.: Public Affairs Press, 1960, 103 pp., \$3.25). This study examines the nature, the course, and the objectives of American policy toward Finland and the Soviet Union during the years from 1939 to 1944. It gives considerable historical background, describing how Finland succeeded in emancipating itself from Russia after World War I and in maintaining its relative independence during World War II, when both Germany and Russia considered it of great strategic importance. Despite efforts to be neutral, Finland was drawn into war with Russia in the winter of 1939-1940, and again in 1941-1944, and with Germany in the winter of 1944-1945.

"Finland's success in retaining its independence against both aggression and subversion owed much to the United States, which although remaining cautiously aloof during the winter war when American opinion was itself neutralist, continued to assert its friendliness to the little Republic," writes Quincy Wright in his introduction. Index.

Contemporary Political Ideologies, edited by Joseph S. Roucek (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1961, 470 pp., \$10.00). This symposium by twenty-one American specialists surveys the main ideological trends in the world today under such headings as: Variations in Marxism and Neo-Marxism, Sovietism, Chinese Communism, Soviet Russia's Reluctant Satellites, Titoism, British Socialism, Zionism, New Nationalism, Colonialism and Pan-Movements, New Democracies (Germany's Reconstruction, Rejuvenated Italy, Austria's Survival, Japan's Reforms, India's Gandhism) and The American Welfare State. Notes, index.



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